A DISCOURSE OF Government.

WRITTEN
By Sir PHILIP WARWICK *Knight.*

Design'd by him as an Appendix to his MEMOIRS of the Reign of King CHARLES the First.

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THE Publisher TO THE READER.

After so many pamphlets of false and impious Politicks, which have poisoned the minds of people with evil notions of government, tending to the overthrow of all establisht rules and orders of justice, equity, and common

common honeſty, in the acknowledgment and practice of which the happineſs of a nation doth conſiſt, the heat and violence of paſſion being now ſomewhat abated, and perſons more at leiſure to attend to the ſober counſels and dictates of reaſon, it will not, I hope, be judged an ill grounded preſumption, to ſuppoſe, that this diſcourſe written with great ſtrength of reaſon and argument, after long and ſerious deliberation, and a deep reſearch into the fundamental and eſſential laws of humane nature, and the conſtitution of the Engliſh government, and done ſeveral years ſince, without any prejudice, or partiality, or deſign to gratify a private paſſion or intereſt, will meet with a reception and entertainment, ſuitable to the great name of the Au-

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performance among all such, as have learning and skill to judge, and candor and honesty to submit to the power and convictions of truth. For as to the disciples and followers of Buchanan, Hobbs, and Milton, who have exceeded their Masters in downright impudence, scurrility, and lying, and the new modellers of Commonwealths, who under a zealous pretense of securing the rights of a fansied original contract against the encroachments of Monarchs, are sowing the seeds of eternal disagreements, confusions, and bloody wars throughout the world (for the influence of evil principles hath no bounds, but like infectious air spreads every where) the peaceable, sober, truly Christian, and Church-of-England-Doctrine, contained in this book, being so directly contrary to their furious, mad, un-

christian, and fanatical maxims, it cannot otherwise be expected, but that they will soon be alarmed, and betake themselves to their usual arts of slander and reviling, and grow very fierce and clamorous upon it. Whatever shall happen, it is not out of a design to caress and flatter one Party, or to provoke and exasperate another, that this book is at this time published, but to do service unto truth, and to restore it to its native beauty, by taking off those masks and disguises, with which it has of late been disfigured, and to settle mens minds with true notions of the original of government. For discourses of this nature, founded upon law and reason, will hold at all times, and will never be unseasonable.

I shall not run out into any unnecessary or excessive commendation and praise of the Author, nor do I now pretend to write his just and full character; it may suffice to say in short, that he was a Gentleman of sincere piety, of strict morals, of a great and vast understanding, and of a very solid judgment; a true Son of the Church of England, and consequently a zealous asserter and defender of the truly Christian and Apostolical doctrine of non-resistence; always loyal and faithful to the King, his Master, in the worst of times, whose fortunes he steadily followed, and upon whom he had the honour to attend in several places, during the course of the wars, particularly at Edge-hill, Oxford, and at the treaty in the Isle of Wight; and who by his wise conduct, and faithful advice and behaviour,

behaviour, gained a good esteem in his royal judgment: and yet at the same time he was a true hearted English-man; a great lover of his Country; and one, who wished as well to the constitution, and to the established religion and laws, as any of those demure Pretenders, who sat in the same Parliament of forty one with him, and raised that rebellion against their rightful Soveraign, as he openly called it in the House of Commons after the restoration, when some were making excuses for it, from which we are to date all the miseries and confusions, which we have undergone, and do still labour under. A reflexion upon those sad times, and the villainous principles, upon which they then acted, put him upon writing this compendious discourse, in which he has markt out a plain and certain

tain way to preſerve, and, when loſt by fatal miſcarriages, to recover our peace and happineſs together with the honour, the ſtrength, the riches, the trade of the Nation. The notions here laid down, are true and juſt, and tend to the quiet and advantage of mankind in general, and have their weight and uſe in all Countries, where the laws of natural and civil juſtice prevail. It is an exact Scheme or Idea of government, derived from its firſt principles, in which he ſets forth the neceſſary and eſſential powers of Soveraignty, the virtues of a Prince, the indiſpenſable duty of Subjects, the qualifications of a Counſellor of State, and the method of a wiſe adminiſtration and conduct in all emergencies, whether in relation to domeſtick or foreign affairs, or to the various conditions and profeſſions of

men

men in a well conſtituted kingdom. This great Man, after his retiring into the Country, where he ſeemed to live above the world, and to be no way affected with the glittering pomp and glory of it, which he with a true greatneſs of mind deſpiſed, addicted himſelf to reading, ſtudy, and meditation: and that ſo many ſerious and wiſe thoughts, as his certainly were, might not be wholly loſt, he put them down in writing, for his own private ſatisfaction, in a due method and order, one depending upon another, to give them greater ſtrength and beauty: and being very aſſiduous in his contemplations (if not diverted by the neceſſary buſineſs of life, by viſits of friends, by journies to town, for two or three months in the year, to attend upon a place, which was his firſt preferment

preferment in the Court, and by the exercises of an undissembled piety and devotion) he had an opportunity of writing several quires of paper upon various subjects, (for his admirable and inquisitive genius was not confined to any one particular study and learning) as Divinity, Philosophy, History, especially that of England, Practical Devotion, and the like. This I now publish, was written in the year 1678, (and designed as an appendix to his Memoires of the reign of King Charles the first, of most blessed memory, which hereafter may see the light, when more auspicious times shall encourage and favour the publication) which he, being very exact and curious in his compositions, did often refine upon. Yet notwithstanding this care, there seems to be a defect, page 13, which he designed

designed to fill up, and questionless did it, as I find by a reference made there to some loose paper, which I could never meet with. But however as it is, I doubt not, but that this discourse will be highly instructive and useful to the young Sons of the Nobility and Gentry, the growing hopes of their Country, and who one day by their virtue, courage, loyalty, wisdom, and learning, befitting their birth and quality, will make a great figure in it: for the seasoning of whose minds, capable of the highest and noblest impressions, with virtuous and true notions of Policy, and for their direction and service, it is chiefly published, and to whom therefore it is humbly dedicated.

The

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PAg. 29. l. 29. *Person.* p. 89. l. 29. *make, is* p. 80. l. 23. *were.* p. 121. l. 13. *reckoned.* 139. l. 21. *recommend.* 149. l. 12. *justice is.* 146. l. ult. *prescribe.* 154. l. 7. *condition: for.* 164. l. 1. *prompter.* 172. l. *that is a:* in the margin there for *civil* read *single.* 193. l. 13. *take.* 206. l. 20. for *too* read *two.*

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OF

OF Government;

As examined by *Reason*, *Scripture*, AND *Law* of the *Land*.

Government as examined by reason.

GOD and nature made men sociable creatures, which appears by this, that every man affects a companion; which arises from this, that every single man stands in need of anothers help. Men could not have liv'd together in a body politick, if God had not disposed the natural inclinations of their minds for such a society; and the same reason, that leads them to co-habit together, exacted from them the preferring publick good before private interest, or the whole before any part; so as government is an ordinance of God, and not an invention of man, and arises not,

as Mr. *Hobbs* would make it, from the paſſion of fear, which one man had of another, but from the moral virtue of juſtice, to do as one would be done unto.

This makes the politick body ſo much to reſemble the natural. The brain muſt be diſtinguiſht from the heart, and the heart from the liver. If one part give life, another muſt ſenſe, and a third nutrition. The underſtanding, or Prince, (or ſoveraign power) muſt give the law, and the animal ſpirits (or Nobility) muſt influence the nerves or inſtruments of motion thro' the whole body or ſubordinate Officers, to ſet on work the muſcles or organical members, or Commonalty, to perform the ſeveral offices, which belong to the ſeveral faculties of the ſoul of government. But we will not follow affectedly metaphors or reſemblances, which only ſerve for illuſtration, but not for proof.

The Object of Government ſtands in

The

The Object of Government stands in

- Persons
  - Ruling, are
    - Either Supream, — Whether supremacy lies in one or more persons. Here rule or government is absolute, arbitrary, and uncontroulable, yet with an eye and duty to publick-weal, or *salus populi*, and an accountableness to God.
    - Or Subordinate, — Magistrates, under him or them, in whom the supremacy is lodged. These do rule by the Soveraigns commission, the powers whereof they are not to exceed, and they are accountable for the execution thereof, not to God only, but man likewise.
  - Ruled, are the
    - People in general, *viz.*
    - 1. Nobility, { Ecclesiastical, Civil.
    - 2. Gentry,
    - 3. Commons.
    - The three states of men, which among us make up a Parliament, and are united to the King or Supream, as members with their head. They represent the whole body of that people unto the King, but the King is the true representative of the people to all the world.
  - The Soveraign, The three Estates, The People themselves } the { Virtual, Representative, Essential } Body of the Nation.
- Things
  - Prerogatives are in defence of the Government it self, and of the Soveraign Person, and to be made use of in both cases.
  - Laws, Civil or Municipal, for securing the { Lives, Liberties, Properties, *&c.* } of the Subject.
  - Thus, *Ad Cæsarem potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos proprietas.*
  - Matters
    - Divine, { 1 Religion.
    - Civil, as { 2 Justice. 3 Council. 4 Commerce. 5 Confederation. 6 Treasure.
    - Military, { 7 Arms by { Sea & Land.
    - The seven great sinews, or pillars, or nerves of Government.

Government and Governors.

Government and Governors are both Gods ordinances: for though He himself was the sole Legislator in all those matters, which concerned mans ultimate happiness; yet he left men by the light of their own natural reason, to make such laws, as concern'd their civil interests, or their concerns of this life, as natural reason dictated unto them. And because no society could be formed and kept together, but by equal and just laws, nor those laws executed but by some Persons, therefore both laws and Governors were made sacred; the one to be observed, and the other to be reverenced; and therefore God owns both, and puts an impression of part of his own honor, both on humane laws and Soveraign Persons, though both these may be infirm and failing; for Princes or Soveraigns may err, as well in making laws, (or in their judgments about them) as in the execution of them, or in their own manners. And therefore God obliged Princes to be well advised about making laws, and as nigh as they could, to follow sound reason, and the best precedents, and to do all with deliberation and good advice, and with an eye to publick utility.

Nevertheless, because these concerns were but about matters of an indifferent

rent nature, and that coming under ſo many divers circumſtances, it often puzled a ſincere and a wiſe Governor what to ordain, and the narrowneſs of mens underſtandings often making that (whilſt the buſineſs was in councel or agitation) appear beſt, which as ſoon as perfected, was often diſcerned not to be ſo, and ſo wiſdom and ſincerity (though not likely ſo groſly, or ſo often) might fail in councel, as well as folly and negligence: therefore he ſtampt his own authority both upon human laws and Governors, thereby to keep them both from being diſputed. And upon this ground it was, that laws were by the ſame authority that made them, to be revoked or repealed. Thus the human authority, from whence theſe laws flowed, ſilenced all private judgment, and became indiſputable, there being nothing to be put in the ballance with it: it being only the prerogative of God's Laws to be entertained for their own excellency, mens for the authority or ſtation they were in. Otherwiſe all Government had been precarious, or ſubjected ſo to change, as to be unſteady or endleſs, and ſo uſeleſs. This every maſter of a family ſhall find, if he give way to his wife, children, and ſervants to diſpute his commands, much

The reverence due unto authority.

more then a Lord or Soveraign over a whole nation. And this ſhould make every maſter of a family as careful to keep up the honor of his Prince in his great family, as he would his own in his little family.

Soveraignty muſt be abſolute and arbitrary.

Soveraignty therefore was by divine ordinance made both arbitrary and unqueſtionable; elſe it could never have anſwered the true ends of government. Divine wiſdom therefore neceſſarily armed (even in behalf of the governed) the ſupream Governors with theſe powers following.

The powers of ſoveraignty, or the prerogatives of it.

Firſt, A power, though not to preſcribe a religion, (for God had done that) yet to protect it, and to look unto the good adminiſtration of it: ſo as natural piety were cheriſht, and God's word or revelations (ſuch as every nation eſteemed ſo at leaſt) were reverenced, and by publick authority maintained: and thus far every ſtate or government, as well Gentile as Jew, have intereſted themſelves in matters of religion.

Secondly, A power to make laws, or ſuch as related to the civil concerns, or good and ſafety of that people.

Thirdly, A power to maintain all ſoveraign prerogatives, which were neceſſarily lodged in the Soveraign, in main-

maintenance of his own authority: for in vain had been the firſt two, if there had been no proviſion made for the laſt. For if Innovators and Conſpirators might act ſecurely, and Government be undermined, and Governors expoſed, private mens peace would ſoon be overthrown, and new laws, and new governors frequently obtruded upon them: therefore every one was bound with life and fortune, to defend the prerogatives of the Government he lived under, as much as the municipal laws, by which he was maintained in his life, liberty, and property.

Fourthly, A power to pardon the breach of laws; ſince mercy adorns the throne as well as juſtice, and no hand is to hold forth this ſcepter, but his, who holds the ſword, that ſo the Soveraign might be as well loved as feared.

Fifthly, A power to execute the penalties of the laws: that thus authority might be feared for its power, as it was to be beloved for its clemency.

And the forfeiture or advantage, that accrued by the penalty, (if pecuniary) was anſwerable to the Exchequer, ſince the offence was againſt the Government.

Sixthly, A power to diſpenſe with laws: for circumſtances often make this power equitable, in relation to times as well as perſons, who may ſtand in need of, or merit ſuch diſpenſations.

Seventhly, A power of equity was neceſſarily entruſted with Soveraigns, becauſe there would be often occaſion to abate the ſeverity of laws; for if extremities in contracts and penalties in laws ſhould be always taken, laws would often be ſnares, and often too burthenſome to be born.

Eighthly, A power to ſtamp monies, or to appoint ſome one thing, which ſhould be the ſtandard unto all Commodities, or which ſhould equal the value of them.

Which is a great evidence of Soveraignty; ſince here is a power, that in a Prince's own dominions (and upon ſuch conjunctures of times, as may be, when ſuch a power, even for want of treaſure, and for common ſafety, may require it) he can appoint this ſtandard to be of an inferior value to the thing it is changed for; the authority of the Prince making that valuable among buyers and ſellers at home, (though not abroad) which anſwers not to the intrinſick value of the thing bought.

Ninth,

Ninthly, A power to raiſe tribute, cuſtoms, and taxes for the ſupport of the government, *viz.* the expences and ſplendor of a Court, the guards of a Prince, the fortifications by land, and navies by ſea, and expences of Ambaſſadors *&c.* For all theſe muſt be maintained by a publick treaſure, which muſt ariſe from ſingle mens private wealth, which proves property; for if ſingle men had no property, there could be no ſuch diſtinction, as private wealth and publick treaſure.

Tenthly, A power to call together Aſſemblies and Synods, and to diſſolve them; ſo as no men in numbers (becauſe danger may ariſe to the peace thereby) have in any well ordered State liberty to meet together, but as warranted thereunto by authority, leaſt multitudes ſhould tumultuate or innovate, and bring petitions on their ſpears head, or make private judgment ſtand in competition with publick authority.

Eleventhly, A power to create a Nobility, the Prince being the fountain of all honor; as likewiſe to make all Miniſters of State at home, as great Officers, Judges, Councellors, and all ſubordinate Magiſtrates; for ſupream power muſt be the root of all other powers and of all titles. And it muſt be but

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one in it ſelf; for power, that is to preſerve peace, is capable of no rivalſhip or co-ordination; for that would diſtract obedience at home and abroad; for no foreign nation can entertain treaties with any other nation, whoſe ſoveraignty or ſingleneſs of power appears with uncertainty, where it is lodged. So as co-ordination is inconſiſtent with all kinds of Government; for two of equal powers, ſince they may be of divers minds, muſt diſtract, cannot ſettle, or make peaceable any government.

Twelfthly, A power of ſending Ambaſſadors unto foreign Princes; the Ambaſſadors office being to repreſent the Prince, as the Prince doth his whole nation. And by this means commerce about trade, leagues offenſive and defenſive are made with other nations.

Laſtly, A power of making war and peace; for it is fit, that none judge of the proper reaſons and ſeaſons for theſe great engagements, but that Perſon, (or thoſe perſons) in whom the ſupremacy and ſoveraignty is lodged. Princes are prudent, when they obſerve the bent and inclination of their people, in affairs even of this great conſequence: but ſubjects invade the Princes right, when they intermingle herein more than humbly ſhewing their ſentiment of it.

Theſe

Theſe are the neceſſary qualifications of all kind of Soveraignty, and theſe are called prerogatives, or regal powers; for no Kingdom, Common-weal, or State can want theſe; and theſe powers muſt be lodged in one, or ſelect perſons, and ſo the Government and the Governors ſtand both by the order of God, or by his divine inſtitution.

Now to acknowledge ſupream Governors, and yet to undermine them in theſe rights, is a ſubtil part of diſloyalty; for give them a great title, and no power to determine the moſt important concerns of it, or not to diſpenſe rewards and puniſhments, and they will ſoon be reputed but as idols, be firſt deſpiſed, and then dethroned. How they may herein be limited, unto the end, that he or they may the more deliberately execute theſe powers, ſhall be ſhewed hereafter.

Theſe powers the Prince or State (nay the people) if they underſtood their own concern, are as much bound to defend, as they are the municipal laws of the land, made in behalf of themſelves: for prerogatives are to be kept as ſacred as laws. One is to defend the government, the other the ſubjects under the government. One ought to be as truly made uſe of for the ſafety and utility of

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the whole body of the people, as the other for particular men; for true publick safety was the mother of all royal prerogative, and *Salus populi suprema lex.*

Sovereign persons.

Thus we see these powers, to the end they may be executed, must be lodged in persons; and no Government can want these powers or persons: so as whoever invades either of them, overthrows all government, or disables it to provide for the safety of the people, or body politick.

If the powers be lodged in one person, then the form of Government is called } Monarchy.

If in a few chief or choice men } Aristocracy.

If in all the people, it is a } Democracy.

Deviations from these are termed } Tyranny. Oligarchy. Ochlocracy.

For my own part, I cannot believe that there can be any such kind of government as pure Democracy; for if the supream power be lodged in the whole people, then they are both governors and governed, and many absurdities will follow, as will be shewed hereafter.

All

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Hence it is, that God made paternal power the foundation of all civil government. And hence it is, that moſt reaſoning men agree, that Monarchical government is beſt ſuiting with God's ordinance, and the benefit of ſociety; for even *Ariſtotle*, bred in and amongſt Republicks, allows Monarchy, as the fitteſt organ for the ſoul of government to work by, as through its unity leſs ſubject to diviſions, and as fitteſt for ſecreſie and expedition: and being hereditary, not elective, it is agreed freeſt from faction, or laying wait for changes, or bribing for voices, which are unavoidable and dangerous in all popular elections; ſo as it may be ſaid, by all theſe natural advantages, God inſtituted Monarchy, and permits only the other forms.

Paternal power.

Monarchy the beſt form of government.

When paternal government ceas't, that is to ſay, when the *Communis ſtirps*, or firſt parent, was grown through collateral lines not to be readily known, or to be come at; and that genealogies and relations were not exactly kept, and that mixt Families were numerouſly joyned together, and when large Colonies were ſent to plant void countries, then

How paternal government ceaſt, and the people to have a hand in the election.

then choice was made of some eminent man to be a Leader, or Duke, or Guide, or Prince, or whatever they would call him; (or of some *Optimates*, or chief men, or *Sanhedrim*, or what form best pleased) to go in and out before this people, or to exercise soveraign power. Thus the people, who had no hand in the government (for that was purely God's ordinance) came at last, when paternal government ceast, to have a power of consent in the disposing and lodging the Government by one or more persons. Hence it is, that government is called by one Apostle, *the ordinance of God*, and by another, *the ordinance of man*; for power is originally from God in the abstract and substance of it; though in the concrete or specification, or in respect of circumstances thereunto belonging, (as whether the title be King or common-weal, the jurisdiction limited or absolute) from men; which in effect is the true exposition or reconciliation of the two great Apostles. But be the form what it will, the last appeal must be soveraign, and must have power to exercise all the beforementioned marks of soveraignty: or else the government must be imperfect; for government must be absolute, and the quality of absolute rule is such,

says

ſays *Tacitus*, that it can ſtand but in one alone.

However, though he, that aſſumed this power without conſent, was an Uſurper, yet when the power was once lodged or diſpoſed by conſent or ſubmiſſion, it could not be reaſſumed; for tho' the people ſubmitted their own necks, yet they gave not the government: for the government by an undiſcernible providence, when the form is agreed on, is to be aſſigned to God. And it appears to belong to him, ſince the eſſential part of it, *viz.* the power of life and death belongs ſingly to him; for no man hath power over his own life, and therefore he cannot give it to another. His wiſdom therefore thought not fit to truſt the giddineſs of the people in general, with a matter of ſuch concern, even unto their own peace and welfare; for often changes, which they would have affected, would have been more pernicious to the good of ſociety than moderate, nay, immoderate preſſures. Hence it was even in order to publick-weal, that ſoveraign authority, and his, or their Perſons, that execute it, was ſet above all private judgment to avoid diſputes.

Why Princes were not queſtionable.

The ſoveraign power, by conſent once lodged in one or many, for the ſame

ſame reaſon is not reaſſumable; for we ſee originally, that power was never, or could ever be, lodged in the diffuſive body of the people, who had not a power over their own lives, and ſo could leſs have it over others; for government was no humane invention, but Gods ordinance. When people firſt elected their Governor, we may ſay it anſwered unto Gods providence; when by rebellion or defection they changed him, it was his permiſſion; for when a people demerit of him, he withſtands not their intangling themſelves, and ſcratching themſelves with their own briars. So as when the form of government is once ſetled, the poſterity or ſucceſſors of that People are bound by the conſent and choice of their Fore-fathers, becauſe they are reputed to live in their Predeceſſors, and their Predeceſſors are ſaid to be alive in them. And thus, when providence, in the place of natural governors or parents, introduced civil, the whole diffuſive body of the governed were to be (in this reſpect of change of their form of government) reputed in the ſtate of wives or of children, or minors; for though the one might have choſen, whether ſhe would have diſpoſed her ſelf to ſuch a man to be her husband, yet having done

A people under government are in the ſtate of { *Wives* / *Wards.*

done it, ſhe was always under his Subjection, as the Heir is during his minority to his Guardian. Yet both husband and guardian, ought to do all right to their charge, and Courts there are to relieve both, as God's throne or court is to relieve Subjects.

Hence likewiſe it is, that Princes are not to be reſiſted by Subjects, and both Philoſophical light and Politick ſerve to diſcern this as well as Divine light; for ſays moral Epictetus, *We are not tyed to Parents and Governors, as they are good, but as they are Parents and Governors*; and deep ſighted Tacitus ſays, *good Princes are to be wiſht and prayed for, bad* (or whatever they proved) *to be endured*; and he gives the reaſon for it; *for ill Princes are to be endured as we do ſtorms and tempeſts*, which are ſhowred down upon us from above, or from Providence which hath an hand in giving, and an eye to obſerve, how we entertain his providences. Thus God required non-reſiſtance in order to Subjects own good; for anarchy was worſe than tyranny; and yet at the ſame time, if the Princes command was immoral, he enjoyned non-obedience, that men might prefer the eternal law, which flowed from Gods goodneſs before the poſitive or temporary command, which flowed from mans unreaſonableneſs.

Whose Trustees Soveraigns are.

Hence likewise it appears, that men are not to think, because Princes or States are trusted for them, or appointed for their good, therefore they are conditional Trustees to them: for those, in whom the Soveraign power is lodged, are *Gods Trustees*, and therefore to God only they are to answer for their trust.

Nor is a Prince less than his people, because he was trusted either by or for them, and even by Gods appointment is to minister to them for their good; for the same reason would make Angels lesser than men, because Angels are Gods Ministers for the good of men.

However, primarily the Prince or State are trusted for the good of Subjects; for they are set over men, as the Sun is over the world, to enlighten and influence it, and they shall be accountable for it; but secondarily, they are intrusted to maintain the dignity and rights of their own Regal power, and not to let every humor of the people disable them to govern, by pulling from them the feathers of their prerogatives.

This subjection, which God requires, is no unreasonable thing; for we perceive, it is but a suffering in matters of mens external concerns; for as hath been said, Governors authorities extend but unto matters

ters of an indifferent nature, and it is often pride and impatience, which produce complaints. Which may appear by this, that moſt commonly, when the times are moſt plentiful, and the grievances very tolerable, then delicacy of ſenſe renders men moſt querulous, and their ſufferings are begot more from their inferences and reaſonings of what may follow, than what they feel; ſo as they muſt be beholding to their wit, before they can juſtifie their complaints. Reflect on the reign of Charles the Firſt, as I have impartially made ſome *Memoires* upon it, and this will be found true. Thus much for the ſingleneſs of Government, and the non-reſiſtance of Governors.

But it is objected, Is it not more reaſonable to have a co-ordinate power joyned with that of the Prince?

No ſure; for no Government can admit a diſtinct equal power within it ſelf; for this is but like the doctrine of Polytheiſm; for making many Gods and many Soveraigns, are equally abſurd. Co-ordination is like to prove the mother of a civil War. However, limitation of Soveraignty is agreed on by all Politicians and Civilians, to be conſiſtent even with Soveraignty it ſelf; for hereby Soveraignty is not taken from the Perſon or Perſons

Co-ordination conſidered.

Limitation of Soveraignty excluded.

governing, tho' to him or them the abſoluteneſs of the execution for ſome time, or in ſome part of their Soveraign power (as not to make Laws without their three States or Orders of Subjects, viz. *Nobility*, *Clergy*, and *Commons* conſent) be ſuſpended; for hereby the power is not transferred unto any other. So he or they remain abſolute, tho' limited; for thus as he or they cannot make laws without another, ſo no other body can make them without him or them. And when a law is made, it is made ſingly by the Prince, if it be in a Monarchy; or by the State, if it be in an Ariſtocracy; for a limited (which we call a mixt) Monarchy, or a mixt common-weal, is, in ſuch caſes, but like a man, that is bound, or a man that is ſleeping; he hath temporarily loſt his motion, but not his ſtrength; for as ſoon as he hath the concurrence of thoſe, whoſe conſent he ſtipulated to take, then he is unbound or awakened, and then he or they, not the Concurrers, are ſaid to act ſolely and ſoveraignly; for the power is virtually in his or their perſons in whom the ſoveraignty lies; for it is the Monarchs or the States affirmative voice, that makes the law or ſanction, though it is his or their negative voice, that rejects it. Thus the Soveraign Perſon or Perſons,

is

is the ſingle ſoul of the law, and all this to avoid the ill conſequences of co-ordination. And hence it is, that the true Repreſentative of any people is the Prince in a Monarchy, or the States in a Common-weal; and from him or them there is no appeal but unto God, and wherever the laſt appeal is, there is the Soveraignty. And therefore the people abate of their own greatneſs, when they think any repreſent them, but their Prince or State. Others may repreſent them, in order to repreſent their condition good or bad to the Prince, as a looking-glaſs doth repreſent the body to the heads view; but as bearing their image both at home and abroad, the Prince only repreſents the State of that people. An unequal league with the Foreigner takes not off ſupream power. Thucydides ſays, *Colonies were as free as Mother cities, tho' not ſo reverently mentioned, becauſe of their dependence.* The ſame may be ſaid of paying tribute, becauſe that may be for redeeming an injury, or for ſome acknowledgment of a deliverance, but that paid, it is all that can be demanded. Neither is feudal obligation any deprivation of Soveraignty, ſince that is but a perſonal obligation or ſervice, but gives no right to his Government who is bound to this obſervance.

Thus careful Civilians and Politicians are to keep Soveraignty ſacred, tho' by ſuch ties, as theſe, it may appear reſtrained.

But leaſt ſome ſhould grumble at God for giving theſe great powers unto Princes and States, who are but frail men, in Gods behalf we will ſum up the reaſons uſually given for it. 1. God requires the Princes to rule for the good of their Subjects. 2. If they do not, he denounces himſelf a Revenger. 3. He requires obedience and non-reſiſtance, to prevent Civil diſſentions, which are uſually worſe than tyranny; for Tyrants uſually extend not their oppreſſion upon a whole Nation, but upon ſome particular perſons they are diſpleaſed with, whilſt Civil war, or popular commotions, ſpread over the whole land, and amongſt nigh Relations. And if Subjects may reſiſt for any one reaſon, from a parity of reaſon, which they will allege, they will never want a reaſon. 4. That God often experiments, whether Subjects will depend upon his promiſes, to reſtrain the fierceneſs of Princes, or on their own impatient humors and violences; or whether by an humble patience, they will wait his time for redreſs; ſince what men cannot reſiſt at one time, they find they may divert at another. 5. He ſubjects People to thoſe preſſures, beeauſe they

they deſerve ſuch a ſcourge, as an ill Prince, for being themſelves ſo diſobedient to himſelf; or, *6thly*, becauſe very often they force a well natured Prince to be an ill one: as *Boccalini* ſays, the ſheep getting into their own mouths to the danger of the Shepherd the dogs teeth, or becauſe like the Neapolitan horſe, if they be well dreſt and fed, they will endure no Rider. Laſtly, becauſe a Princes tyranny can but reach unto the outward man, and to the outward things of the man, which Gods wiſe Providence in this world often expoſes to wean men from it, and to draw them to expect their ultimate happineſs or reſt in another World.

To whoſe tribunal he ſtands bound.

Thus tho' a bad as well as a good Prince be thus ſecured by God, God hath not aſſured him, but he will puniſh him, even by permitting an ill Spirit to riſe betwixt him and his People, and ſo it is Gods ſentence on the Prince, tho' a judgment or puniſhment on them both; on him, for violating the natural rights of his ſubjects, and for breach of his obligation or oath unto them, that he would govern them by their laws, and be careful of them both in their lives and liberties. For, ſays *Boccalini*, God made not Princes and Subjects as he did cats and mice, one to catch the other, and for a time to play with them,

Why God often permits ſubjects to be rebellious.

and then to eat them up; for natural, civil, and divine right, teaches the head to conſult for the good of the body, and the body readily to obey the head. In a word, tho' oppreſſion makes a wiſe man mad, yet no provocation can warrant a Chriſtian ſubject to be a rebel.

Thus far we may ſay, this Queſtion about Government and the nature and end of Soveraignty, is examined ſingly by natural reaſon or reaſoning. Next, let us enquire after it by the word of God, and after that particularly by our own National laws.

The

The ſame things examined by Scripture or Gods word, and as expounded by our own Church.

NO conſtitution of Government can be ſo happily framed, as by its ſingle fabrick, to ſecure the peace of a Nation; elſe ſurely God's Theocracy among the Jews, and paternal Government among the Patriarchs, and Kings of Judah, would have prevented all complaints. When divine as well as prophane Hiſtory ſhall be conſulted, it will be found, Policy is like Morality, and may be much improved by theſe two words and precepts, *Suſtine & abſtine.* For the Prince muſt abſtain from violence and rapine, and neither for his pleaſures nor ambition, may he ſuffer himſelf to prey on his people. And often he muſt bear with, or ſuſtain their perverſe or froward humors, leſt unſeaſonably ſtirring them, he make a fermentation he cannot quiet. And ſubjects will find, that the bleſſing of Government flows more from their paſſive obedience, than from any over nice care of their liberties; for

Soveraignty and Non-reſiſtance proved by Scripture.

for *impatience of Subjects has overthrown more States than the Tyranny of Princes*, as will be toucht on hereafter; and moſt commonly *God will not ſend a people good Governors, when they will not fit themſelves to bear ill ones.* It was therefore not only the wiſdom, but the goodneſs of God towards Subjects, that he made Soveraign Perſons only anſwerable to himſelf. All other ways are (as Hoſea ſays) *ſetting up of Kings, but not by him*; or his Oeconomy pleaſes them not; and therefore they eat ſowre grapes (or frame to themſelves falſe principles) and their teeth are ſet on edge, or they deſtroy the peace they hunt after; for the Politick body like the Natural, that will endure no ail, but have recourſe to phyſick, will ſoon purge it ſelf out of the world. But nothing of this, that is ſaid, infers, that men ſhould not defend the rights of free born Subjects, but that they defend them in their proper place or judicatures of the land, and not by the ſword.

But he that gave a law to every ſpecies of creatures, gave one to mankind, which man leſs exactly obſerves, by reaſon of the freedom of his will, and by reaſon of his lapſt nature. But from the law of his nature, or from the Moral law, the beſt Judicial law is framed, which may

may be found by obſerving, how this law among Gods own people, the Iſraelites, ſuits with the Moral law, given to, or for all Mankind; but at preſent we will extend this no further, than to perſons ruling or Legiſlators, and obſerve, what characters God in his Word puts upon them, and how he fences them from reſiſtance, and how he ties all Commonalties to them by obedience; for throughout all Scripture, Kings are ſaid not to reign over perſons but Nations; therefore called *King of Iſrael, Judah,* &c. *and Head of the Tribes of Iſrael,* ſo of all States under him.

Scripture ſets forth, how the firſt man was born under Government as God's Subject; how all his poſterity were under him, and conſequently how Paternal Government was the original of all Government, and ſo all Mankind born under Government; and therefore the precept of honoring Fathers (or Parents) being a Moral precept, it is a proof, that Government is founded in nature, and was by extraction, and not conſent. How paternal Government ceaſt, hath been already ſet forth. Nimrod by Sir Water Rawleigh is eſteemed a *Hunter* or *Uſurper,* becauſe he took upon him the Government over others without their conſent or voluntary ſubmiſſion *Paternal Government.*

ſubmiſſion or choice; not that he was an ill Prince.

And in Scripture the ſanction or reward, that is propoſed for performing this duty, ſhews the benefit of obedience; for it is, *that thy days may be long in the land, which the Lord thy God ſhall give thee*; for obedience of inferiors (as hath been likewiſe obſerved) is the moſt probable way to peace, and peace unto a Societies welfare. Hence it is, that men are ſo ſtrictly charged to reverence their Governors, and Governors to look upon themſelves as *Miniſters of God for good*, and as *Revengers to execute wrath upon him that doth evil*; ſo as his power muſt be no terror to good works, but employed for *the good and praiſe* (or encouragement) *of thoſe that do well.*

When the Governor was not a natural Father, to the end that he might not want natural affection unto his people, if the people wanted one, they were not to chooſe a Stranger; but ſuch a one, as Moſes and Joſhua, Samuel and Saul, and David, or whom God appointed. See Deut. 17. where the promiſe of a Prince and virtues of a Prince are ſet forth, and ſo Kingly rule a bleſſing, and promiſe of God to his People from the beginning.

The

The Prince muſt have humility, that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren. He muſt *not multiply to himſelf horſes*, leaſt power incline him to be oppreſſive. He muſt *not give his ſtrength to women*; for effeminacy abates courage and induſtry, and ſoftens and deſtroys him. And *Solomon* adds another caution, *Let him not drink wine*, (i. e. to exceſs) *leſt he forget Gods law*, or neglect Religion, *and pervert judgment*; for both theſe make him lither or wretchleſs, and unfit for the hardſhips and difficulties of Government. Nor muſt he *encreaſe Riches*, i. e. for his own private treaſure, or by the making his People miſerable and poor, make himſelf opulent, that he may the more ſecurely tyrannize. But rich he muſt be, ſince the ambition of Neighbours is at one time or another likely to diſturb his Peace; and ſince the conſtant charge, and contingent expences of Governors is like to be ſo great, therefore a full Exchequer becomes a good, as well as a wiſe and a politick Prince. Laſtly, Though human Policy muſt be uſed in human affairs, and that it appears too too hard, to expect the ſame ſtrictneſs of morality in a King's Office, which belongs to his perſons, as a man, (which is too hard a task for one no better verſt in both theſe two Sciences than my

Scripture directions for a King.

my self, to give the limits unto) this may be said, that the Prince is obliged, since Politicks flow from Ethicks, as nigh as possibly he can, to suit his Policies with good Morals, or rather, that he frame them out of (at least never contrary unto) the Word of God; for this will make him truly worship his God, and best teach him how to demean himself with men, or how to govern himself, either in relation to his forreign or home Affairs. Not that there are such rules given in God's Word, but that *a Prince's Policies should not warrant any thing that Word forbids, but rather cast himself on Providence.*

Such delineations of a Prince, as these are, will convince men, that not only Government, but Governors are the ordinance of God; for *by me*, says God, *Kings raign*, which Nebuchadnezzar acknowledges, when he says to Daniel, *Your God is a God of Gods, and a Lord of Kings, and he rules in the Kingdoms of the earth, and gives it to whomsoever he will, and sets up over it* (i. e. whenever a people provoke him to send them that curse) *the baseſt of men*; or as Hosea may seem to explain it, they cast off his Government for Governments that men have framed, for, say they, *give us a King like the other Nations*, or let us cast off King Charles the first for a Cromwell,

or

or Chriſt for a Barrabbas. Thus people will ſometimes ſet up a King, but not by God; yea, and pull down a King to their own confuſion: which God divert them from doing any more.

But that they may not thus miſchief themſelves, God's Word deſcribes a King's power by his character. *A King, againſt whom there is no riſing.* And what is ſaid of a King, is ſaid of all Soveraign Perſons, be they one or more, a Monarchy, or an Ariſtocracy, a Kingdom or a Common-weal; for if Subjects, upon diſcontents and diſſatisfactions, might change their ſetled form of Government, the politick Body, like his Natural, that is always giving Phyſick to himſelf, would be ſurely purged out of its ſetled peace, and probably into its grave: ſo as *Solomon* was very wiſe, and ſpake as well to the States of a Land, as unto particular perſons, when he ſaid, *Meddle not with thoſe, who are given to change*, &c.

Fear God therefore, and *honour the King*, and *curſe not the King*, i. e. ſpeak not evil of him, or in diſcourſe revile him. Remember, he is thy Politick Parent; go backward therefore, and cover his nakedneſs. Shimei's curſing was but revilings. Cut not off ſo much as the lap of his garment, or approach him not with a prophane tongue,

tongue, or hand, as if he were not the Lord's Anointed, for he cannot be innocent, that lessens his dignity, or clouds his Majesty. No, do not this *in thine heart*, or *in thy bed-chamber*; no, *nor mingle with those, that are given to changes*; for *their calamities shall rise suddenly*, or a *Bird*, some small or unlook'd-for accident, shall betray thy conspiracy, or, *who knows the ruine of them?* or it shall fall upon them by some providential accident, and their ruine shall be as swift, as their plots were secret: for if God's Word, in case of oppression, direct men to cry unto him for relief, and not to cry, *unto your Tents, O Israel*; what is our resistance, but to cast off our dependance on God's providence, and to have recourse unto the Witch of Endor, or our own impatience: or like an injured man, that will not let the Judge give sentence, nor the Hang-man execute him, that robb'd him, but he will do both offices himself? *Rebellion therefore is like the sin of Witchcraft*: it removes its dependance on God's Providence, and flies, as has been said, to an ill Spirit, or its own disobedient and vindicative humor.

There is no distinction betwcen the King's person and his power.

Nor must men subtilize by distinguishing betwixt the power and the person; for that Apostle, who says, *Be not afraid of the Power*, expounds it by the Person, *for he is appointed*

by

by God, &c. Thus a King's Perſon and his Power cannot be ſeparate, though they may be diſtinguiſhed; or his authority may be, where his Perſon is not, but never his authority can be wanting, where his Perſon is. Whoever therefore will not do the law of God, (written in God's book, nor of the King, written in his ſtatutes) *let Judgment be executed upon him, whither it be unto death, or baniſhment, or confiſcation, or impriſonment.* And if this command comes from Artaxerxes by Ezra, he would not have ſet it down, but as it was warrantable to execute. Nay, the people of Iſrael themſelves ſay as much to Joſhuah, *Whoſoever reſiſts thy commandments, and will not hearken to thy word*, (or Legiſlative power) *he ſhall be put to death; for whatever thou commandeſt, we will do, and where-ever thou ſendeſt us, we will go. Only the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moſes*; or be careful to rule thy ſelf by God's law, as we will be to rule our ſelves by thine, or contrary not thou thy will eſtabliſhed by a law, by ſome ſudden or paſſionate reſolve.

Yet, as hath been obſerved before, though God hath reſerved Princes for his own Tribunal, yet he hath ſhewn by ſeveral inſtances in Scripture, very particularly in that of Abimelech, and the men of

God, who is the ſingle puniſher of Prince's faults, yet permits as a ſcourge of his Subjects, and Subjects ſometimes to be a ſcourge to their Prince.

Shechem, that he often makes Subjects (by permitting it, for it is ever evil in the Subject) to become ſcourges to their Princes, and both to work each others ruine. As a ſcourge to David, he lets the greateſt part of Iſrael riſe againſt him, and follow his rebellious ſon Abſalom; and it was of the Lord, (by his permiſſion) that nine Tribes and a half forſook Rehoboam, and followed Jeroboam for Solomons idolatry.

However, our great Maſter, born King of the world, acknowledgeth himſelf in his humanity, born a Subject to Auguſtus and Tiberius, and doth a miracle to pay a tribute, and *gives to Cæſar the things that are Cæſar's*, (outward obedience and obſervance in matters of a ſecular and indifferent nature) and acknowledges the power of Pontius Pilate over his life, and will not call for the Legions of Angels, as he could, to defend him: nor doth his Apoſtles tread in other ſteps, or teach other doctrine. Yet doth not all this ſecurity authorize a Prince to be arbitrary or tyrannous; for God proclaims himſelf an Avenger; nor doth his Word afford ſuch Princes any other appellation, than that of a Bear, or of a Lion.

When Nebuchadnezzar would have had his golden Image worſhipped, what is the anſwer,

anſwer, Not, let us reſiſt, but, *Pardon us in this, O king. Non eſt noſtri juris peccare, pati eſt. Tyrannus cum titulo* is, or may be God's Anointed; *Tyrannus ſine titulo* is an Uſurper, and is to be looked on ſo, by all thoſe, who were born under, or had taken oaths of allegiance to a dethroned Prince. Thus Athaliah was deſtroyed to reſtore Joaſh, and perſonally Joaſh proved afterwards not much better than ſhe was; however, in him was preſerved the ſeed of David.

Now Princes in their ſtate of Sovereignty (as our Prince in Parliament) are ſaid to be above the laws, becauſe they may change, abrogate, and diſpenſe with them, not, becauſe when it pleaſes them, they may violate them. If they judge the change conduces unto publick good, they are ſuperior to their laws: but if they remove a law to ſatisfie a paſſion, or take off a reſtraint from themſelves, or like Nebuchadnezzar, will be deifying themſelves, they may puniſh their Subjects for not obeying thoſe laws, but God will puniſh them, for abuſe of their office; and other remedy the Subjects, by the law of God, have none; but by the falſe reaſonings of a Junius Brutus, and a Buchanan, they have many. So as Subjects adventure not only their peace, but their ſalvation for their

rebellion. Rebellion is not a ſingle ſin, but complicates them. It diſquiets a whole Nation, makes great thoughts of heart; no man ſits under his own vine. It involves the innocent in the miſery, tho' not in the guilt, and tyrannizes over Fellow-ſubjects, over whom they have no juſt power or right. The Ship-money, determined by law, (though probably with all its circumſtances not warranted ſo) was far from a juſtification of arms; but rather than indure a Monopoly or a Loan, a Civil War muſt give licenſe for plunder unto the Soldiers of both parties. With ſo Chriſtian a King, as Charles the firſt was, had his two Houſes been of the ſame temper; or had they not had a malicious and ſhort-ſighted policy to alter the whole frame of Government; how eaſily, both before the war was begun, and after the ſword was blooded, might they have compoſed all things ſuitable to God's laws, and the laws of the Nation? But theſe men made themſelves Slaves to their Slaves, becauſe they would not be loyal Subjects to their Prince. It is one thing for a Senate (and certainly an honeſt one, and a dutiful one) to repreſent grievances, and to withhold Supplies upon no redreſs of grievances, (but there is nothing a grievance properly, which violates no law in being)

ing) but it is rebellion to take up Arms upon ſuch pretences.

As Moſes and Chriſt taught this ſubjection, ſo we ſee both their doctrines differed not from what right reaſon makes true Policy; for obſerve, whether the Græcians caſting off the tyranny of Monarchy, or undermining an Ariſtocracy to ſet up a Democracy, or ſupplanting that with an Oligarchy, or caſting off all theſe for a ſelect 400, or an uſurping 30 Tyrants, bettered their condition, or whether it was not more fatal to them, than the arbitrarineſs of any one, or any few ſelect perſons. *How ruinous to a people affecting new forms of Government is.*

Hence Moſes, Chriſt, and reaſon, muſt needs have prevailed with the Apoſtles, rather to endure the tyranny of the worſt of Princes, under whom they lived, (even Nero) than have quitted their ſound doctrine, *Let every ſoul be ſubject to the higher Powers.*

And as the Apoſtles did, ſo did their Succeſſors, the primitive Biſhops, who willingly became Martyrs rather than rebels. He that would ſatisfie himſelf herein, let him but read Tertullian's Apology, and he will find, it was not weakneſs, or want of courage, but ſtrength of faith, that kept the primitive Chriſtians quiet under the perſecution of the moſt bloody Heathen Emperors. *How loyal the primitive Chriſtians were.*

But we have lived to read false Teachers, that make the doctrine of resistance a new light; which light, is a light that leads to darkness, setting up the passions of the multitude to be their own guides, and their own ruine.

The Romish doctrine of Subjection.

Our great Adversary, the present Church of *Rome*, contrary to St. Paul's doctrine to the same, *Romans the thirteenth*, makes Princes hold their scepters of, and Subjects their allegiance to her. And the Scotch Presbytery, with their Lay-interpreter Buchanan, *De Jure regni apud Scotos*, and Junius Brutus subject Princes to the People; (for which there is as much warrant in Scripture, for Presbyters to Lord it over Princes, as for the Pope.) And so these serpents, casting their tails into their mouths, make extreams meet.

Calvins.

But judicious Calvin, however biassed, was convinced of the unwarrantableness by Scripture of such doctrines; therefore about the latter end of his Institutions, determines against resistance of Soveraign Princes: though he leaves a gap in his strong hedge, limiting what he had laid down, rather to every single man in a State, than to such orders of men, as are called the States of a Kingdom; for unto these he will neither give warrant (because in no Christian State now is there such

ſuch a conſtitution as were thoſe of the Ephori, Demarchi, or Tribunes of the People in Athens, Sparta, and Rome) nor yet doth he make a reſolution againſt them.

Luther, who when the Boors or Peaſants in Germany were tumultuouſly reforming themſelves, and caſting off their Prince's authority, diſclaims their proceedings; *I have ever*, ſays he, *from the beginning, taught ſubjection, and abhorred all ſedition, exhorted to obedience to the higher Powers. Yea, even to bear with tyranny and wicked government; though I perceive, that the war is managed on both ſides with an evil conſcience, as Governors to ſettle tyranny, and People to gain their deſires by ſedition.* Yet even this happy Inſtrument of Reformation made this faint reply to ſome Lawyers, who preſt upon him, that the laws of the Nation in ſome caſes permitted of reſiſtance, *that he would not ſay, that the Goſpel did impugne or diſſolve, or aboliſh the politick laws of the Land.* Which certainly it doth not; for the Goſpel at the ſame time obliges the King, when it reſtrains the Subjects from reſiſtance, but ſtill it warrants not reſiſtance.

Luthers.

Sleidans Commentaries.

Whilſt the Church of England, with Moſes, Chriſt, the Apoſtles, and the primitive Church, countenances no tyranny

The Church of England,

in the Prince, nor allows any resistance in the Subject; nor recommends any stupid insensibility to them; for she allows their orderly and not terrifying way of petitioning; nay, in the Courts, and before the Judges appointed for it, she bids them defend themselves; she bids them not give up their right, but she forbids them to maintain it by force. She secures not the Prince; the subject will not rise against him, since God, being singly and properly his Revenger, may, and often doth make the subjects disloyalty his rod for tyranny; and so as both offend, he will punish both, *viz.* the one by the other. This Church with what sound reason doth, (on which all sound Politicks are built) and what our own Laws assert, resolves, all single persons are forbid resistance; and then farther resolves all Orders or States of men in a Politick body, be the Government Monarchical or Aristocratical, *&c.* are but as single men in respect of the Head or Soveraign power, for even these in respect of him or them are to be reputed, even in their Politick Body, but as single or private men, so can no more resist the soveraign person or persons than a private man. This I believe to be Apostolick doctrine. And this the Recognitions made to our own Kings in Acts of Parliament warrant us to say. Now

Now a Prince, that is thus secured in his Temporals by his own Church, or by the Christian faith in relation to this doctrine, had need give some very good account of the advantage he makes in his Spirituals by removing from this communion: but I am assured his loss is equal in both.

Government examined by the Law of the Land.

IF this be the nature of Government in general, and of Soveraign Persons, to whom Government is intrusted, let us in the next place examine, how the Laws of this our own Nation determine the cases. *What the law of England requires about subjection.*

We all know, that our Government is a mixt Monarchy, and yet by all Foreigners (as Bodin, Grotius, and others) is reputed an absolute Monarchy; for limitations, which transfer not the power unto any other, but require only the consent of some other, divest it not of the title of Monarchy, or of the Kings being an absolute, tho' not an arbitrary Monarch, as hath been endeavoured to be proved in the foregoing sheets. Our

Our Laws say then, that

Axioms of Law. All Persons are under the King, and the King under none; or *omnis sub Rege, & ipse sub nullo.*

He hath no Peer in his Kingdom, nor any Superior but God; or, *Satis ei erit, quod Dominum habet ultorem*; then no Judge over him.

Allegiance sworn to him, not only by single men, but by the three Estates. *Allegiance* is to be sworn to him, and homage paid, not only by every single person through the Kingdom, but by every single member of his two Houses of Parliament; for not one of them can sit there, before he hath taken the oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy; and he that reads either of these oaths, needs not seek, where the Soveraignty is lodged. And tho' these oaths were formed principally to disclaim Papal jurisdiction, yet that abated, they are but the old Legal oath of obedience. Nay, the three States of Subjects in the Kingdom, *viz.* Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, as a politick body, make the same recognition. See the recognitions made to the ancient Kings; even the Saxons, and those to Edward 4. Henry 7. and Henry 8. Q. Elisabeth, and especially to King James. *Great*

Great (ſay they to him in an Act of Parliament) *are our bleſſings by uniting the two ancient Kingdoms, or rather the two Imperial crowns,* &c. *and upon the knees of our hearts we agnize our moſt conſtant faith, obedience, and loyalty, to your Majeſty and your Royal Progeny.* And in this high Court of Parliament, where all the whole body of the Realm, and every particular member thereof, either in perſon or by repreſentation, (upon their own elections) are by the laws of this Realm deemed to be perſonally preſent.

Sir Edward Coke obſerves by the laws of King Alfred, as well as by thoſe of the Conqueror, the ancient Kings, who were Saxons, had all the lands of England in demeaſnes; (*Inſt.* fol. 58.) and the Barons and Lords of Mannors were by the Conqueror enfeoft with all, which the King held not, but they held it for defence of the Realm under the King, and conſequently, they were to ſupport it in time of danger. This evidenced the Conqueror had ſeized the whole land by way of conqueſt. So as the King was the grand Lord, or Lord paramount, and the Nobility and Gentry but the mean Lords, and all the reſt held in vaſſalage under the King or them. Freeholders came in by the Nobilities ill husbandry, and by their ſelling

selling part of their land, and enfranchizing of it. But still the land was held by some tenure, which obliged the Owner, Lord, or Commoner, more or less, (as in Capite or free Soccage after the conquest) for the defence of the land; for indeed that is the ground-work of all society. For every man is naturally bound with his All to defend the body Politick, and the constitution of the Government; tho' the quotum, and the manner of the raising it, had the Subjects consent, that it might be the more equally laid, and the more cheerfully paid, and the more orderly levied, and as an evidence, the Government was not despotical, but the people free, and yet thus under subjection.

The limitations of the Kings prerogative.

The raising of money or taxes is one of those particulars, wherein our Monarch is limited, for he cannot raise money upon the Subject, but by his Commons, and with the consent of the Lords, or by concurrence of them both; yet the Commons can raise no money but to give unto the King, or as the King accepts it for such a use.

Which is conviction enough, that all the taxes of the long Parliament were illegal, and their power an usurpation.

Many other instances there are of the Kings single Supremacy; but without mentioning

tioning more, (for all are embowell'd in these few) we will conclude with Sir H. Spelmans assertion in his Glossarium, *Omnis Regni justitia solius Regis est.*

In the next place, we will consider him in a Parliament, and here his prerogative is unlimited, or he is in his Zenith, or he is entirely Soveraign; for here the purse and the sword are joyned together. Here, or with consent of his Lords and Commons, he makes what laws he finds necessary for publick weal; which are the two great cases, wherein Monarchical prerogative is limited; for lives and liberties are secured to Subjects by the Common and Statute Laws of the Realm; for we are a free People, or we know the Law we walk by. And yet in Parliament, (in matters wherein the publick safety is concerned, or the Princes Person) a new Law may declare, that a treason, which before that new law was not so. But complication of Acts, which were known before, and acknowledged of an inferior species to treason, before the making such a law, cannot be made treason by that law, tho' the person for them may suffer as a Traytor. *The Monarchy absolute in Parliament.*

The great Act of Treason says, nothing should be accounted treason, which was not therein particularly named; yet all this

this caution was to exclude inferior Courts from ſo denominating it, but not the King in Parliament. Indeed here prerogative is unlimited, becauſe here whatever is determined, may juſtly be ſuppoſed well weighed, and ſo provided, as it may not entrench upon liberty in general; tho' for example ſake, it fall ſevere on an individual Perſon. But if a Prince be here importuned, nay violated, or his Houſes advices be preſt upon him by rabbles or multitudes of Plebeians, this is as great a crime in that Body towards him, as any fault could be in the perſon thus brought to judgment, becauſe of the danger in its precedent; ſince a Prince may as well force the conſent of his two Houſes by an Army, to declare whom he pleaſes a Traytor, as they can him by multitudes and numbers of the meaneſt Tradeſmen, to make laws of any kind. This was a caſe, which God grant may never be drawn into example; for our judicious Hiſtorian *Daniel* ſays, *Where the Prince and States of a Kingdom watch the neceſſities of each other, that they may obtain their ſeveral ends, and make advantages, the true intereſt of the Nation is loſt; and as this proceeding is unjuſt, and not ſincere, ſo it is ever unſucceſsful.* The Prætors edict ſays, *Quod vi factum eſt, ratum non habebo.* And Bartolus hereupon ſays,

Spiritus

Spiritus Sanctus posuit hec verba in ore Prætoris.

Parliaments are called by the Kings Writ, and are adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved at the Kings pleasure; and his death dissolves them without any further signification. Which shews, how intirely they depend on his Soveraignty, and on his Person.

No Member of it hath priviledge of Parliament for treason, felony, or breach of peace.

The two Houses are to act suitable to the call of his Writ. The Commons are called *ad faciendum* or *consentiendum*, or to perform and consent; the Nobles to treat and give counsel, or *colloquium & tractatum habere*; and they are called, not for all, but for some (or such as he shall please to communicate to them) of his affairs; tho' when they meet, they have liberty to represent any grievance, which properly is a violation of any law; for that cannot properly be called a grievance, which is no breach of a law in being. And here they may represent, what they suppose would tend to publick utility, submitting it to the Royal pleasure. In a word, the Houses may propose, but it is the King, that determines; for he accepts or rejects, and what he accepts is only a law, and his

law

law only; for his Houſes pray a law, but he enacts it; for authority muſt be ſingle, and therefore our laws call him *the beginning, head, and end of a Parliament,* which ſurely excludes all pretence to co-ordination.

It is never called the *high Court of Parliament,* but with reference to his *Royal preſence.* It is true, it is the higheſt Court of Judicature, becauſe hither men may appeal from all inferior Courts of Weſtminſter-Hall; but whether they may here begin original proceſs, is inquirable. In this ſenſe it is called the Court of Parliament, but not the high Court of Parliament; for the Lords Houſe is a Court of Record, and can adminiſter oaths and fine, *&c.* And it is called the Court of Parliament, when the Lords and Commons joyn in an order; but thus never to the Houſe of Commons ſingly, for they can adminiſter no oath, nor fine, nor impriſon, but their own Members, or they may for violation of their own priviledges, commit to their own Serjeant a Forreigner, who hath violated their priviledges. This is ſaid not to diminiſh their ancient and juſt juriſdiction, nor to leſſen the great uſe of them, but to keep each Court within its bounds, which is truly to preſerve the general peace and welfare of the Nation.

In

In this high Court of Parliament the King meets with his three States of the Realm, *viz.* Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, and Commons.

The necessity of a good intelligence betwixt the King and his two houses of Parliament.

To have a good intelligence with this Body of men, surely is one of the greatest policies a Prince can shew; for by them he is best represented unto his people. The supplies they give Him, are best paid, when granted by them. Here appears the good constitution of Government, or that harmonious Justice (as Bodin calls it) of a State, where every order of men see themselves represented, as members of the Politick Body, or have a value put on them; or thus, they are not excluded from having an interest in the State. These are the men who walk the perambulations of the Government, and part of whose charge is to keep the true and old boundaries and land-marks of the State, and not to set up new; or who are to guard prerogative, priviledge, and liberty; so as none of them intrench upon the other; for Subjects wound themselves as much as

they do their Prince, when they invade his prerogatives. And if the people were capable of judging, they would find, as the Government cannot want in some measure, and in some things an arbitrary Power, so when this for some time hath been wrested out of the Prince's hand, it hath been more oppressive upon them in their hands than His.

The usefulness and unavoidableness of arbitrary prerogative.

It is a piece of ignorance to think, because a decision is arbitrary, therefore it is unjust; for cases, that cannot be foreseen, or that come seldom, and clothed with divers circumstances, or fall under no certain rule, or are of great import or danger, and can stay for no formal council (all these) must have an expedite determination, but still as just a one, and as conform to right reason as may be; for reason of State is to warrant no injustice. Nor can it be limited unto strict forms or process of Law; therefore say the Civilians, *Jus privatum versatur, quia reddendo cuique quod suum est versatur, & eo quod normæ æqualitatis & justitiæ congruat.* This therefore must be steddy and unalterable, and where it is so preserved, Subjects are happy; for the known laws preserve their own lives, liberties and properties; and the written and known laws are the Standards of all these. But to prevent attempts against

Wherein prerogative is exercised.

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the Government and Governors, and in order to the safety of the people, prerogatives or extraordinary powers were never wanting, and for these reasons only laws were subjected to prerogatives, and no wise people ever grudged it: for unreasonable attempts are often perfected, or a Prince assassinated, or a State everted, before formalities of law can be pursued or satisfied; the Government therefore and the Governors must have their security, as well as private men. And better men be terrified from coming nigh the bounds of this mount, than admitted with safety to approach it so nigh, that they may project a hope to perfect that, which they would venture lives, and all they had, if they saw but a fair possibility to effect. Hence it is, that we say, *Jus publicum legum convenientiam & aptitudinem semper expedit, sed non semper æquitatem*; but this is not to be wrested, or made a patronage for any tyrannical action. Princes ought to be as morally just as private men, but under another law; for what will protect one, will not the other; reason of State should never be made a pretence. Thus we see private Law moves by a standing and formal rule of strict justice, publick by a rule of reason and equity: neither by injustice, oppression, or passion, for all design,

sign, or revenge against any particular man. In Subjects therefore, especially in those Representatives of the Subjects in general, there ought not to be an indifferency to uphold the State and the chief Governor; for attempts upon these are like some diseases in the natural body, they must be early suspected, and soon taken in hand; for if deferred until an ordinary judgment can discern them, the wisest Physician will not be able to cure them. Suetonius, in the life of Domitian bewails Princes condition, *Quibus de conjuratione comperta, non creditur nisi occisis.* A State may die of an apoplexy as well as a private man. Government, like a tortoise, must keep its constituent parts under its hard shell, or every child's foot (or the most inconsiderable body) will hurt its tender limbs.

The choice of Parliament men.

Persons therefore sent as the Peoples Representatives, ought to be chosen out of that number of men, which understand and love the Government setled, or as Aristotle says, *Ut ea pars sit potior, quæ rempublicam sanam esse vellet, quam ea, quæ nollet,* or who affect not changes, or who are not popular Orators, with ambitious hearts, designing brains, and smooth tongues, and who would be Ephori, Curators, or Tridunes, or King-Controulers: who

who are apt to propoſe violent remedies, or make phyſick more pernicious than the diſeaſe; of whom it may be ſaid, as was ſaid of Sylla, *Patriam durioribus remediis quam pericula erant ſanavit.* Such men as theſe are apter to make remonſtrances to the People, than reaſonable repreſentations to a Prince. And our late Hiſtory of Charles the firſt will ſhew their temper; for they, even after they were victorious over the King, upon the ſtairs of their own Senate-houſe, wounded and bruiſed their Soldiers, many of their fellow Subjects, and thoſe who lived in their own quarters, for no other reaſon, than that they petitioned them to make a peace with him. Examine their own Records, what prerogatives theſe men uſed over their fellow Subjects, and there will be little occaſion to complain of the cruelty, even of a Henry 8. They that teach a multitude to reſort to their own ſtrength againſt their Prince, will live (as London did) to ſee their own cannon or ordnance by their own Army, turned upon themſelves, which they mounted to keep out their Prince. But this ſad example terrifies neither ſide, not the one, from occaſions of jealouſie about religion or property, nor the other, from entertaining again the the ſpirit of ſchiſm and rebellion. But

ariſe, O Lord, and compoſe our diſtractions. Thus if you ask what is a wiſe man (or a people) without liberty, or *quid Cato ſine libertate*? You may live to anſwer, What is liberty without a Cato, or *quid libertas ſine Catone*. Tacitus makes mention of a Sect, who brought forth the *Tuberones* and the *Favonians*, unpleaſing names to the ancient Common-weal, who to overthrow the State (ſays he) pretended Liberty; but if they had overthrown it, they would have given an aſſault to have overthrown liberty likewiſe. And he commends in another place the good counſel of Sanguinius Maximus, a Conſul, who deſired the Senators not to encreaſe the Emperor's cares, by hunting after matters of diſlike. The wiſdom of our Government makes it an axiome, *The King can do no injury*, therefore no provocation juſtifies force againſt him. His Miniſters are anſwerable to the laws; He is exempt, and all this for the Subjects peace. The ſtates of a land ſhould never repreſent the grievances of the land by Microſcopes; for ſuch magnifying glaſſes do but exaſperate the humors of the whole body, and diſcourage the Prince from giving remedies; for when a Prince diſcerns a willingneſs in ſuch a body not to miſunderſtand him, it is the beſt way to procure a good under-

ſtanding with him. Wiſe men ſhould reflect on the unavoidable errors or diſorders in their own families, before they ſhould aggravate or lay too naked (eſpecially to thoſe that cannot cure them) the failures of a Government. Nor is it excuſe for theſe *Zealot-Stateſmen* to ſay, they act with good intentions to the publick; for miſtakes of judgment may plead both with God and man for a mitigation of the puniſhment of the offence, but never for a juſtification of an evil or illegal act. Thus Nations are often overthrown by impatience; ſo dangerous is an overdoing Reformation: but a wiſe Senate makes a happy people, and a glorious Prince, by conſidering States, like as they do men, or that they are beſt, not who have no failures, but who have feweſt.

There are times, when men are more willing to caſt off the form of Government, than the Governor: and ſuch deſigns are with moſt difficulty withſtood.

Thus we ſee Government (or rather the juſtice of it) is founded upon the law of Nature, ſecured by the Word of God, and defended by the Laws of the land. But we have a great Apoſtle of this Age, or a learned and ſtrong preſumptuous brained *Leviathan*, who not founding it upon nature, makes it ariſe from neceſſity and

Government how founded.

Mr. Hobbs conſidered.

fear: thus making the Government and the Governor rather the brat of a miſerable and frighted people, than the ordinance of God; ſo weakning the nature or original of Government, and yet one while making the Governor ſuch a *Leviathan*, that no ſingle Perſon, or body of men, is to reſiſt him; for he ſo exalts him, that he may ſet up what Idol or vain opinions he will for a Religion, and all his Subjects are bound to entertain it, and no other: and no man upon any occaſion to riſe againſt him. And yet at laſt if they do, and preuail, he finds means to juſtifie them. Thus he can blow hot and cold, and we muſt all ſubmit to his dogma's, or be a fooliſh generation. But many good pens have made remarks upon him, that were it not to frame a little Scheme, principally for my ſelf, I would not meddle with him at all.

How Mr. Hobbs makes the paſſions, and not the moral vertues the foundation of Government.

His Arguments run thus. Government aroſe upon neceſſity, and upon the fear one man had of another's power, every man by birth having an equal right unto every thing. So the natural condition of mankind was a State of war or hoſtility with one another. Now this is very ſtrange, that this learned man ſhould not conſider, if wolves and vultures (the fierceſt beaſts and birds of prey) will not

not act thus upon their own kind; if nature, (which we may believe is this Gentleman's God) framed theſe wild creatures calm to one another; how ſhe ſhould come to be ſuch a Step-dame to mankind. And if this Gentleman perceives man's ſoul endued with moral virtues, as well as natural paſſions, why ſhould he make Government ariſe from the concupiſcible paſſion of deſire, and the iraſcible of fear, and not from the cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, juſtice and fortitude, with humanity and veracity? Do not theſe moral virtues evidence, that men were created not only for a harmleſs, but a beneficial Society? And doth not the neceſſity, which man hath of help, in relation to his body, ſhew he was not framed to live alone? And in relation to his mind, doth not temperance reſtrain deſire, and fortitude repreſs fear? How doth temperance fit him to be contented with a little, and ſo make needleſs the invading the rights of others? How doth juſtice regulate his actions towards other men, and ſo ſecure them from any violence from Him? How doth humanity make him apt to relieve anothers neceſſities, as juſtice did to preſerve his rights? How doth his veracity ſecure another in his converſation with him? Nor did art or policy beget theſe virtues in man-

mankind or nature, but a God of nature implanted it in humane nature. And can this Gentleman believe, that the diſorders that flowed from injuſtice, were the mother of juſtice? though it was often the mother of good civil laws againſt particularized acts of injuſtice. Injuſtice would not have been perceived, but as it was a deflection from natural juſtice; or why doth he ſay, every man naturally, upon the fear he had of every other man, was againſt every other man? which made it reaſonable for every man to ſecure himſelf by way of anticipation (i. e. as I conceive, without any other provocation or injury, but his own fear) by force and wiles to maſter all others, till he ſaw no other power great enough to endanger him. His Maſter *Thucydides* ſets forth much of this, but allows not the practice. If this be not prodigy, I know not what is; for if this be true, we will repeat it again. What a ſtep-mother is Nature, (for we will not now talk of a God, or intelligent mind diſtinct from, and antecedent to all viſible beings, or of inviſible powers, which ſeem to him but as ſcarr-crows ſet up to fright fearful and ignorant men) who made this kind of creature, Man, miſerable, by its primier deſignation and

yet

yet by or upon experience of his own misery, how came a man reasonable enough by law and penalties to find a means lodged in himself to divert the evil, which nature had subjected him unto? Thus the effect seems superior to the cause; for if man can thus excel his own nature, how comes it about, that other creatures cannot do the like? or how comes man to be wiser by submitting his own understanding and strength to a Governors, to provide better for himself than Nature did? Did Nature produce him to a state of war, and he find out the benefit of Society in peace? Pray then, why should not a horse do the like, and find he was turned out of the orchyard, where was long grass, into the barren Common, for cropping the trees? Or why should not bees and wasps make leagues together, and one give some of their honey to avoid hostility? By all this we see how fatal it is for men of strong natural parts and good literature, to entertain false principles; and how false principles about Nature produce falser about policy. Judge Hales hath convinced this Gentleman in his Origination of Mankind in point of natural Philosophy; and the Lord Chancellor Hyde hath done it as well about his Politicks; and Dr. Parker in his Ecclesiastical Policy, hath shewed the

If Mr. Hobbs way of stating this question be true, the creature is wiser than the Creator.

the absurdity of this Gentleman's opinion about Religion and Civil Policy; and therefore I will rather give men warning of him than enter farther the lists; or I would not farther fall upon one, whom so many others have attackt so masterfully, and with success.

God made Government his own ordinance, and made Governors owe their Authority to him; for it is *by him that Princes reign*; for *Promotion neither comes from the East, nor from the West, for it is God that sets up one, and pulls down another.* He cloathed them with power and majesty, as the necessary supports of all Government; for without these no personal virtues of the Prince would be able to support him, or with a heady and mistaking multitude to gain that obedience, which Government cannot be without.

God vested Government with power and majesty.

Power therefore is singly lodged in him (or them,) in whom the Soveraignty is lodged. And if there be no Soveraignty, or a power, from which there is no appeal, there is no Government; for the rights of Soveraignty must be uncontroulable. If God himself were not omnipotent, men would not be guided by his wisdom; for we see men questioning his decrees every day, not content with his justice; for how many disrelish his determination of not re-

Power.

sisting

ſiſting evil Governors, tho' it were made in behalf of themſelves, as the beſt means to ſecure their common peace and publick intereſt? A great part of the office of a Governor is to reward and puniſh; yet herein, if power fenced it not, every one would ſhare with his Prince, or diſpenſe theſe themſelves, and become Judges, or give ſentence (nay be Executioners too) in their own caſes. Where rewards and puniſhments are not well diſpens'd, loyalty and faithfulneſs will both quit a Court. And Boccalini makes thoſe virtues rather to retire to a Dog-kennel, than return thither; for that creature, ſays he, hath ſome gratitude and ſenſe of being well uſed; and therefore theſe virtues quitted the Court, and went thither. Thus the diſpenſing rewards and puniſhments being ſo eminent a branch of a Princes power, he ſhould truſt it in no hand to diſtribute but his own. All natures, (but Gods) wanting ſomewhat, are moved or attracted by rewards, and deterred by puniſhments; for puniſhments were added unto laws, that whom conſcience would not reſtrain, preſent pain and loſs might.

Multitude of ſubjects in ſome one, or ſome nigh Countries, is a foundation of greater greatneſs than largeneſs of diſperſt dominion. This hath enabled France to ruin Spain. Majeſty

Majesty. Majesty is but the glory of power reflected, or it is a result of the amplitude of greatness, directed to bring awe and reverence towards authority; for Majesty is but a seeming pageantry, when power upholds it not, and where every one can approach it without respect; for, says the Politicians, *Majestas major é longinquo*; for when a Prince by some unseeming familiarity of some Favorite abates or lets fall his own Majesty, every one that thinks as well of himself, as the Prince doth of the Favorite, forgets duty and becomes sawcy. And thus when a Prince abates of the reverence, which ought to be paid to his person, he seldom finds it paid unto his affairs. It is good for a Prince, by a reputation of mildness lodged in him, rather by his discretion, than natural temper, to abate in his subjects in general the fear of his power; for that will be thought the juster, when he is sharp upon a particular man, that demerits; but to let fall his Majesty, warrants low thoughts of him among the generality. Thus Princes, tho' as men, they must live as men; yet by reason of the dignity of their office, they must either abstain from, or use these familiarities in private, or be prejudiced in their regal station. And the person, to whom the Prince communicates these favours,

vours, if he be either vain or inſolent upon them, (which is a hard task not to be) he draws upon himſelf an inſupportable envy, and on his Maſters reputation a great diminution.

The Prince the true repreſentative of a Nation.

The full glory of a Nation (or its majeſty) is drawn, as in a burning glaſs, into one point, in the perſon of the King; and therefore if he let it fall himſelf, or any ſubject by abuſe of his favour darken it, it is an offence againſt the publick.

How his power and majeſty are neceſſary.

The office of a King or ſupream Governor is to govern multitudes of people; and they are heady, refractory, and unſteady, like horſes, apt to be reſty, without they find their Rider faſt in the ſaddle, and themſelves commanded by the bit and ſpur, or under a power; and thus power is neceſſary. And common people like children, are delighted with glorious and gay things; and thus Majeſty is neceſſary, ſo as the reverence of civil Government is upheld much by the ſplendor of Majeſty; for without this popular fancy will not be pleaſed nor ſatisfied; for which reaſon greatneſs ever ſtands in need of ſome ſenſible luſtre. Thus, as there is a real neceſſity of power, ſo conſidering how ſtrong fancy is in multitudes, there is a neceſſity, that Majeſty be as little neglected as Power.

Power

The personal vertues of a Prince.

Power and Majesty are the two great supports of Soveraignty, but they are best upheld by two personal virtues, *viz.* that of Piety, and that of Justice.

Piety.

Piety leads a Prince to believe, that he is accountable unto God for the administration of his high office, and it leads the subject to believe, that that prince, who acknowledges a greater power than his own, and that a divine power, is like to use his own unto good ends. It bows his own heart unto God, and his subjects unto himself; or it disposes him to live well, and his subjects to obey willingly. It makes him watchful in the discharge of his own office, and resolute against those, who invade him in it. It is the best directress both of his Power and Majesty; for it keeps power from cruelty, and majesty from disdaining of others. It makes a Prince value the divine Providence, that watches over him more than his Guards; knowing, without this, civil wisdom or military power very often miscarry. Indeed, the vices of Princes always turn unto their own punishment; for they, that imitate them in their vice, are aptest to disquiet them in their Government; and thus they dishearten good subjects to uphold them, and encourage ill to rebel against themselves.

Justice,

Juſtice, as it flows from piety, ſo it is upheld by power. Juſtice muſt appear, or be known to be armed; or it is too like to be diſputed in its execution. Men entred into Society, that they might enjoy the benefit of it; and when it is obſtructed a Common-weal is ſick, if generally not adminiſtred, the band of Society is diſſolved: the execution of it is the life of the laws. No arbitrary power, or deciſion, or reaſon of ſtate muſt want juſtice, for the ſtanding laws, and the arbitrary determinations of Soveraignty muſt both be reaſonable and juſt; the one may want the formalities or forms of proceſs, which the other is tyed unto; but juſtice muſt be the life and ſpirit of them both. And therefore they are narrow thoughts, that think, what is arbitrary is unjuſt; for when it is the determination of a good and a wiſe man, it is very often more perfect than the law it ſelf, becauſe made a rule after the inconvenience of the law is perceived; or wiſe men would make it a law, or give it a ſanction as ſoon as propoſed. So as I ever thought the binding the Judges, or their binding themſelves too ſtrictly unto the letter of the law, and formality of words, and ſpellings, in pleadings, was like ſtrait ligatures, which hinder juſt circulation of humors; for it is one thing *Juſtice.*

to leave the Judge too looſe, but it is another (more nocent) to tye him up too ſtrait. This ſets up diſtinct Courts of Equity, and that multiplies ſuits, and many other inconveniencies. Keep an ill or corrupt man from being a Judge, ſoon remove him, when it is perceived; nay, ſeverely puniſh him, but pinion him not ſo, as he muſt ſit and ſee the craft of a Sollicitor, or an Attorney, evade the true meaning of the law; in ſuch a caſe let him (as well as the party pincht by the ſubtilty of the plea) have the liberty to put the caſe to a ſummary deciſion of all the Benches, which he finds not fit to determine in his own Court.

Faithfulneſs. Faithfulneſs in a Prince is but a part of his juſtice. *Lying lips*, ſays Solomon, *become not a Prince*; and the reaſon is, that he that hath a generous heart, will not ſtand in need of a falſe mouth. A Prince ought to be cloathed with reputation, which no man inwardly can render to him, on whom he cannot depend; or whoſe word he cannot rely on.

But becauſe neceſſarily there muſt be granted unto men in civil affairs, and in Kingly Policies a greater latitude, than ought to be allowed in common converſation, not of dealing falſely, but of demeaning a mans ſelf ſagaciouſly, therefore Princes

Princes and Ambaſſadors, who know what weights are uſed, ſeldom expect other coin, than that which is mixt with an alloy, which though it debaſeth the mettal, yet makes it work the better. Chancellor Bacon diſtinguiſhes well betwixt diſſimulation and ſimulation(indeed the diſtinction is Cicero's in his *Offices* l. 3.) making the firſt but an art of State, or an art of life, as Tacitus calls it, i. e. an art of living among men, that diſſemble: the other a falſe profeſſion, by which (I think) he means falſity, when he profeſſes ſincerity; which ſurely is a falſe Policy, and no ways allowable; the firſt he aſſigns unto Auguſtus, the ſecond unto Tiberius. The firſt is but the art of a well managed horſe, who obſerving the hand, knows how to ſtop on a ſudden. Undoubtedly where a Prince believes he is clearly dealt with, he ſhould be as clear in his dealing: for though their condition exempts them from that openneſs and round dealing, which is the honor of a private man's nature: yet the importance of their obligations reaching unto the good or harm of ſo many private men, they are admitted to have more of the ſerpentine windings than would become a private man. Equivocations muſt neceſſarily be diſallowed by all men in Treaties; but reſervedneſs

in ſpeech, or diverſion in diſcourſe, which otherwiſe would diſcloſe a meaning too ſoon, a ſpeaking that for his own opinion, which he avers not to be his Maſter's inſtruction, a ſubtilty of extracting the others thoughts, and yet concealing his own, to be cautious in the beginning of a Treaty, ſo he be ſincere and open in the concluſion of it; all theſe are ſeemly in an Ambaſſador, which would be very blameable among private men, eſpecially Friends. *The beſt compoſition*, ſays a great man, is *openneſs in fame, ſecrecy in habit; for nakedneſs*, ſays he, *as little becomes a mind, as a body.* Hiſtories and Civilians give greater latitude unto Princes to diſcharge themſelves of the obligation of their Treaties than exact Morality will allow of. I remember ſeveral inſtances in Dr. Zouch's writings, and particularly of Queen Eliſabeth, who ſaid plainly, ſhe meant ſincerely, when ſhe treated; but having promiſed an aſſiſtance, further than would ſtand with her own treaſure and her Peoples ſafety, ſhe could not bind her ſelf unto the extremity of her Articles. She was ready to ſhew, ſhe meant not in her Treaty to deceive, nor did ſhe then, to bear the ill conſequences, which ſhe now diſcerned. This I relate, this I juſtifie not; but if frequent examples do juſtifie it, then we

we may ſay, Princes are not deceived, becauſe they expect not the exactneſs of private men, whoſe damages reach further than their Perſons or private concern. And in Treaties it is now ſometimes made an article to make a retrait upon ſuch diſcoveries.

Clemency is a chief part of humanity, and ſhould ever be found in a Prince, becauſe moſt men at one time or other ſtand in need of a Prince's goodneſs. But to make it valuable, this virtue ſhould proceed from generoſity, not facility of his nature. And he muſt be careful, that his natural good temper, no, nor his moral clemency, appear to take off the terror of his politick juſtice. His clemency will ſufficiently appear, if it reſtrain him from frequent ſeverities: for it is neither for the honor of the Prince, nor the Phyſician, when their Patients are ſent in numbers to the burial-places. Clemency withſtands not ſeverity, though ſhe endeavors to uſe it ſeldom; for a Prince may be very clement in his diſpoſition, nay, in his judgment and uſual practice, and yet be very ſevere upon provocations, that warrant the ſame; for ſuch a well uſed ſeverity the better illuſtrates his clemency. But it is much better for a Prince to pardon an offence againſt his Perſon, than againſt his *Clemency.*

Government, or againſt a private Subject's intereſt or right. And nothing can worſe become a Prince's bounty or clemency than to grant pardons to offenders, as donatives or rewards to Servants. It is much better to give them the forfeiture of an Offender's eſtate, for that is an Eſcheat to himſelf, than a pardon to the Offender, for that is a ſelling of juſtice. A pardon is fit not to be given at all, or to be done freely, that ſo it may be a real act of clemency, and make the Offender grateful, or upon a ſecond fault more guilty.

Modeſty. Modeſty is a virtue of ſo mean a ſound, that it may ſeem derogatory to attribute it unto a Prince, but if well interpreted, it is a flower in his Crown; for it is a high ſpirited virtue, tempering greatneſs or power towards men of inferiour condition, or it is a generous diſpoſition in a Prince, not to dazle a private man with the glory of his Majeſty, nor to create in him fear by the terror of his power. So it muſt needs be attractive both of love and reverence, rendring the Prince acceſſible, and making him unapt to put a neglect or affront upon the meaneſt man; ſince the meaneſt may do the greateſt a ſhrewd turn; for *nihil tam firmum eſt, cui periculum non ſit etiam ab invalido.*

Beſides,

Beſides, Modeſty is a great antidote againſt flattery, the common bane of Princes, and the flattery, that is made unto their buſineſs and affairs, is often greater and more pernicious than that which is made unto their Perſons; for the one is but ſcratching an itch of a prurient temper or blood, but the other is endangering the publick peace or ſecurity. Flattery of a Prince's Perſon is but like a painted flower, that pleaſes the eye, but offends the ſmell; but flattery of his buſineſs is like a chymical vapor, that ſtupifies the brain. But in both kinds Princes love to draw it upon themſelves; for ſuch as ſeem to admire their perſons, and applaud or concur in their counſels, they take to be their friends; and the reaſon of it is, they love rather to have their hopes fortified, than their dangers awak't; for they affect to cheriſh hope, and ſtifle fear, and are not patient of deliberating or examining a matter by contrary judgments, or of men of ſeveral conceptions, or divers tempers and educations or intereſts; for oppoſite opinions are like the teeth of a file, it muſt ſcrape off, before it can ſmooth an affair, whilſt ſeveral concording judgments too often make an affair pleaſant and hopeful in the beginning, though more commonly irkſome and ſhameful at the latter end of

it. Xerxes never knew the value of his Councellor Demaratus, until he had made his ſhameful retreat out of Greece: then he found what the other had told him, that there was much difference between a great multitude and a well diſciplined army, whether it were to fight or to ſubſiſt; and then he knew the accidents, that attended upon the one, in marching through ſtraights, and finding proviſion, and the uſefulneſs and ſervices of the other. And for the honor of this great King it is, that he valued this ſingle man, more than he did all his other Councellors, when he returned home. But when obſervations of this kind are never ſo much multiplied, Princes Courts will never be cured of this King's-evil, but will favour thoſe, who counſel towards what they love, and never have in eſteem thoſe, who by projecting the worſt, and by foreſeeing ill conſequences, or cautioning againſt dangers, evidence, that they love their Maſter's honor and ſucceſs in affairs, better than they do their own preferments. For flattery is the beſt Court-picklock, and plainneſs of ſpeech the ſureſt bar againſt a man's own preferment. Modeſty hath this farther good operation upon a Prince, that it minds him of the incertainty of events in the beſt lay'd and proſecuted deſigns; there

there being a common viciſſitude or change of fortune, which wiſe men, like Porus, will diſcern and laugh at even in their captivity, becauſe thereby they diſcern, *quam caduca ſit felicitas humana*, as Curtius expreſſes it, or how fading and falling a leaf proſperity is.

Liberality or bounty is much cry'd up in a Prince, and is very becoming greatneſs or Majeſty; for men would not love the ſun or heavenly bodies for their own glory and heat, if they conveyed not unto them and other creatures cheering light and benign influence. But it requires prudence in a high meaſure to guide it; for if it run into the intrinſick eſtate of a Prince, or make him poor, that others may be vainly rich, it diſcredits him more, than it honors him, and looſes its name, for 'tis termed prodigality. Even he, that is benefitted by it, deſpiſes him for it, looking rather on it as a weakneſs of mind than a greatneſs. And it obliges unto no thankfulneſs, if what is looſely or inconſiderately given, obliges to ſuch expences or ſplendid courſe of life, (which ſome Princes affect from thoſe they are thus bountiful unto) that they can lay up nothing for themſelves and children. Money being like meat; if a man muſt eat or ſwallow till he regorge it, he will find a *Liberality*

Philo-

Philoſopher's ſupper better than a Prince's feaſt. If Favorites of pleaſure be the objects of bounty, then the Subjects ſhut their purſe from ſupplying him, who feeds ſo many vermin, and on whom ſuch vermin hang. Let their food be never ſo good, their mein or countenance never is florid; or if exceſſive bounty unto ſome few make Servants looſe their ſmall penſions, wages, or diets, it aliens the affections, and chils the duty of thoſe other many attendants towards their Maſter. Indeed bounty unto ſuch men ſhould be only waſt water; when the Exchequer can ſupply the ordinary expences, bounty is then and not until then ſeemly. Nor ſhould bounty unto Favorites, or expences of pleaſure deprive deſerving Servants or Subjects of rewards, ſuch as have merited of the State in home or foraign affairs; for for theſe a Prince may laudably appear rather poor than not bountiful. Yet for theſe he muſt not weaken the publick revenue, which in all Nations is reputed Sacred. But the caſual revenue, and the offices in the gift of the Crown, the leaſes even of the Demeaſnes, and things of this nature are wiſely here diſpoſed: but giving honors and eſtates in perpetuity, if any one made his reflexions, how many Noble families owed both to the Crown,

and

and yet in this laſt age have contributed much to pull it down, one would put no great price upon gratitude, or Princes might well think it fit, to put ſome new rules unto their bounties. Rewards unto ſome perſons, which far exceed the merit of the perſon, makes others much undervalue what they receive, though they receive with an overmeaſure. And if their reward come unto them more from the interpoſition of a great man, than the Prince's own diſpoſition, the former will have the thanks: and thus a Prince buys but a Servant for a great man. Sir Dudley Digges in his Preface to Secretary Walſingham's Letters obſerves, that Queen Eliſabeth was better ſerved for a Penſion of forty pounds per annum, than King James for an annuity of four hundred pounds.

Frugality in a Prince is an univerſal bounty to all his People; for it enables a Prince to live without, or at leaſt to crave leſs aids, and a Prince's care to promote trade, manufactures, husbandry, *&c.* or prevent confederacy among men of a trade, as Graſiers, Butchers, *&c.* or Monopolizers, who ſet the price or dice, as we call it, upon all buyers, is to be numbred among bounties, which reach unto the whole body of the People. So as the *Frugality.*

Kingly

Kingly Office is an inſtrument of bounty and of frugality both; for by one and the ſame means he inriches his People, and ſaves his own treaſure. Men of this temper are leaſt preſt upon, for no man judges better, when, and unto whom it is fit to give, than that Prince, that ſeeks to make his People rich rather by his providence, and by their own induſtries and frugalities, than by his coffers; for it is a very ill ſymptom in a State, when every broken fortune hopes to make it ſelf up from a King's Exchequer. Thus frugality is a key unto the Subjects treaſure; for the people willingly lend the key of theirs unto a Prince, that keeps the lock of his own: and as unwillingly to one, who ſpends upon his Favorites what is his own, or what his Subjects ſupply him with; ſince the humor of ſuch times and expences infects the Country, as well as the Court, and ſo they will rail againſt the vices, that are ſo coſtly unto them, though they imitate them. And if ſuch an expenſiveneſs lead towards a general poverty, it will in a ſhort time draw on a general defection.

Yet Courts muſt not want their ſplendor: for that is a part of the Prince's majeſty, and the very ſilks and fine linnen of it, the back and the board of a few Courtiers feed the belly, and ſet on work

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the hands of many Vulgars. It was obſerved to be impolitick in the Emperor Julian (and accordingly complained of) that he affected to appear in his Court more a Philoſopher than a Prince, baniſhing the Officers of ſhews and vanity, and of Cooks and Barbers and Taylors, *&c.*

Love of fame was implanted in men unto the end they might love virtue; ſince there is no greater evidence than that where the one is deſpiſed, the other is neglected; for though the perſon of the man in a ſhort time will be forgot, his deeds with reflection on him will be remembred. Hence it is too many men had rather wound their conſciences than their fame; yet many make it the cheapeſt thing they are concerned in. Neglect of fame begets remiſſneſs in Government; for *he that cares little, how men look upon him, cares leſs what he doth*: ſays that witty and pleaſant, and yet often ſerious Spaniard, Quevedo; if Chriſt himſelf thought fit to ask his Diſciples, *what ſay men of me?* nay, unto his Apoſtle St. Peter, *what ſay you of me?* it may become the wiſdom of the greateſt Prince to make the ſame enquiries. It is diſagreeable unto nature to be unconcern'd in fame; ſince the God of nature made it a reſtraint upon a vicious courſe of life, or a means to keep men out of bad company, out *Love of Fame.*

out of thoſe courſes, which expoſe him to be undervalued; for not only looſneſs of life, but remiſſneſs in affairs, or raſh entering upon important actions, and faintly proſecuting them, or uncertainty of mind and unevenneſs of councels (all which uſually are attended with unſucceſsfulneſs) draw down infamy upon a great man. And when a Prince hath loſt the inward reverence, which is due unto the generoſity of his mind, the outward, which is paid unto his perſon, will ſoon appear a ſhadow, which forſakes the dyal with the ſunſhine. It is unlooſing the girdle of Government (*ſolvere cingulum regum*) to withdraw an inward eſteem from a Prince. Shall jealouſie of a Subject's reputation awaken a Prince? Shall he think it his concern, that this man be not overprized, and yet be unconcerned, that he himſelf is reputed no way valuable? Since no men are concerned for a Prince they value not, how inſecure doth contempt of Fame render him?

Yet Princes or Great men are not to think a laſting fame is a good fame; ſince the word *Famous* is an equivocal word, and men may be famous for bad as well as good actions. Judas is as well recorded as St. Peter, and Heroſtratus, who burnt Diana's Temple only to keep up his name,

name, loſt his eſteem among men, and had almoſt loſt his name likewiſe, Alexander the great, and Julius Cæſar, and the great and proſperous neighbour Prince of our times affected fame, but they underſtood it not; for her Trumpet ſounds and recommends heroick, noble, and virtuous actions, or actions, that benefited mankind, not ſuch, whoſe effects and proſperity, were only like a ſtorm at ſea, or a plaguy year, which are regiſtred in the Kalendar, for the deſtruction they made and the harm they did. How much more hath a private man to thank God for, that he made him an inſtrument of a little good unto a few men, than the greateſt Prince in the world hath, that he was an univerſal Peſt, and that upon his own choice. The folly of ſuch a conceit appears in this, that he thinks he ſhall preſerve the memory of his perſon(unto which he is fondly indulgent) by it; when fame reaches (as that great Boethius ſays) no farther than unto his actions: ſo as if they be not beautiful and ſhapely, though he were another Abſalom, fame will but ſet him out as a Traytor. Boccalini hath a good repreſentation of the ſhame and infamy of black ſucceſsful deeds, when he repreſents Duke Sforza of Milan demanding a triumph of Apollo, and it being granted him upon the condi-

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tion, that the families he had unjuſtly betrayed and tyrannically ruined, ſhould be placed about the wheels of his Chariot, the ſhame thereof cured this itch of vanity, and he declined his triumph, that he might conceal the way or means, that enabled him to pretend unto it. This may be a true reaſon, why God removed the repreſentations of mens perſons from fame, and by it engraved only their actions; for it was the virtues of the mind, which he took care to recommend to poſterity, and he deſigned nothing to be memorable and renowned, but what was fit to be imitated. So as fame, by God's appointment, was to preſerve the memory of his great and good deeds, unto whoſe perſon God deſigned a reward from himſelf in another world, if not in this likewiſe. And yet a good fame makes a man live after his death; for the honor other men pay unto his memory, whoſe perſon they have no notion of, renders him to them, as if he was ſtill a living example of virtue. The appetite of honor is rooted even in nature it ſelf, and therefore if men be careful, how they get it, they may be ſollicitous to get it; becauſe alive and dead it benefits others as well as themſelves, and becauſe it is obſervable, that thoſe men, who care not what others think of them, care as little what they do themſelves. Pru-

Prudence is a Prince's Maſter-virtue, indeed it is a private man's chief honor. In all Civil, Military, and Eccleſiaſtical affairs it is the great directreſs. It weighs all circumſtances, and foreſees the moſt probable events; for where there is the moſt of prudence, there is the leaſt of chance: for *ſumma ratione geſta fortuna ſequitur.* *Prudence.*

It is the diſtraction of a man's mind, that he hath ſo many ſeveral repreſentations of one and the ſame thing, like a picture if he look upon it by one light, it ſeems one thing unto him, if by another light, it ſeems to vary its figure. In its ſelf an affair may be one thing, but cloathed in its various circumſtances it is another: ſo as many ways ſeem to lead unto it, and yet really there is but one: and this path Prudence only can walk in; for the prudent man, like the Chymiſt, can ſeparate bodies, that are mixt and incorporate together, and which are indiſcernible unto a vulgar eye. In Civil affairs, he is the beſt Chymiſt, who hath moſt experience; for though men may be ingenious without it, yet ſeldom ſolid or expedite, and yet all the ſciences ſerve him much; for the prudent Prince will ſtand in need of natural Philoſophy, to judge of the natural conſtitutions and tempers of men, as well as moral, to know how to improve,

govern, or reſtrain the tempers of thoſe, whom he truſts with his affairs; elſe an impetuoſity of temper will blind reaſon, and tranſport him, who diſcerns his own infirmities, and yet hath not been accuſtomed to bridle them. An eloquent and deſigning man will be followed by multitudes, when a ſober and well weighing judgment will too often want a companion. A prudent man is apter to ſuſpect his own advice, than another man's, of whoſe integrity he is ſatisfied; ſince he may with reaſon ſuſpect his own judgment, becauſe every one needs to ſee his own thoughts through ſome other medium, than his own way of reaſoning; the phanſie and the judgment being too nigh of kin to be ſevere upon each other. Which made Balſac determine, that it was too often the ſhame and reproach of human wiſdom, that the greateſt minds, being wholly left unto themſelves, in the greateſt affairs were likelieſt to commit the greateſt errors. And therefore the prudent man is far from being an overweaning or overcautious man, and thus prudence recommends modeſty.

Choice of Officers. Nothing therefore more manifeſts the prudence of a Prince than the choice of his Councellors and ſubordinate Miniſters of State, and Domeſtick Servants and Favorites;

rites; for the office of the Prince is well performed in his Perſon, when he hath choſen good Miniſters and Servants; for as hath been ſaid already, He is not the worſt Prince, who is the worſt man, but he that hath the worſt inſtruments to work by; for the tools uſually ſhew the artiſt. For a Prince for money or favor to bring undeſerving men into offices of great truſt, is to gratifie the deſire of his enemies; for they wiſh nothing more.

Of choice of Counſellors about a Prince.

It is a great evidence of a Prince's own abilities to be able to chooſe a good Councellor, and of his virtue, not to render ſuch a Counſellor uſeleſs unto himſelf; for he that will receive Counſel, muſt have no pretincture or preingagement, or no bias, which may draw him off from judging what is ſaid unto him. He muſt have no petty Counſellors or Favorites of pleaſure, to ſtagger his reſolutions by whiſpers. He muſt ſhut his ears unto flatterers; for if he once believe that ſort of men in what they ſay in commendation of himſelf, he will ſoon believe them in what they ſay againſt others. So as Julians reply to a man that highly commended him, was very remarkable, *When*, Sir, ſays he, *you have told me as freely of my faults, as you have of the excellencies you pretend to ſee in me, then I will give belief to*

what you ſay now. And Ariſtotle's epiſtle unto Alexander is moſt remarkable, wherein he told him, *he was moſt glad to underſtand, that he was not, as too many Princes were, ſo ſcornful and ſo unreaſonable, as to make good advice ridiculous.* This was worthy of ſo great a man's taking notice of; for nothing makes ſerious men ſooner deſert a Prince's intereſt, than to be under a ſlighted character; for Cicero in his Offices obſerves, *many men will loſe their lives for a Prince, who will not loſe their reputations.* I once heard theſe Buffoons, that thus pleaſed a Prince, called by a ſerious Gentleman, *the Petards of a Court*; *for*, ſaid he, *by repreſenting any man in a diſguiſe or maſquerade, they will blow up his credit preſently.*

If a Prince have a known bias, he will too ſoon be obſerved, and a common underſtanding at Court will make that appear wiſdom, which really is but flattery; for there is ſcarce any one maxim in Policy, which is not combated by ſome other; therefore they that ſtudy their own preferment or ſecurity, not their Princes eſtabliſhment or honor, will ſoon find, that the weaker reaſon, that gratifies the ſtronger paſſion of a Prince, is ever acceptable and rewarded; whilſt the ſtronger reaſon is miſ-interpreted as a diſaffection.

Princes

Princes therefore muſt diſcountenance no man's adviee: for a wiſe Prince, like a good Huntſman, muſt encourage the dog, that hunts for the ſents, as well as he that hits it. And Counſel, that is ſincere, muſt be grateful, and the Counſellor if he ſpeak in private, his Counſel muſt be kept private: for if the Prince expoſe him unto a contrary faction, it will create that caution, that he will want freedom of advice, when the other wants his ſecurity in adviſing. Thus Princes muſt not call their Counſellors to adviſe, as Xerxes did, and then tell them, *he called them to bring obedient minds, not troubleſome debates.* And if a Prince would be well adviſed, he muſt adviſe early; for there is no comfort to ſay, Sir, the time is paſt, or it is too late now to think on it. A Prince ſhould have no Councellor to be ſo mean, as to be a reproach unto him, nor ſo lofty, as to reproach him; for the very errors of a Prince are to be concealed, or reſpectfully laid open before him, and to be, as much as may be, concealed from others.

My Lord Bacon ſays, *a Prince ſhould have but few, and thoſe well choſen Counſellors, that they may carry on his buſineſs with one ſpirit of direction*; therefore he obſerves wiſe Henry the ſeventh made uſe only of Biſhop Morton and Biſhop Fox. Over

greatneſs in one, or over ſtrict combination in a few, may be both dangerous to him. He may keep his ear open unto many, but he muſt not let them run into factions againſt one another, if he hope to be ſerved by any; for they will reak their ſpight againſt one another at the price of his diſſervice. If both concur not in his buſineſs, he deceives himſelf, if he thinks he hath uſe of either. If he carry himſelf with indifference unto their particular concerns, he may make uſe both of their advices and intereſt unto his own ſervice. And any other way of managing factions, or keeping them at odds, unto my obſervation, was never uſeful unto any Prince. If either of them have a predominancy with him, at leaſt ſo by turns, as one checks the other, both diſſerve him.

The beſt way of a Prince to know the nature of him he would make a Counſellor of, is to know him by domeſticks, and neighbours, and general vogue; for from theſe no man can long conceal himſelf or his natural inclinations. Enemies will traduce him, friends over value him; but theſe (if what they ſay flow naturally from themſelves) beſt diſcover him. And the Counſellor's nature is as much to be conſidered, as his abilities: for though Princes moſt commonly beſt eſteem of

ſubtil

ſubtil men, it is moral good men, who beſt advance their ſervice; for a mind not ſeaſoned with morality, like the delicateſt wines, will beſt pleaſe the taſte for a time, but ſoon grow prickt or ſowre, or ſome trick they will play at laſt, harms more than any of their ſervices do good.

Characters of a Councellor.

When piety therefore is joyned unto natural abilities, ripeneſs of age, and good experience, (as early having entred into buſineſs) then a Prince may expect not only an able, but a faithful Councellor. If piety be wanting, abilities will turn but unto compliances, and ſelf-ends, or ſerving ſome faction rather than the Prince; for moral virtue is the only reſtraint upon ſelf-intereſt. Abilities deſtitute of piety, ſeldom advance a Princes ſervice, and he is likelieſt beſt to ſerve his Prince on earth, who ſerves his God in heaven; for piety only can reſtrain the ill effects of ambition or covetouſneſs, or lead a man to prefer his maſters ſervice, more than any proviſion for wife or children. It is the honour of Cardinal Toledo, that he refuſed to be of the Kings Council, without he might declare Gods will in oppoſition unto the impiety of modern policies. Without natural abilities in a Councellor, men expect a harveſt, without having ſowed the field; or if it were ſowed, and

the seed corn not good, (viz. sowed with principles Epicurean, Machiavilian, or Hobbian) they will never serve to govern a free people; they may to render men slaves. If Councellors be not grave and aged persons, they that are to obey their counsels will not reverence them, or cheerfully submit; for young men must necessarily want experience, and without experience the best abilities will be subject unto gross errors. A Statesman, or indeed, any man in any course of life, must be broken unto business (*rompu aux affaires*) before any other man can confidently depend on him; for he is not to be depended on to guide an affair, that hath not seen both sides of fortune, or met with disasters as well as good successes, or observed them carefully in History. When young men give the counsel, the matter of it is most commonly violent; for their temper leads either unto rash and daring things, such as may endanger the settlement of the present state, (which no wise Prince for increase of jurisdiction or prerogative should ever adventure) or unto wit and repartees, which are proper for discourses at a table, but not for the gravity of a Council-board: for commonly they gain their esteem by judgments they make on things past, or by reflections on an affair in general, not by

by councils or determinations on ſomewhat that is preſent and particular. Indeed, it is a great miſtake to think men of wit, with ſome mixture of Latin and Greek, or foreign languages, make the propereſt perſons for buſineſs. A great man both of wit and learning, Thucydides, determines againſt it, *Hebetiores, quam viri acutiores, melius Rem-publ. adminiſtrant.* Young and witty men have too much fancy to examine their own judgments, and their warm temper makes them proſecute an affair with eagerneſs at firſt, and remiſneſs towards the end, *acribus initiis, ſed incurioſo fine*, and they are too likely raſhly to run into errors, and by unſeaſonable remedies to endeavour their cure, or *intempeſtivis remediis delicta accendunt.* I uſe the Authors words, (tho' the method of writing be out of faſhion) becauſe I would ſtrengthen my ſelf with their authorities. Beſides, young and witty men value themſelves much by being not reſtrain'd by ancient forms of buſineſs; for uſually they find ſome way more expedite, and ſeemingly more reaſonable, which uſually upon tryal is found otherwiſe; for they argue their own change, or what they make it is a ſtate of melioration, but they foreſee not the inconveniences, which attend upon their own project;

ject: whilſt Thucydides obſerves, the Nations, which were leſs prone to change their cuſtoms, were moſt commonly eſteemed the wiſeſt. Beſides, men of this age and temper, as they are moſt enclined to be vain glorious, ſo leſs capable of ſecreſie, whilſt age and experience render men apter to give wholſom than complying counſel; and as not to be too ſtrictly tied unto old forms and cuſtoms, ſo not to part with them but upon great examination. All which is the evidence of a judicious mind.

Nothing therefore characters a Councellor better, than that it may be truly ſaid of him, He is a ſincere man, or, as we ſay of a good Common-wealths man, he is one that prefers the Publicks concern before his own private intereſt; ſo a good Councellor will in affairs, that are important, rather conſider his Maſters ſervice than his Maſters inclination. And that I may ſet down all the extremities of integrity at once, (but I am afraid I am deſcribing *rara avis in terris*) a man that will loſe his place, or fortune, or favour, rather than not plainly, and without artifice, tell his Maſter betwixt them two, what is his opinion. Afterwards, tho' his Maſters judgment be like to be his Maſters prejudice, (becauſe Councellors are not Preceptors)

ceptors) that will as induſtriouſly obey his Maſters commands, as he would have done, if his Maſters commands had been grounded upon his own counſel; for he ought to think, that his Maſters opinion or inclination may be better than his own. When the Prince cannot admit this freedom, nor the Councellor (in caſe there be nothing immoral in it) make this ſubmiſſion, neither of them is fit for the other. If the Princes own counſels caſt what is ſettled into danger, or make it to be obtained by extremities (tho' not illegalities) upon his own Subjects, a good man would rather make his retreat, and dye obſcurely, than ſee his Maſter or his Country run a great riſque; for it was Calliſthenes great honour, not that he is ſaid never to have betrayed his Prince unto others, but becauſe he would never condeſcend to betray him to himſelf, as moſt Flatterers do, or concur with him when his opinion differed. Thus it's one thing to obey a Prince, another to counſel him.

This imaginary ſincerity (for we may rather deſcribe it than hope to meet with it) in a Princes Councellor will incline him, that thus values ſimplicity of mind, to avoid all ſubtil and underhand ways; for a man of this temper is a judging or thinking perſon, and he knows humane actions

actions are beſt managed by familiar and eaſie means; for the plain hearted man, who reſolves ſingly to have his eye upon the nature of the buſineſs he is to act in, (and he cannot underſtand well the nature of an affair, if he totally forget the conjuncture of the times and perſons engaged about it) he will diſcard ſubtilty, and not ſuper-refine upon that, which may end well, if he make not new adventures, that it might conclude better; ſince, as Cardinal Mazarine obſerved, the *faiſons mieux* ſpoiled more buſineſs than ever it advanced; for ſubtilty commonly ſews thorns, and often is forc'd to walk over them. Machiavels Borgia thus prick'd his own feet, and ſo did Pope Clement VII. And d'Avila obſerves, Henry the 3d grew weary of the intrigues his Secretary Villeroy had intangled him in; and Bentivoglio ſhews Cardinal Granvils dexterities proved Philip the Seconds intanglements. A Prince or Councellor therefore muſt not conſider the advantages the end he propoſes will get him, and forget, that the complexion of the times, and the humours of Subjects may be indomitable, or ſuperable with ſo much hazard, that it will be no wiſdom to put a Princes fortune upon the chance of a die. A Princes greatneſs ſhould riſe like a vegetable, indiſcernibly;

bly; for haſting to be rich, and haſting to be great or abſolute, are both alike dangerous.

No man will be long thus ſincere or honeſt, who hath not courage; for it is an act of bravery to ſeek his Maſters advantage before his own; for courage frees him from the ſollicitude of diving into his Maſters inclinations, or ſcrutining *abditos ſenſus Principis*, or being concerned what party ſtands in oppoſition unto him, or what harm they can do him; which thoughts take up the whole time of a timerous Councellor, who proſtitutes both his Maſters and his own honour for a little ſecurity. This temper is ever reclaiming rebellions by careſſes, or expedients, and they, who are of it, ſpend moſt of their advice in ſhoring up the houſe they plainly ſee will fall, but hope it will laſt their time. Their trade is how to obſerve, which party in a Court prevail, and to be officious towards it, and they care not in what languiſhing condition their Maſters affairs are, ſo their own poſt be ſafe. With the Amſterdam dog, they will at beſt defend their ſhoulder of mutton for a time, but when they ſee the other dogs have pulled it out of the basket, they will go in for their ſhare. It was faintneſs in councel, that loſt both Rome and Conſtantinople,

tinople, and I may say England or the Monarchy in King Charles the first's time; his armies discipline render'd them not formidable unto the Rebels, and yet the Councellors were afraid of their too great prosperity.

A good Councellor should be steady in his advice, but steadiness differs much from inflexibility. He that adheres to principles is reckoned steady; yet when the conjuncture of affairs requires it, he must strike sail, and he can own it; for says Cicero, as affairs submit themselves often to me, so must I sometimes unto them; *Ut mihi res, sic me rebus submittere cogor.* And Cato, had he been less positive, had preserved Rome's or the Senates freedom longer. *Cato optime sentit, sed sæpe Reipubl. nocebat.* Probity may be impetuous, and so consequently nocent. Flexibility may suit with judgment, because forc'd by necessity, but instability can no way be justified, because it is a natural inconstancy of mind, or weakness of reasoning.

A wise Councellor will not engross too many affairs into his own hands, nor incroach upon other mens offices; nor be apt to undervalue them in it; or be apt to raise his own credit by the loss of other mens; for he that doth good offices unto others, is in the best way to make hearty friends

friends for himſelf. And he muſt be patient to hear other mens advices; nay, with ſome reſpectfulneſs bear their follies; and he muſt be unconcerned, even when his own councels are not complied with, or are laid aſide. Above all, a Privy Councellor ſhould be ſecret, for without ſecreſie neither arms nor councel are like to be ſucceſsful. Auguſtus valued Mecœnas for his ſecreſie; Agrippa for his laborious patience; and Virgil for his pleaſurable and learned converſation. If there be a chink in a Council-Chamber, it diſcovers, or gives as much light, as a window doth in another room. Our great Chancellor Bacon recommends it unto Princes, to beware that they themſelves unſecret not their own affairs; for crafty men will lay trains by diſcourſes of one kind, to find the ſecret reſolutions of another kind; ſo it is dangerous for Princes perſonally to treat with foreign Ambaſſadors.

How much it is in the power of a Prince to make good Councellors for himſelf.

But leſt this ſhould ſeem a Platonick Republick, or rather a ſpeculation, than any thing, that was probably practical, or might diſhearten Princes from looking after ſuch men to make Councellors of; we will only ſay, if cuſtom and habits can change nature, Princes can do as much; for if the Prince will chiefly favour men

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of good natural endowments, and of a moral honeſty, (which will ſoon turn into piety) and if he encourage induſtry, and let young men perceive, that they muſt walk up unto preferment by ſtairs and degrees, and begin with the lower offices, before they can hopefully pretend unto the higheſt; if he find not good men to ſerve him, he will make men fit to ſerve him. So as it is much the Princes own fault, when he thinks a Favourite of pleaſure or ſports, converſation and divertiſement, muſt preſently be fit to be made a guide in buſineſs; (for he can give the place, but he hath not omnipotency to give the abilities) or when he will look upon no man himſelf, but through the glaſs, or as the image of a man is reflected unto him from a Favourite, or ſome great Officer; for this is to ſtrengthen their root, and to weaken his own. For here, tho' the gift is his, the obligation is anothers; this makes him have many attendants but few ſervants; for ſervants placed about him by great men, are rather their ſpies than his ſervants. Such an unconcernedneſs as this, who is about him, makes him appear like a town block'd up, he can freely receive no proviſions he ſtands in need of; and his own ſervants are diſheartened, by perceiving great mens

friends

friends and ſervants every day preferred or gratified before them. This courſe chills all publick ſpiritedneſs, for men introduced by Favourites think, they ſhall laſt no longer than their Patrons, who are often changed or in the wain; and ſo they come unto a Court like harveſt men, who ſerve only in a ſhort time to reap that which others ploughed, ſowed, and harrowed for; or they work only in fair weather, and when the corn is carrying into the barn. If a Prince therefore have ill ſervants, he owes much of it unto his own negligence, or not valuing that which he ſtands moſt in need of.

A Printes menial Servants or ſmall family.

And thus from his great Councellors and Miniſters of State, we will come to reflect upon his menial Servants, and ſay a little of his little Family or Court, and then of his great Family or Common-Weal, or the ſeveral orders of men in the Common-Weal, each of them being to be a part of his Regal ſtudy, for by them he may be ſerved, or he may be endangered; and neither Servant nor Subject will be long uſeful, when he obſerves there is no obſervation of what he doth. And nothing may ſhew a Prince more his declenſion, than when both theſe ſorts of men are unconcerned, whether he be pleaſed or diſpleaſed with their ſervice. And

very often the irreverence, that is paid him in his own Court, is the mother of the neglect of his commands out of it, or that the discontents of the one breed the malevolence of the other; yet it is a great evidence, that a Government is off its hinges, when a few forward and daring men openly oppose his affairs, and many cautious ill wishers are pleased at it, and scarce any ready to assert his rights; or rather, as Tacitus expresses it in his terms, *Is habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus audirent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur.*

Libels and licentious discourses are ill Symptoms, and false news easily spread; and when men in place speak fearfully, and those that invade the Government boldly, it is a sign reverence is lost. Tacitus expresses it, when they speak, *liberius quam ut Imperantium meminisset*; or, *quando mallent mandata Imperantium interpretari quam exequi.* Discontents among the Vulgars, and broken estates among the great ones, or if there be other combustible matter, no man knows how small a spark, or from whence it may come, that will set all on fire. When fear is greater than feeling, jealousies will admit of no reasoning. And when there is a general dissolution of manners, there is seldom found authority enough to reclaim that people;

people; but ſome notable change follows; for there is in a State in ſome conjuncture of time as diſcernible a publick madneſs, as there is in private men; and perchance I have lived to ſee it abroad, or at home, I think more than once.

A Princes Court is a little Republick, and it is a great ſign, that the Prince is in the affection of his people, when his ſervants are reſpected through his whole Kingdom for the reverence they bear him. Which if it be paid by ſome few great men of the place, where they come, it is ſoon imitated by all the reſt of the Country; therefore his Servants uſually called Courtiers, muſt be as courteous and civil in their ſphere, as they are willing to be kindly treated, when they are in other mens. So as a Princes family ought to be of perſons well choſen, and of good reputation and behaviour; and the nigher in relation or ſervice the perſon is unto the King, the more humanity and kindneſs he ſhould ſhew to thoſe who come to Court; eſpecially thoſe who come rather to pay a duty, than make a ſuit; for this laſt ſort are to be anſwered friendly, but ſtill according unto the nature of their requeſt. Acceſs ought to be eaſie, and anſwers made with gentleneſs as well as reaſonableneſs; for the hand of haughti-

neſs is not to reach even a courteſie; for where the receiver is diſcontented in the manner of it, the favour conferred is never half acknowledged.

A Prince ſhould not admit about his Perſon men of bold tempers, and who dare openly avow immoral tenents or principles, for theſe men will ſoon call that which is good indifferent, and then they will not be long before they will call that which is vicious reaſonable; and artificially inſinuating into his favour by keeping intelligence with his paſſions, they will endeavour to lead him from vanity unto vice; and the fouler the latter is, if they be but an inſtrument or companion in it, the ſecurer they are in his grace; for there is at a Court no ſo ready way unto gain and preferment, as that which is got by ſome ſhameful ſervice; and ſuch men being privy unto a Princes clandeſtine vices, they will never be quiet until they be admitted unto his publick concerns. *Scire volunt ſecreta domus indeq; timeri.* Such trivial Servants, or ſmaller ſort of Favorites as theſe, have politicks fitted to ſecure themſelves. There is nothing (ſay they) ſo ſafe for a Prince, as to make new creatures of his own. A Prince muſt be conſtant, and adhere even unto his errors, rather than be lightly carried over unto other

other mens Judgments, leſt he ſeem to live upon a borrowed reaſon. Hence it is, or from ſuch ſmall Favorites as theſe it is, that ſome Hiſtorians have obſerved, that when the ſpring-heads of ſome Princes councils have been diſcovered, they are ſmall even to contempt. Darius's expedition into Greece, aroſe either from a Phyſician unto himſelf, who told him, what excellent figs grew there, or from his Wives maid, who told her, if the King made a war upon that land, ſhe would have the great Ladies of Greece her ſlaves. Varro hath the like obſervation, and Monſieur de Pleſſis aſſigns much of the miſeries that befell the French Nation upon the Catholick League, unto the Duke of Guiſes cheating Monſieur d'Eſpernon of a Miſs. And thus often a Favorites paſſion begins a war, as well as a Princes publick intereſt. On the ſmaller ſort of ſmaller Favorites Boccalini puts a high contempt, when he ſays, all the money in a Princes treaſure will not buy ſugar enough to candy or ſweeten them. The Abbot D'Eſcallie, I remember, long ſince at Bruſſels told me a very pleaſant ſtory, how his wiſe Maſter, the Duke of Savoy, (Le viel Renard des montaignes) took from him an elegant Barber that he had, who grew ſo great a Favorite, that he

truſted him in ſome of his moſt important Services; in which miſcarrying, he complained unto the Abbot; *Sir*, (ſays the Abbot) *concern not me herein, for I put him unto the outſide of your head, you put him into the inſide.* A Prince therefore muſt be very careful in the choice of his Servants, that they be men equal unto their buſineſs, and not above it, or under it, and honeſt minded as well as ſtrong brained; for to ſerve faithfully is as neceſſary as to ſerve ably; ſince abilities ſeldom make recompences for frauds, and ſince honeſt men in favour will ſeldom want the parts of able men, not yet admitted thereunto. Balzac ſays truly, *the greatneſs of a Prince muſt not rob him of the pleaſanteſt part of human paſſion*, i. e. the free and kind converſation of ſome perſon, whom by ſome ſecret and unaccountable motion he likes in converſarion; for neither moral virtue nor policy puts any ſuch reſtraint upon nature; theſe correct the imperfections of ſenſual appetites, but gratifie both great and ſmall inclinations in natural and not immoral contentments. But publick Miniſters, or ſuch as privately are employed about publick affairs, are to be choſen by reaſon, not affection. Such choices, as hath been already obſerved, Auguſtus made, when he drew into his affection and ſervice Mecœnas,

A Favorite of pleaſure allowable, but not to be made a Favorite of buſineſs.

cenas, Horace, and Virgil, who were qualified as well to be Councellors as Companions. Beſides, an ill Favorite is often a neceſſary inſtrument or skreen unto a worſe Prince; for Tacitus obſerves, Tiberius was worſe without Sejanus than with him. *Tiberius* (ſays he) *vixit obtectis libidinibus, dum Sejanum dilexit & timuit, ſed in ſcelera ſimul & dedecora prorupit, poſtquam remoto pudore & metu, ſuo tantum ingenio utebatur.* And people reake their ill will rather upon theſe than on their Prince.

Nothing is meant more here, than that a Favorite of pleaſure ſhould not be made a Favorite of buſineſs. A Prince ſhould be the Maſter of the ſpring-head himſelf, that he may water whom he pleaſes; for if he ſuffer himſelf to be ingroſſed, and paſſes his influences by another unto all his Dependants, he may have outward reverence but never inward eſteem; for ſuch uncontroulable Favorites for the moſt part, as they are very expenſive in themſelves, ſo they are very inſolent unto others, and therefore upright and able men will not ſerve under them. Thus they are like Beacons or Lighthouſes at ſea, which old Sailers know are to be avoided; but young make towards them in the night, and endanger a ſhipwrack.

A Princes great family, or orders of men in his nation.

Theſe and many more troubleſom conſiderations a Prince hath about his Domeſticks or little Family. Many more then he muſt have about his great Family or Common-weal. For as individuals or ſingle men are to be conſidered, ſo every rank or profeſſion of men are to be weighed by him, ſince his ſecurity or his danger hath in ſeveral periods of times ariſen, as his Nobility or Commons, nay, as his Clergy have been affected and predominant. Nay, he is to obſerve even the natural and conſtant clime of his Country, for that will learn him much of the temper of his Subjects in general; for as Barclay ſays, *Hæret quædam vis inconcuſſa hominibus pro conditione terrarum.* And ſome ages run unto arms, others unto learning; ſome unto trade, ſome unto ſuperſtition in their Religion, or Phanaticiſm. With all theſe difficulties his ſpirit of Government muſt grapple, and without a ſpirit of Government he will miſcarry; or if he pleaſe not himſelf in the affairs of his Government; or if it be his task, not part of his pleaſure. A Princes Politicks will be as improſperous as his Oeconomicks are, who loves to ſpend freely, and yet never to look upon an account; but every one meets not with a Richelieu, and a Mazarine, or Colbert; nor with a Maſter, who will ſo treat them.

A ſpirit of government neceſſary to a Governor.

Come

Come we now unto his great Family, which conſiſts of the Orders or Tribes among his Subjects, *viz.*

1. Clergy.
2. Nobility.
3. Gentry and Commons.

} Or his three States made up of theſe three Orders.

Next of the Profeſſions, *viz.*

1. Divines.

2. Lawyers.
3. Phyſicians.
4. Soldiers.
5. Merchants.

6. Seamen.
7. Tradeſmen.
8. Artificers.
9. Husbandmen.

And

10. Vulgars or Multitudes.

Wiſe

Wise States encourage not Bookmen in great numbers: for they oftner, both Divines and Lawyers, especially Atturneys, rather raise quarrels, than either prevent or compose them. *Literas*, says an Historian, *ad usus saltem discebant*, &c. *reliqua omnis disciplina erat, ut pulchre parerent, ut labores perferrent, ut in pugna vincerent.*

A *Government* (says Bodin) *is made up of an harmonick justice*, i. e. of such a structure; that the meanest tribes or profession of men find, that they are considered, and in some measure considerable in the Government: even the Multitude or Vulgar, or lowest sort of men being very considerable, in respect of their very number.

The

The Clergy are an order of men ſet apart among all Nations for the divine ſervices of the God of the land; for the Gentile and Barbarians never wanted their Brachmans or their Druides, and every where they were men of prime rank; for the natural reverence, that was due to their calling, gave ſuch an authority to their perſons, that moſt commonly they were converſant in the moſt important affairs of the Nation; (for here we mention them only in relation to the Civil ſociety) none being fitter to interpoſe betwixt Prince and People, than thoſe that interceed with God for both. And the reſpect that is paid to them, is a reverence paid to God; for upon the ſame ground Princes Ambaſſadors are treated with thoſe obſervances they meet with; upon the ſame are God's Miniſters. In this order of men God becomes in a manner viſible unto us; for when we find he hath Servants peculiar to himſelf, a Court, or Temple, and revenues appropriate for maintenance of both, we ſtraight conclude, *of a ſurety God is in this place*, or he is the Lord of this people. So as there is no greater evidence, that piety decays in a Nation, than that they are apt to conteſt or diſreſpect their Prieſts or Miniſters. *Clergy.*

Now

Now as this is a valuation due to the Miniſter of God's word, ſo he himſelf is to pay a reſpect unto his own calling, and to appear worthy of it, and fitted for it; for duties are reciprocal, and he is God's husbandman, and therefore muſt cultivate his People; and if he truly diſcharge his office, in fitting them for another world, he fits them beſt for ſociety in this world, and for ſubjection to the Prince: and there is no ſuch way for him to procure the dignity, that is due to himſelf, as to exerciſe the proper virtues of his calling. Other tyes or compliances with the humors and manners of a People: or becoming like them with them in common converſation begets familiarities, but not reverence. Piety in themſelves, and endeavors to make their flock pious, or of orderly lives, diſcretion in being friendly and helpful, or ready to adviſe and do good offices, a private information or admonition at home, or a converſation, which recommends that unto particular men out of the pulpit, which is preached unto them in it; this attracts their good will, whilſt being unconcerned with, or conforming their company to the irregular or negligent habit or cuſtom of others, removes the inward eſteem they ſhould labour for. This ought to be very ſincerely purſu-

purſued; I will no be ſo uncharitable, as to ſay, it is artificially ſo done by ſome of the Romaniſts, and by ſome of the Preſbyterians, (though I believe one gains much of his authority by his indulgences and eaſie abſolutions, and the other by his aſſurances, that they carry God's brand to mark the elect with:) only I wiſh our Country Clergy would be more ſtrict to follow the rules they receive, and I have often heard given them by their Biſhops in their viſitations: for when they influence their flock towards God's ſervice, they lead them the eaſier to be ſubject chearfully to their Prince's laws and commands. And if this Order of men will expect (as juſtly they may) the Prince's protection for themſelves, they owe it him as a duty, to keep themſelves ſo in eſteem and friendſhip with their congregations, as they may diſpoſe them to his ſervice; for if they fall into the envy or diſeſteem of their Pariſhioners, they who ſhould be an eaſe and coadjutors of their Prince, make their protection a burthen to him, or they become as an uſeleſs body. In this quarrelling and examining age the Governors of the Church ſhould endeavour to make matters of faith treated on with plainneſs, and not mingled with too many diſtinctions: that matters of good life be taught

taught as much by the example of the teachers, as his expositions or precepts: that their Visitations and Courts of Jurisdiction be not only formal, or in maintenance of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction or gain, or rather for shewing their Orders, and paying for it, (as I have heard no mean men among themselves say) than for keeping them in good order; especially that their excommunications be upon weighty matters, and somewhat that is purely Christian. For though contumacy to a Court be a great fault, and that this Ecclesiastick Court have no other penal or legal censure: yet when the subject matter, on which the excommunication is grounded, is some civil or mixt concern, then this being a spiritual punishment seems so remote, that it makes excommunication seem light, and draws neglect rather than respect or obedience to the Jurisdiction. These good Fathers should be known to be forward to divert a Prince from laying great or unnecessary burthens on their Subjects; which if it be perceived by the Subject, then this temper in the Clergy will get such a disposition in the Layety, as will lead them respectfully to hearken to such doctrines, as invite them patiently to bear grievances or pressures; since it is an eminent virtue in a Christian Subject to bear with the

errors

errors of a remiſs Government. Thus a Clergy muſt make themſelves as uſeful as they can in ſecular affairs both to Prince and People, if they would gain upon them in their ſpiritual concerns; and this we may ſay, is an incumbent duty upon them, as they are members of a Politick body. And in this ſenſe it is, that nothing more concerns a Prince, in reſpect of the influence this order of men have on his Subjects, than that he provide, (as God hath done for him) that his Clergy depend on no body but himſelf; for if either in the Prince's Eccleſiaſtical affairs, they pretend a Superior authority to his, as making themſelves depend on a Pope, and thereby exempting themſelves from the Prince's juriſdiction, or that they can wreſt themſelves into his ſecular affairs, as they have ſome relation to Spiritual or Eccleſiaſtical concerns (which even Preſbytery hath ſet up a claim unto) then this Prince's State, and his Subjects obedience will be very precarious and dangerous: and his condition not much bettered, if Junius Brutus and Buchanan, or the Schoolmen and Jeſuits be the Interpreters of St. Paul's thirteenth Chapter to the Romans, or of St. Peter's 1. Ep. 2. ch. v. 13. And the like he may expect from an Enthuſiaſtical Teacher, who will be but *binding him in chains,*

chains, and his Nobles in links of iron. He muſt not be ignorant therefore, that his office ſuperviſes theirs, and when he hath not encroached upon that ſpiritual part of their office, to which they are properly ſaid to be ſet apart and conſecrated, (as adminiſtring the publick Offices of the Church, of praying for, and preaching unto, and adminiſtring the Sacraments) then to overſee theſe Overſeers in the good or male-adminiſtration of their Offices is his duty and his ſecurity. And in this kind, how far an Epiſcopal Clergy (as acknowledged and ſetled here in England) exceeds all others through the whole world, as beſt agreeing with Chriſt's inſtitution, and the Apoſtles practice, judicious, learned, and Chriſtian Examiners will beſt and ſooneſt find out. And we will conclude our remarks upon this Order of men with this experiment, that in the year 1640, nothing raiſed ſo much the Rabble, as did the Non-conformiſt Clergy, who from all parts of the Kingdom came moſt up to the City, and filled moſt of the pulpits, and the Lecturers reſiding there; and in this preſent year 1678, nothing ſo much ſecured the peace of that place (nay, we may ſay of the whole Nation, for Whitehall had one kind of Guards, and the Citizens, true it is, by the King's leave, were their

own

own Guards) as did the Orthodoxy of the Clergy, and the satisfactions the better sort of Citizens took in their own Ministers, who so prudently preached down the then suspected designs against the Religion established and secured loyalty by Christian principles.

Nobility is (or of old was) usually the off-spring of virtue, or valor, or industry, now it is more commonly the creature of the Prince; for he is the fountain of honor. Their order is like the lesser or planetary lights in the firmament, which attend upon the sun; they are to set forth the splendor or majesty of the soveraign throne, yet sometimes they eclipse it. If they withdraw their banks, they often let in an inundation of Populacy, and endanger the throne; if they interpose their bodies, they sometimes skreen the Populacy from the scorching heat of Soveraignty; but they prey often upon both; for as they are sometimes a restraint upon the Tyrant Prince, so they are often an encouragement to the giddy multitude, to be contumacious and refractory: and sometimes they have been so unnatural, as to draw over the fickle multitude, and to joyn themselves unto a forreign Prince, against their true Soveraign, as in the time of King John. Which evidences, that *Nobility.*

the body Politick like the Natural, when the humors and gall overflow, and the parts loſe their temperament, the whole looſes its health. If the Nobility be few and great, they too often turn the ſcale of Government, which they ſhould keep upright; if they be many or neceſſitous, they firſt peel the Court, and then are Court inſtruments to peel the people. Nobility is a plant, that will degenerate; and though they often owe their fortunes as well as their qualities unto the Crown; yet we have too many examples among us, that the Sons and poſterity of thoſe Families, which were wholly raiſed by the Prince, employed themſelves moſt to pull down the cloth of State. Thus the nobleſt of men, if they may but gratifie ſome violent paſſion, or compaſs ſome preſent advantage, they deſert their ſtation, and the meaneſt things will be done by the greateſt men. When their numbers are many, they appear but like a more ſplendid Gentry. Henry the ſeventh did as it were undermine their greatneſs, which in ſo mixt a Monarchy as ours is, was not very compatible with Soveraignty in ſo few hands. From that time this order of men in our Government hath not only been in the wain, but may be ſuppoſed much to have degenerated; for the ancient

Nobility

Nobility have much leſſened their Eſtates and have made way for the principles of Oceana; for cutting off the dependencies from themſelves, they made the Yeomanry free, which bred our multitude of Freeholders, who (ſays Mr. Harrington) have now the ballance of our land or landrents, and conſequently, in his opinion, of our wealth, and by his arguments, conſequently of our power: but conſult Mr. *Wrenn*, and Oceana is drowned. And our Reformation did as much for our Church-lands, which ſeemed a fifth or ſixt of the Kingdom. All which contributed unto the late temporary ſubverſion of our Government in our late good, but unfortunate Prince's reign, Charles the firſt. God did reſtore us from this captivity, but whether he be not drawing upon us, for the abuſe of that mercy, the judgment we generally deſerved as Regicides, he knows, whoſe ways are in the depth, and paſt finding out. This change had never been effected, had not the Nobility forſaken that cloth of State, they owed their dignity unto, and ought to have protected: but infirm muſt that palace be, whoſe main beams ſhrink from the walls; but down will thoſe beams fall, which are withdrawn from what ought to ſupport them. And when our Gentry do

the like, our very Soveraignty will fall to be among Mechanicks; and not long after, the vulgar Rabble will have a proſpect for their ambition, and when paltry Players (both Clerical and Lay) have got the habits of King, and Prieſt, and Nobles, and Gentry, the mock Comedy for ſome time will paſs for a good form of Government. But he that rules in heaven can only predict, whilſt an honeſt and condoling, not upbraiding, ſpirit may inoffenſively, becauſe rationally, forewarn.

Nobility in all nations, as they have had more honor deferred unto them than other ranks of men, ſo they have had more priviledges and immunities. Boccalini, I am ſure, hath the reflexion: but I remember not whether I follow him ſtep by ſtep; he reſembles (as I think) Princes unto ſhepherds, the Commonalty unto the ſheep, and the Nobility (for Nobility were originally Soldiery) unto the doggs. (This is not a derogatory term, for it is but to follow a Metaphor.) *So as*, ſays he, *if theſe be overawed, that they may not bark and fight for their charge* (for they are to defend the ſhepherd as well as the ſheep) or, if they be not armed with an iron collar of Generoſity, (ſome extraordinary preheminence or priviledge) but be awed and cowed by the ſhepherds boys, or the rams of

the

the flock, both ſhepherd and ſheep in a time of need, or when ſome wolfiſh conquering King ſhall invade, or a Home. Uſurper undermine both; I ſay then, ſuch a ſort of generous daring Spirits will be wanting, and a bold Fellow, that hath followed a loaden horſe on foot, will think, he is as fit to ride on horſeback, (and probably he may be ſo) as the greateſt Lord: for a crab-wine is preferred to ſupport the ſtomach before vinegar, that ſprang from a generons grape, becauſe turned. If Nobility degenerate, Princes ſhould employ men, who have the virtues, not the titles of great men. But if Nobles have both, they are the fitteſt men to be employed for their extraction; and their already being maſters of moderate fortunes makes them have great advantages over men of natural and acquired parts, though never ſo well exerciſed or experimented, if new men; for the tree is leſs envied, that grows from a root, and hath been long in growing, than the muſhroom, that was not at night, and ſhews a head in the morning. Henry the ſeventh ſuppoſed he had ſtrengthened the Crown, when he cut the wings of the Nobility; Henry the eighth vindicated the juſt rights of the Crown, from the uſurpations of a foreign uſurping Biſhop; both which acts made great changes in

the ſtate of our Government. Queen Eliſabeth both unto Biſhop and Nobleman allowed a due honor: but in her time, a novel Schiſmatical Presbyterian humor crept into the veins of ſome of all orders; ſo as too many Presbyters deſigned to level the Biſhops with themſelves, and too many Nobles, Gentry, and Commons found fair hopes to ſet up a real Ariſtocracy with an inſignificant or titular Monarchy. And thus was made an inundation in Charles the firſt's time, which ſwept away the ſcepter, and the ſword, and the miter; and though the waters are fallen again into their banks, there is yet much ſlime left behind, and the ill vapor, that not long ſince gave the Common-weal a ſyncope, may turn into an apoplexy, if the three Eſtates be not apt to do right unto one another, and all unto their Prince.

Soldiery. Soldiery may be accounted a leſſer ſort of Nobility; for arms raiſed in the firſt times private men into the rank of Nobles, as uſually favor of Princes, and management of affairs, or the penny doth now; but honor loſt its ſpirit, or luſtre, or eſteem among men, ſince flattery or a ſum of money became the current price for it. No man can properly be accounted a Soldier: though he may be a ſtout and valiant

valiant man, who hath not been frequent in dangers, and ſerved ſome time at the trade.

Gentry are the leſſer Nobility, and did uſually influence the Commons, as the Nobility did uſually them: but as they emancipated themſelves from dependance on the Lords, ſo among us the Freeholders have withdrawn much of their reſpect from them. For that laſt rank of men, ſince the ſale of Church-lands ſince Henry the eighth's time, and of the Crowns parting with much of its deſmeaſnes, and the Nobility and Gentry both making great ſales unto men of profeſſions, of what was theirs, Lawyers, Merchants, and great Traders being now great purchaſers, we may juſtly ſay the ballance of the Kingdom in our age is much changed from what it was in former ages. And our young Nobles, both of the greater and leſſer rank, having rather a forward and a finical education, *viz.* rather haſtening timely or early to appear ſuperficially men, than ripely and throughly to be ſo, they often run out of their eſtates, before conſideratively they know they are in them. And by theſe often changes, which the ancient Families of moſt Counties undergo in their eſtates, the publick concerns or form of Government is leſs ſteddy than it ought to *Gentry.*

be in a well conſtituted Common-weal. And if a Prince made this a part of the care of his Government, to preſerve and countenance the ancient Families both of his Nobility and Gentry, and to diſcountenance ſuch as neither took into arms, nor civil employments: if he obliged them ſometimes with offices freely given, or diſobliged them not, by conferring dignities upon ſome new Upſtarts, who purchaſe in their Counties, and overtop them at firſt coming, which their wives cannot bear, being to loſe their precedence, theſe ſort of men keeping their reſidence among their neighbors would prove the beſt ſecurity both of a Prince's perſon and Government, and their loyalty in the laſt King's time was moſt examplary: whilſt the men of profeſſion, the Lawyers, and the Merchants were as remiſs (to ſay no more) in their duty. For from men of pleaſure may be expected more loyalty, than from men of gain, who are ever apt to follow the tide, which uſually turns into profit, whilſt the other, content with their own eſtates, affect ſecuring the preſent Government or ſtate of things. Great Miniſters of State heretofore were not aſhamed to keep a good correſpondence with the moſt conſiderable and judicious perſons of this rank in every County; for they are not only

only valuable in their Country, but fill up many of thoſe places, which ſerve in Parliament, and the Common-weal muſt be beſt advanced, when it is ſerved by men, who are beſt affected unto the eſtabliſhed Government. And it muſt needs be a general comfort unto the Subject, when a Prince deſires to be ſerved by Perſons, that are neither mercenary nor factious. Theſe are the men, that in their Countries keep up good order and induſtry; ſo as to have a good regard unto them, may not only be reckon among a Prince's policies, but among his virtues. If they find themſelves neglected, whether the diſorder ariſe from the great men, or the ſtorm from the multitude, they are not like ſeaſonably to interpoſe: for though duty oblige all men in the politick body, as in the natural, when a vein is opened, to endeavor to ſtop it, by running towards it, yet the wiſe Hiſtorian hath obſerved, too many men chooſe their own ſecurity, rather than with hazard to obviate the danger of the Common-weal. *Tuta & preſentia, quam vetera & periculoſa mallent.* But this I conceive is, when the State wants noble and generous Perſons to depend on: for when men of eminency are not on the ſtage to defend laws, men of loyalty will not be much concerned under what laws they live;

and

and thus moſt commonly innovations are admitted.

Commonalty. Commonalty, if a man draw the lines of their picture from Scripture, or the beſt Hiſtorians, he will Scarce be able to give them a good epithet. Biſhop Andrews obſerves, beſides the word, *My People*, there was nothing but a *crooked, a perverſe, a ſtiff-necked, a gain-ſaying People*; and Thucydides ſhews their raſhneſs and temerity; ſays he, *quicquid modeſtum, ignaviæ ſpeciem habet; quod circumſpectum & providum, ſegnitiæ, quicquid abruptum & præceps, id fortè & virile cenſetur*; for they have no leiſure or art to ſtudy or think, and therefore act as they are driven or prevailed on, or according unto example or cuſtom. They therefore are reſembled unto waters, which are ſtill and quiet in themſelves, if not agitated by winds or popular Orators; or if the Government be weak and declining, they fall from it as waters do, that fall from a deſcent, and by an irregular motion ſoon make a torrent, and ſweep away all that ſhould bound them, or is before them; *the rage of the ſea, and the noiſe of the waves, and the madneſs or irrationality of the people* are joined together. And no character better fits them than the great Hiſtorians, i. e. They either humbly ſerve or proudly domineer; *aut humiliter ſerviunt,*

aut

aut ſuperbè dominantur. They run among rocks, and over ſhelves and ſhallows, and therefore he need be a good and experienc'd Pilot, that conducts the ſhip of Government when they are raiſed into a ſtorm. Their paſſions being ſtrong, and their judgments weak, they are more ſeducible unto a falſe religion, than apt to be ſettled or fixt in a true, becauſe the one is founded on reaſon, which they have no meaſures of, and the other is laid on principles, which relate unto fables and prodigies, or any crafty or obſcure notions of ſome deſigning perſon. Now there is no way ſooner diſcovers the nature of principles, than the end they ſerve unto. If they ſerve not unto the virtues of the mind, you may juſtly doubt them; If they advance the triumvirate of the world, pleaſure, profit, and ambition, by other means than virtue, (for there is a virtuous pleaſure, profit, and ambition, as they ſuit with reaſon, as well as they ſuit with ſenſe) they are falſe. But this ſort of men having not buſied their underſtandings about ſuch diſtinctions, they are too too often the unhappy inſtruments to beat down truth in all kinds, and ſet up error; for they are not more fickle in their Religion, than they are unto their Government, or rather Governors, from whom they are apt to be ſeduced.

ſeduced. It is the wiſdom of a State in theſe laſt ages of the world, not to trouble them with unrevealed niceties of Religion, or to oblige them unto many rites and ceremonies, the uſe whereof they cannot penetrate into; for this age, like the former will not take all on truſt, but to keep them in employment, and out of neceſſity by ſecuring their trades and manufactures, the moſt probable way to make them good Sons of the Church, and Subjects of the State. And let them find they are not deſpiſed, but that the Prince ſometimes communicates himſelf unto them in ſplendid ſhews; (for *panem & Circenſes* the Romans found great uſe of in pleaſing, and by pleaſing, in governing their multitudes) for as hath been ſaid, multitudes are valuable for their number, and Princes ought to think them very valuable, becauſe if the Prince hath their affection, he is ſurely ſafe. Neither great Nobles nor popular Commoners are able to effect any conſiderable thing without Briareus's hands. But ſays Cicero, as they have little judgment, ſo they ſeldom follow verity: and thus being too prone to ſuſpect their Governors, they are too eaſily wrought on by popular Officers, or Tribunes, who repreſent them; and being of a mutinous diſpoſition, they brutiſhly nouriſh

riſh factions in a State, for things they do not underſtand, till they pay the price of it, with their own blood and ruine: not knowing the Demarchi of Athens, and the Ephori of Sparta, and the Tribunes of Rome were ſet up as the Conſervators of the peoples liberty, but were truly the overthrow of them all. In a word, the worſt men are apteſt to diſpute their Governors: for *peſſimus quiſque aſperrime Rectorem patitur*: and moral and religious men make the beſt ſubjects, as being the beſt judges of the bleſſings men enjoy under a well ordered Government.

Having ſaid thus much of the before mentioned ſeveral ranks and orders of men, whereof their States are made up, it may not be amiſs to mention the ſeveral profeſſions and their ends, and how they are of advantage, and how they may be of danger unto a Government; that ſo the Prince's wiſdom may make the true uſe of them all, and divert the ill conſequences of their abuſes in their callings. *The ſeveral profeſſions in a Nation.*

Of the Divine we have ſaid much already, therefore ſhall only ſay here, that he manages the opinions about celeſtial and moral truths, or the ſtate of men after this life. The Phyſician is to preſerve the health of the body. The Lawyer the

concerns

concerns of a man's eſtate. The Soldier is to ſee juſtice may be executed. The Merchant exports the ſtaple, and imports the forreign commodities: and the Tradeſman vents both by retail. The Artificer manufactures all, and the Husbandman provides food for all, for the King himſelf lives by the field.

In no profeſſion can any man be truly a good Citizen, that is tranſported either with pleaſure or covetouſneſs. It is a great ſentence of Saluſt's, *Nec quiſquam extollere ſe, aut divina attingere poteſt, niſi omiſſis pecuniæ aut corporis gaudiis*; for with neither of theſe two taints or corruptions can the Divine ever be believed, that he means as he ſays. And with them the Phyſician and Lawyer will either neglect or beggar their Patients and Clients. The Soldier grows cruel and rapacious, if theſe vices ſeize on him, and will ſooner loſe or ſell the place he is to defend and maintain, than keep it. And the Merchant, Tradeſman, and Artificer trade unfairly, and not unto their own Countries advantage by covetouſneſs; the one bringing in commodities, which ſerve only unto ſenſual appetites and vanity, or to pleaſe the phanſie; the other either adulterating, or working ſo ſlightly his wares, that Forreigners decline the trade; ſo as all theſe incon-

inconveniences, and the prevention of them, fall under the Prince's care and policies, or art of Government. Indeed in the body politick, as in the natural, there not being the leaſt thing done, but requires an influence of the Governors. He muſt inſpirit every profeſſion, or they ſtagnate.

None of theſe profeſſions are ſuperfluous; for there muſt be a Divine, though every man were ſo knowing as not to need inſtruction: ſince his Office is to be the mouth of the Congregation unto God. A Lawyer cannot be wanting, becauſe two men may mean very juſtly and ſincerely, and yet not know how to aſſure one another in legal terms. A Phyſician cannot be wanting, becauſe health will impair, and ſickneſs ought to be conſidered by a man, that is in a ſtate of health: upon which reaſon a man ſafely cannot be his own Phyſician; for ſickneſs often deprives a man of ſenſe, and diſables him to judge his own caſe. One man's neceſſaries muſt be ſupplied from various trades, and that makes neceſſary all the other diſtinct callings. And thus the wiſdom of God, that deſigned men for ſociety, ordered it, that men could not live with one another, if they had not likewiſe been to have lived by one another. True it is, the

No profeſſion ſuperfluous.

the Soldier is but a neceſſary evil in a Common-weal; for would all men obſerve juſtice, there would need to be no force; for force is never to be uſed, but when reaſon and law are by violence withſtood. It is depraved, not ſincere, nature makes this profeſſion neceſſary; but that neceſſity makes it very honorable and uſeful; and as it requires a great courage to execute it, and a great preſence of mind: ſo this is hardly attained without a profeſſion accuſtomed unto danger. It likewiſe requires great natural ſtrength of body, and moral virtue of the mind; for no order of Theologues, no, nor of Penitents, undergo thoſe hardſhips, which the fatigues of war bring with them; nor have they frequenter occaſion of moral vertue, to reſtrain ferocity, and to exerciſe humanity.

The great extent of government.

If all this providence and care belongs unto the Regal office in relation to the choice of perſons, and the adminiſtration of profeſſions, how much further muſt this providence extend, when it is to weigh ſuch numberleſs particulars of buſineſs, where every caſe differs almoſt from another; falling under various circumſtances, which requires a particular act of prudence to determine, and which are too too numerous to preſcribe rules for.

It

It is no marvel then, that God, who hath made Princes provinces thus large, hath afforded them his own title of Gods among men: for their providence reſembles his, in a ſhadow of the extent of it; and in the various affairs it provides for, they ſtand in need of an univerſal wiſdom, like his, and of an ability of turning evil to good, i. e. that that which damnifies private men, may be made uſe of, or conduce unto publick advantage. Wiſdom therefore built her a houſe, and fixt it on ſeven firm pillars, or mankind, who found a natural diſpoſition to live in ſociety, as well as a natural neceſſity, in reſpect of the mutual aid one man gives unto another, diſcerned, that the ſtrongeſt tye to faſten them unto one another, was the ſame band or religion, which tyed them unto their God.

Some learned men make this houſe to be the body natural of man, and the five outward ſenſes to be five pillars of it, and the two inward, phancy and memory, to make up the ſeven. I ſhall not preſume to ſay, the Text warrants my application; but in relation unto this diſcourſe I ſhall make the houſe to be a body politick, or civil Government, which may be ſaid to be upheld by theſe ſeven underwritten pillars, viz.

1. Religion.

2. Juſtice. 5. Commerce.
3. Council. 6. Treaſure.
4. Confederation. 7. Arms.

Religion. Religion, as it is a pillar by it ſelf to ſupport Government, ſo it is the baſis of all the ſix other pillars; for as the word imports, it is a tye or band betwixt the divine and the human nature; and no ligament would have held men together, but that which linked God and man together. Which commerce or intercourſe is the great proof of an intellectual world, God's Spirit here influencing this intellectual world, as the ſun doth the elementary.

Natural. Inſtituted. It is uſually divided into natural and inſtituted, or what God writ by creation, in the heart or underſtanding of man, and ſo natural religion was eſſential to man by creation, as inſtituted, was given by, or written in his Word for man, and principally deſigned for the manifeſtation of that revelation, which relates to redemption.

Man naturally capable of immediate revelation from God. Man was naturally capable of revelation from or by an intercourſe with God, by ſuch means as his divine wiſdom thought fit to communicate himſelf:

for

for we ſee before man's fall he received a revelation in that poſitive prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit; for poſitive laws, relating only unto things of an indifferent nature, are every one of them ſo many immediate revelations from God. Hence may be obſerved, how extenſive natural religion is; ſhewing the human dependence on the divine nature, adoring that majeſty and goodneſs, and evidencing its own gratitude by its obedience, expreſt by the exerciſe of thoſe moral virtues, viz. piety, juſtice, and ſobriety engraven in its own nature; and evidenced by that natural conſcience, which will diſturb even the mightieſt Princes, when all the world elſe flatters and ſecures their vices: which proves, that men have a proſpect of comfort or fear beyond this world. The ſame natural religion (or that reaſonableneſs it is grounded upon) ſhews, why men, who thus admitted a God, thought, that God deſigned for himſelf peculiar and ſeparate ſervants, temples, ſacrifices, *&c.* and all theſe to be of the choiceſt perſons and things, that were among the ſons of men, becauſe they were dedicated unto the ſupreameſt eſſence. Hence it is we may conceive, that all the religion of the Heathen world was natural; for it was ſo neceſſary for man to de-

The extent of natural religion reaching unto that, which is uſually accounted inſtituted religion.

pend upon a ſuperior nature, that otherwiſe (as the Lord Bacon ſays) he would not have been able to have ſupported the frailty of his own nature. Man admitted therefore many Gods, rather than he would be without one; and what were all the opinions of fate and deſtiny, and Elyzium fields, but an acknowledgment of providence and immortality? and what were all the Philoſophers grave precepts about morality, but a groping after the Decalogue, and the diſperſed Ethicks in Scripture? How careful was this blind world of their Dianas, and Palladiums, and topical Gods; for herein they thought lay their hope and their ſtrength, and expected not a victory, till they could enchant or draw over to themſelves the God of the place. Plutarch could ſay, depraved nature runs into ſuperſtition or atheiſm, and then ſound reaſon led unto true religion, which is but an obedience unto God's laws written in mans heart, upon the ground of piety and gratitude.

The Heathens care of religion.

No nation would ever allow atheiſm among them, nor let the divinity of their Gods (though falſe ones) be invaded; for this among the Athenians coſt Socrates his life, and Diagoras was baniſhed by them for but ſpeaking doubtfully of them; and Marcus

Marcus Tullius, one of the two Library-keepers of the Sybills books, was ſewn into a ſack, and flung into the ſea, but for making an imbezlement or a raſure, Lucius Albinus flying from the Galls, with his wife and children, ſeeing the Veſtal Virgins on foot, deſcended from his chariot to ſave and eaſe them; and they all agreed in this, that ſacriledge was much more heinous than theft, and that though Dionyſius the Syracuſian prided himſelf in his proſperity, even by this ſin, yet the direful vengeances, which befel his ſon, were aſſigned to be judgments on the ſacriledge of the father. It is well known, how erronious the Heathen Divinity was; and yet we cannot but think, that theſe reverences to falſe Gods were acceptable to the true. It was the lapſe of nature, and the ſeduction of the evil ſpirit, and inadvertence and habit in evil, that made men thus groſly miſtake the object of their belief; but it was natural reaſon and religion, that made them determine, there was ſomewhat in this kind to be believed; and their immoral actions (eſpecially as they were nocent to civil ſociety) fell under the correction of thoſe laws, which were framed to make ſociety beneficial.

This is enough to ſhew us, how even by the light of nature men made civil ſociety to be ſupported by religion: for it is not only the cauſe of good order, but of good ſucceſs or bleſſing. For in Vitellius's time, when the Capitol, wherein was the Temple of their Gods, was burnt, they deplored themſelves much more than they did, when the Galls took their city; for then they ſaid, *the ſeat of Jupiter was unſhaken, and their Capitol preſerved.* All this conſidered, we cannot wonder, why the wiſe men of thoſe ages with Ariſtotle determined, that the firſt care of every State ſhould be that of religion; and with Dion Caſſius, that the religion of every country ſhould be but one.

Religion a ſupport of civil ſociety.

Now the firſt reaſon for the firſt propoſition is, that religion neglected or deſpiſed weakens all other parts of government. *Religio neglecta aut ſpreta trahit ſecum rempublicam*; for where there is but an indifferency to it, or a want of devotion and inward eſteem of it, the ſoul of moral virtue is loſt; for men will be rather temporate for health, than for the peace of ſociety, or to have a fitneſs by piety to have an intercourſe with their God; and juſtice will be obſerved rather as an outward compliance with laws, than an inward eſteem of ſuch a beneficial tye, in relation to ſociety.

The care of religion.

ciety. For it is the love of juſtice, which flows from religion, not the fear of its puniſhments, that inſpirits government; for this values the Legiſlators authority and wiſdom, the other dreads only the Lictor's rods. Secondly, Government is never freely and chearfully obeyed, but when it is ſuppoſed God's ordinance, and that it is accounted a part of religion ſo to eſteem it; elſe obedience will be more precarious, than the nature of it will admit. The commiſſion of goverment therefore iſſues out of God's Chancery, and directs the Prince to direct his government to the benefit of the ſubject; and yet when he fails therein, leaves no appeal to the ſubject, but unto his providence, who preſcribes to both; for Nero's vices were not half ſo pernicious to the empire (no, nor to particular men) as were the revolts even from that monſter, and from his Succeſſors, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, who were but peſtilential breaths of the ſame ill vapor. When conſpiracy had caſt out Kings, the Conſul's rule ſeemed ſo majeſtick and arbitrary, that the Commonalty muſt needs be tempering it by Tribunitial power; ſo as Livy obſerves, that the cord of government was ſo ſtrongly haled at each end, (or extremity) that there was no ſtrength left in the midſt; and that ſtrife

was more for the management and rule, than for the ſafety and preſervation of the State, and all theſe revolutions, becauſe government was not ſuppoſed God's ordinance, but the peoples choice. Thus we ſee it is religion, that only makes Soveraignty and liberty ſociable, or ſets ſuch bounds to majeſty in the Prince, as may advance concord among the Citizens. Caſt off this temper, and every miſtaken judgment will produce ſuch angry humors, as will neither endure the ordinary evils or ſores of government, nor the common remedies or ſalves for its cure. Thirdly, the higheſt throne, though never ſo wiſe, powerful, or ſincere, depends upon Providence, which can either by natural or moral cauſes diſappoint all its beſt laid deſigns. An earthquake, a ſtorm, or a treachery fruſtrates all man can do, whilſt nothing can withſtand heavenly benedictions; and the very opinion men have, that the Gods are propitious to them, gives diligence and courage in all attempts.

Theſe are the reaſons, and many more, why government muſt be ſupported by religion. Next we will offer a few, why the religion of every Nation ſhould be but one. First, Religion is the higheſt, as well as the ſtrongeſt obligation upon the mind of man; ſo as if that admit any princi-

Religion ſhould be but one.

principles of liberty, or exemption from Civil authority, diſobedience ſhelters it ſelf, and replies, it is fit to ſerve God before man, and ſo grows incorrigible, becauſe reaſonably it may juſtifie it ſelf: (though that be an error as will be ſoon proved.) Secondly, Men of a ſuperſtitious temper either infect one another, or are miſled by ſome ſubtil knaves, who make good gain of men, who are of a ſuperſtitious devotion, and who make conſcience of every little thing, and are apt to believe vain and fooliſh propheſies, or interpret revelations. And thus ſays Livy in his fourth book, they became a publick offence, inſomuch as the Ædiles had in charge, that no other Gods ſhould be worſhiped, but thoſe of the Romans; nor after any other manner, than had been uſual in their native Country.

Indeed if it were rightly conſidered, the religion of all Nations ſhould be but one, becauſe all ſhould ſerve but one God, and he by the tradition unto the Patriarchs before the Law, and by his divine preſcripts under the Law, and by the revelation of his will by the Meſſiah and his Apoſtles after the Moſaic-Law, made his will known in all neceſſary, natural, moral, and divine truths, tending unto ſalvation, whereof Kings and Prieſts were the guardians,

but

but not the parents; for they were to deliver in matters, immediately relating to ſalvation, nothing but what they had received, though in matters relating to decency and order in his ſervice, or in matters of civil concern, they were authorized to give the law ſuitable to their own beſt judgments, and all ſubordinate to them were thus to ſeek an unity in the faith, and a common utility in the State in the band of peace. Thus God is a God of order and not of confuſion; and if he made religion a ſupport to government, private men, by framing new axioms of their own, to exempt themſelves from obedience, or to weaken the ſinews of government, muſt not diſtract it. For if a Soveraign may command one thing, which God hath not forbidden, and a high Prieſt another, which God hath not revealed, or a private perſon contradict both in thoſe things, which are both true and ſuitable to their diſtinct authorities, then the reins or girdle of all authority, divine, eccleſiaſtical or civil, is diſſolved.

Among the Gentile world inſtituted religion was no diſturber of government, becauſe it conſiſted principally in outward rites, ceremonies, and obſervances. But in the Chriſtian religion, God being a jealous

lous God of his honor and truth, it hath great influence on government, becauſe the main end of it, as it was to make reconciliation, and clear the intercourſe betwixt the divine and the intellectual nature; ſo it was to reſtore natural religion, and to cleanſe that polluted ſtream. Therefore that Church, which upon falſe gloſſes on inſtituted religion introduces corruptions in natural, and weakens civil Soveraignty, that it may uſurp Eccleſiaſtical, or diſpences with moral duties, that men may be the more obſervant of their ceremonial laws, makes the buttreſs, which was to ſupport the wall, thruſt it down. And thoſe Princes, whom God bridled by his moral law, in the exerciſe of their Soveraignty, weaken but their own Governments, when they decline thoſe laws, natural religion and common juſtice recommended unto them, as to be the baſis of all their civil, municipal, and human laws. Nor doth any ſpirit more weaken government by pretence of religion, than thoſe Enthuſiaſtical perſons, who upon pretence of particular impulſes, reſpect neither human nor divine laws; for theſe can fall in love with their own ſelves and their tribe, and broach doctrines, that we may ſay turn the world topſie turvy; for one ſays, 1. Dominion is founded in grace, and thereby is

Inſtituted Religion was to reſtore natural.

The ill influences on Government by ſeveral phanatick principles.

is all Soveraignty overthrown; though the same men at the same time read, that Cyrus was Gods Anointed as well as David. Another sort of them say, 2. None have right unto the creature, but the godly; though God makes his sun to shine, and his rain to fall on the bad as well as the good: and they will judge likewise, who are those; and then what becomes of the property of their fellow subjects, whom they account usurpers thereof. 3. An impulse of a brain-sick or vindicative spirit must be by a third sort a command from God, and who then is secure of life? Neither doth there want those, who would be as holy in other mens opinions, as they are are in their own: and therefore their words must be accepted as an oath, and so government lamed in a principal sinew, and the reverence and awe, which mankind hath ever expresst of God's name to extract truth, must be laid aside, that their sanctity might be justified. But such men as these by their superstitions may contradict sense, philosophy, natural and instituted religion, and fall so low in their very demeanors, (as are our Quakers and Seekers outward carriage) that that which is ridiculous and irrational must be accounted religious, or the government must be overthrown. 4. Nay, a soberer sort

ſort of men will ſo venerate their own interpretations and dogma's, that if Civil or Eccleſiaſtical authority reſtrained the divulging their opinions, though contrary to that of their national Church, their petty and ſmall truths, if truths, muſt be juſtifications to them to diſquiet the peace of the government. Upon this whole repreſentation, (beſides condolement) which might lead all theſe ſorts of men unto ſome modeſty, what have we to ſay, but that all this is contradictory unto that Goſpel-ſpirit, moſt of theſe men pretend unto? for if Chriſt in his own perſon, and his Apoſtles in theirs, would not reſiſt ſecular Governors, (for that great truth, on which all other Evangelical truths depend, i. e. that God was reconciled unto the world by his Son Jeſus Chriſt) but chearfully ſubmit themſelves unto authority, and undergo the puniſhent that was laid on them: then if Pope, Presbyter, or Phanatick would now think themſelves bound to the ſame ſubmiſſion, it might be well thought, it would prove the beſt cure for the two firſt's uſurpations, and the laſt's deluſion. But in order to a remedy, if we will hear a wiſe man's opinion, there is no better way to ſtop the riſing of new Sects, than to reform (I have forgot his words) groſs and known abuſes,

abuſes, or troubleſome niceties, and to compound ſmaller differences, and to proceed mildly, rather by gentleneſs than violence, and to convert or win over the principal Authors by ſome countenance or preferment, than to imbitter them by ſcorns. But all this is to be meant towards modeſt Diſſenters, and ſuch as revile neither governments; for if God lead his people by the hand of Moſes and Aaron, and have ty'd men to them by religion, or religious obſervances of them, and any ſort of men in matters that are not immoral, may riſe up againſt them, and ſay, *ye take too much upon you, ye ſons of Levy*, or *what have we to do with Moſes?* all government is at at end. And when the religion eſtabliſhed in a land is rent by diſcords, and the holineſs of the Profeſſors of that religion is much abated and grown hypocritical, and ſo to honeſt minds ſcandalous (as it was about Mahomet's time, for then the Neſtorian and Arian hereſies much abounded both in Aſia and Africa) then ſays this great Chancellor, *you may look, not only for a new Sect, but poſſibly for a new religion.* And no diſobediences to government are ſo dangerous, as thoſe that are grounded upon religion, nor no Sect ſo likely to prevail, as thoſe, who complain of the preſent management of affairs, and promiſe

promiſe great liberties and exemptions.

The mind cannot be forced, yet it may be reſtrained.

I am far from believing, there is any power in a Prince or a Church to force a man to believe; for no man can force himſelf but in civil or ceremonial concerns: if a Prince or a Prieſt require that, which another thinks not prudent, or is of an indifferent nature in it ſelf, Subjects are bound to nothing, or they are bound in matter of this nature to ſubmiſſion; for ſuch compliance can never truly wound conſcience. A Prince may make a civil law about Huſbandry, which an experienc'd Husbandman may know will not work its end; and yet he is bound to an obedience; and the Church may enjoyn an imprudent rite, and Chriſtian liberty may cenſure it ſo; and nevertheleſs it requires an outward conformity. And thus we ſee, how religion conduces to civil quiet, by admitting a liberty in judging the injunctions of authority, and yet making innocent the obedience thereunto. For if God, in things relating to his own honor, exempted not the ſubject from the civil authority, but ſubmitted him to a paſſive obedience, then it is reaſonable to judge, he doth it much more in all things, which concern only mens ſociable and civil concerns. And this is enough to prove, how ſtrong a pillar religion is unto the houſe of government.

It

It is a great obſervation of Valerius Maximus's, whatever the Augurs declared from the Gods, the Senate determined not againſt, *Religionique ſummum imperium ceſſit; omnia namque poſt religionem noſtra civitas duxit, etiam in quibus ſummæ majeſtatis conſpici decus voluit.* And they took care religion ſhould be truly taught amongſt them: inſomuch that they gave to the forreign cities under their government Sons of their Prophets to inſtruct them; ſays this good Author, *Decem filii ſingulis Etruriæ populis percipiendæ ſacrorum diſciplinæ gratia*, &c.

Scipio Africanus is ſaid never to have gone about any buſineſs, but firſt he went to the temple.

Governments or bodies politick are as ſubject to diſeaſes, as bodies natural are; for a State may be free from violent convulſive fits, and yet may fall into a paralytick or hectick diſtemper, or an atrophy; for it is an ill ſign in a State, when ſubjects dare not rebel, and yet grow ſullen; for ſuch mutinies make no noiſe, and yet looſen all the joynts and ligaments of policy. Beſides theſe hardly to be diſcerned ſickneſſes of State, there are periods of times and revolution of things, which have ripened a State for a death, even when it ſeems in a good condition of health, or whilſt

whilst it hath marrow in its bones, or a good condition of plenty and peace; for so was the time of our late change begun in 1640, when we saw in few years after, that there was but one step betwixt the highest and the lowest condition. So as unless *Providence keep the City, the Watchman waketh but in vain*; and nothing keeps Subjects out of the way of rebellion, nor Princes in the way of justice, as doth religion.

Justice the next pillar of Government; religion and justice both spring immediately from God; for it was the eternal wisdom that formed the ligament or bond, which we call religion, which should tye, as by a law, every rational creature to perform the justice of his nature, which other creatures observe by instinction, man by choice. So as a law is but a rule what things the creature should follow, and what fly. Thus the eternal Wisdom wrote natural laws in the very essence or rationality of man, and by this rationality this creature was capacitated to receive from him positive laws. When man offends against the natural law, his conscience checks him, and when he offends against the positive, some known revelation, or unquestioned tradition, or written word of God, must be his accuser. *Justice.*

Hence laws uſually are divided into Moral, which are thoſe, which flow from the law of nature, or ceremonial, which are thoſe, which flow from ſome poſitive law of God, or judicial, which ſhould imitate the juſtice of Natural laws, and were given to ſome men, as unto the Jews, by God himſelf, or from the law of Nature, and the rationality of man, unto all others, and are framed by men in order to the exerciſe of juſtice among themſelves, and are made as conformable, as may be, unto the law natural and eternal, and have for their end the common good of that ſociety, which is under the authority of the Head or Soveraign of that ſociety. So as every ſuch law ought to be honeſt, and poſſible to be kept; every ſuch law containing in it two powers, *viz.* directive in what it preſcribes, and coactive in puniſhing offenders againſt it.

Juſtice, natural and civil.

Now juſtice is but a performance of ſome act, which ſome law requires. And as we ſaid on the former head, religion was either natural or inſtituted; ſo we muſt ſay on this, it is either natural or civil. Indeed, natural juſtice is an eſſential part of natural religion, and ſo is inbred in man; and that is the reaſon natural juſtice ſo far exceeds civil, or what human laws preſcribes. For human laws cannot extend

Why natural juſtice ſo far exceeds civil.

extend their sanction, or rewards and punishments unto desires and concupiscences, out of which all civil injustices arise; and some offences or injustices seem unto Legislators so trivial, that there is no law or sanction against them. Yet natural justice prohibits even such offences, which made the great Naturalist and Statesman Cicero say, It was a narrow, or a mean thing, to be just only as far as civil law required; *quam angusta est innocentia ad legem bonum esse*; or *quanto latius officiorum patet, quam juris regula*; for humanity and liberality *&c.* are left out of the publick Tables of the Romans. Indeed both Tables of the Decalogue are but parts of natural justice: so as a man may be a good Citizen, *Vir bonus est is, qui consulta Patrum*, &c. when he is not a good man, or when he narrows that justice, which he owes to men, unto civil sanctions.

Justice is concerned in { making, executing, obeying, } laws.

1st. In making them; for the Legislator must sincerely be convinced, the law is beneficial for the Government and for the Governed; for if it serve only personal ends, as that the Prince and Governors by *Justice in making.*

it ſingly reap the advantage, and that it conduce not to common good, it wants the beſt character of a law. The like it doth, if an unruly multitude force a law from him, in prejudice of the good conſtitution and ſtrength of the Government or Royalty. Secondly, if laws be made unto good ends, and not executed, they become a ſnare; for uſually the breach of a civil law carries with it ſome profit and advantage, and ſo one man to his loſs obſerves that law, which another through his diſobedience gains by. And non-execution of laws leads men to the neglect of the Government; for they think it a fooliſh thing to be tied by that cord, which others ſo eaſily break. Thirdly, therefore when laws are made, ſubjects muſt make a conſcience to obey them; for it is a debt they owe unto their Prince, and unto the whole ſociety, and to every particular man of it. So as a Legiſlator muſt make a law no ſnare; a Magiſtrate muſt impartially execute it, and a Subject conſcientiouſly obey it.

Executing.

Obeying Laws.

The law of nature is the rule of all human and civil laws; Tully could ſay, *Nos legem bonam a malâ nullâ aliâ ratione, niſi Natura norma dividere poſſumus.* And Baldus, *Imbecillitas eſt humani intellectus in quacunq; cauſa legem quærere, ubi rationem naturalem*

ralem invenires. A law therefore muſt be ſuitable to religion, agreeable to the natural (not humorous) diſpoſition of the people, and muſt tend unto publick good. And thus civil and judicial laws made by men are manifeſt proofs of moral laws written by God in man; for they ever confirm thoſe *laws*, and conform themſelves thereunto, and are adapted to civil caſes only.

Laws in defence of the Government and Subject.

Laws therefore are made both in defence of the Government and Governors, as well as of the Governed in their ſeveral concerns of life, liberty, property and good name, fame or reputation; and the breach of theſe laws falls under ſeveral penalties, higher or lower, as the offence is; for it is treaſon and miſpriſion of treaſon to offend againſt the Government or Prince; and it is excommunication to offend againſt Eccleſiaſtical authority; and it is murther and felony, or a capital puniſhment, to take away a mans life, or rob him of his goods; and he falls under a pecuniary or corporal puniſhment, that robs a man of his liberty or good name. Thus juſtice, whether it be political or private, is the defence of the Head and Body in ſociety, and obliges the Prince by the directive part of the law, tho' not the coactive; (for therein he is ſubject only

Penalties.

How laws oblige the Prince, and how the Subject.

unto God) to be juſt unto, and tender of the ſubject; and by the directive and coactive part of it, obligeth the Subject uniformly and impartially to honor, aid, and obey him in his government. Nay, a man by it is defended from himſelf, as well as from others; for men by exceſſes and penury are often unjuſt unto themſelves, and unto their relations. And this reſtrains a man from uſing even his own to his own private detriment, as well as unto the publicks; for the publick has a right both in his perſon and private poſſeſſions, and all this, *ne Reſpublica capiat aliquid detrimenti.*

This virtue guides men in peace, and regulates them in war, and frames all ſound council. It is that in the Politick Body, which conſent of parts makes in the Natural: or it gives amongſt the members thereof a fellow-feeling of each others ſtate. It makes the foot content to ſupport the body, and the body the head, and the head to influence by its animal ſpirits all the members. It admoniſhes the ſtomach, not wilfully to ſend up fumes and jealouſies to annoy the head, and ſupplicates the head, not to caſt down rheumes and catarrhs upon the lungs, leaſt the State be ſhort breathed, and ſo ſhort liv'd; whilſt mutual juſtice and love, like

the

the harmony and good temper of humors, begets peace, which we may call publick health. And thus it becomes the beſt ſtay of a common weal, when it diſtributes juſtly rewards and puniſhments, chaſing partiality from the diſpenſation of rewards, and paſſion or ſeverity from that of puniſhment. We may ſay of it, it was implanted by nature, and cultivated by natural religion, and revived by inſtituted. Chriſtianity, being it ſelf famous for making this a radical principle, that men ſhould do to others as they would be done unto themſelves; obliging men under any kind of government, and in any ſtate, bond or free, to obſerve their own laws, and not to violate thoſe, by which they held commerce with any foreigners: Princes even to be content with their own bounds, knowing the poſſeſſion of a real virtue was much more than the poſſeſſion of an uſurped dominion; ſince no one perſon is able to influence the dominion of the whole earth, but he that made it. And even he as man refuſed it, probably becauſe he would wean the moſt aſpiring minds, and powerfulleſt Princes from affecting it. Thus making juſtice a guide to modeſty, leaving ſoveraignty to him, who made the whole, and diſtributes it by parcels to whomſoever he pleaſes.

Juſtice diſtributes rewards and puniſhments equally.

Council. Council is a deliberate conſidering of a particular affair by a man's ſelf, with the help of ſome other. Every council ought to ariſe from ſome knowledge of that affair, or of the nature of it, and be grounded on experience, and managed by prudence with an unbyaſſed mind: ſo as truly an ignorant and unexperienced and injudicious perſon is not fit either to give or receive council. He that is to receive it, be he Prince or private man, muſt have weighed and deliberated the matter he takes council upon within himſelf, or elſe he will not be capacitated to judge of the advice given him. So as men muſt habituate themſelves in their own affairs, that they may render themſelves capable of council; eſpecially a Prince, whoſe education, and his own contemplation ſhould have verſt him in ſome general knowledges, before he can be fit to receive particular advices upon particular affairs. For unleſs he have conſidered or ſtudied the nature of mankind, the conſtitution of his own Government, the genius and inclination of his own people, the power and intereſt of his neighbouring Princes, and ſuch like general heads, (unto which all determinations of particular affairs ſhould be ſquared) he himſelf cannot properly be ſaid to be fit to take council.

What fits a Prince for Council.

Beſides,

Beſides, (as has been obſerved before upon the head of Councellors) if he have not judged of perſons, as well as things, his policies will be weakned. Nor will any thing ſo probably render counſel uſeleſs to him, as a converſation with thoſe, who being not able to give counſel, through the familiarity of their Prince, uſually deride council. Princes therefore (who need council moſt) ought to be moſt careful with whom they converſe; for converſation inſenſibly inſinuates it ſelf, and a Favorite's folly either becomes a council, as given by him, or makes a Prince diſreliſh a ſound council given by another; ſo as few Princes thrive by council, who are miſled by converſation. Hence we ſee, that Princes ſhould buſie their minds about determining within themſelves their own affairs, that from without themſelves they might receive advice; for men moſt carefully adviſe them, whom they know to be habited to weigh their own affairs: for if the veſſel be empty, they are leſs careful to conſider, what liquor they pour into it. It is too hard a task for any man to give rules, how to give, or how to take council; ſince affairs are ſo various, and particulars depend ſo much upon their circumſtances, no better rule can be given, than not to remove a preſent evil at the

price

price of a future laſting inconvenience; for it never fares well with thoſe Princes, who conceive, that an *Expedient* fills up the place of a council; for ſuch palliate cures are but temporary ſatisfactions, and bring a State into a friable or crumbling condition for nothing, which wounds the conſtituent parts of a government, or ſhakes its foundation, or transfers power from a Prince to any other order of men, is recompenced by any ingenious Expedients. *Belluarum eſt* (ſays Cicero) *vivere in diem, noſtra concilia ad ſempiternitatem tendunt.* Wiſe men foreſee remote conſequences, and weak men live from hand to mouth. Saluſt, like a wiſe Phyſician of State, diſcerned, how the Government fell into a hectick; *Ego* (ſays he) *ita comperi omnia Regna*, &c. or I never obſerved Kingdom, City, or Nation long proſper, whoſe councils were not ſound; (or deep, or ſteddy:) for when partiality or favor, fear or pleaſure hath corrupted counſel, wealth firſt decays, then empire weakens, then follows change of Government, then ſervitude. Thus by the firſt ſtep the Government is weakned by it ſelf, afterwards it is fitted to be a prey unto a Forreigner. Great neceſſity therefore there is, that the pillars of Government be often ſurveyed; for it ſerves little to repair the pent-

The difference between an Expedient and a Council.

The declenſion of a State.

pent-houſes, if the beams of the houſe ſhrink.

Of the qualifications of a Councellor we have largely ſpoken already. The wiſe Chancellor Bacon makes the very modes of conſultation advance much the conſult, and ſo neglects not ſet times, place, as a Council-chamber, the figure of a council-board, whereby men may conveniently hear and be heard, that the ſtate of the queſtion or propoſition debated be put up in writing; leaſt Rhetorical ſpeeches loſe the queſtion, and ſo the reſolve differ from the matter firſt propoſed. He ſeems therefore to diſallow ſuch figures of ſpeech, as too popular, and unbecoming a Council-board, or looking upon eloquence and rhetorick, as too amuſing and deceitful, and not allowing it, but in order to remove from the mind of the auditors ſome prejudice they are prepoſſeſſed off; for, ſays he, ſometimes there is a neceſſity of a fomentation, or warm hand to chafe in the oyl; yet he likewiſe allows, ſo they will hold to the queſtion, that a matter may be debated, that is fit to be rejected, ſo it be in order to find out ſomewhat, that may be fit upon the firſt propoſition to be agreed unto; and he gives an ingenious, philoſophical, or chymical and logical illuſtration thereof, ſaying, *a negative*

tive is more pregnant of direction than an indefinite; as aſhes are more generative than duſt. Thus council ſhould neither be given nor taken in haſte; deliberation being eſſential thereunto, if the affair will any ways permit it; otherwiſe courage muſt ſupply council; for no fruit requires more time for ripeneſs, than doth council. Precipitation like the warmth of a chimney, that hath a tree behind it, makes the fruit forward and ſoft, but not mellow and well taſted. And thus it fares with all other matters; for a forced ripeneſs prejudices both a good taſte and nouriſhment. Council is no where better ſet forth than in *Eccleſiaſticus*, ch. 22. v. 16. and 17. *It ſettles the heart upon a thought of underſtanding*, (or weighs conſequences) *for*, ſays he, *as timber girt and bound together in a building cannot be looſed with ſhaking, ſo the heart, that is ſtabliſhed by adviſed council, ſhall fear at no time.*

Confederations. A principal work of Council is the deliberating about confederations, which are leagues made between ſeveral Soveraign Princes, independent one on the other. The law of human nature obliges all nations to be juſt and kind unto one another, ſo as when ever they have intercourſe with one another, they are ty'd unto each other by natural juſtice, as being of one kind

kind or ſpecies; ſo as though they never know one another, yet they are thus bound to one another, if ever they have intercourſe or commerce. And then all their leagues are but political reſults of natural juſtice and wiſdom: for juſtice examines the principles of their confederation, and wiſdom the end of it. viz. that it be really for reciprocal and mutual good, or that it be juſt in the beginning, and wiſe in the end. And thus from home-affairs we muſt now tranſport our ſelves unto forreign, and weigh thoſe things, which concern peace and war between ſeveral Nations. On which ſubject Grotius has erected an everlaſting monument: ſo as this ſmall and freſh ſtream is but to lead a Novice unto the mouth of the arm of that ſea.

Nations benefited thereby.

Nations ſtood in need of one anothers help, and were benefitted by one anothers aſſiſtance, and interchange of native commodities, as much as private men of one and the ſame Nation and City do of one anothers helps in their ſeveral trades and profeſſions; for reciprocal advantages are the grounds of all common ſocieties.

This

Treaties of Peace and War.

This is the root of all Treaties, viz. those of
1. peace or commerce.
2. war { offensive, defensive, } or both by { land & Sea.
3. and of all other constitutions, and agreements.

All Treaties depend on veracity and sincerity.

If veracity aud sincerity, and openness of dealing, and plain heartedness planted in man by his Creator, for the security of society, had not degenerated, and been vitiated by covetousness, ambition, envy, and self-love, the benefits of society had been the chief comforts of man's life, and the whole world had appeared, but as the Creator's great family. But now nighest relations being apt to deceive one another, it is no marvel, that forreign Treaties are for the most part deceitful; so as a modern, learned, and good States-man, the Lord Cherbury gives it for a rule, that in forreign Treaties, where a present advantage is but little, and a future great, it is the wisest thing to take the less, because too probably, before the time come about, wherein the future and greater advantage is to be reaped, the face of affairs may be so

ſo changed, that the ſtipulated future advantage will be loſt. I have forgot his words, but his ſenſe I think I have not altered. Somewhat muſt be in the matter, when Marcus Aurelius (I may ſay the beſt moral heathen Prince) allows in ſuch caſes a Prince to be *ἡμιπονηρὸς* or *ſemi-malus*; and as Cicero ſays, *Nec poſſunt aliter ii, quibus commiſſa eſt tota Reſpublica.* And yet this good man ſays in another place, *Ne quid inſidiosè, ne quid ſimulatè, ne quid fallaciter*: ſo as treachery and fallacy, and ſimulation are abſolutely rejected, whilſt diſſimulation or a concealing a matter, or uſing worldly prudence or diſguiſe ſeems allowable, becauſe unavoidable; for, ſays another, *Non regent, qui non tegent.* It is one thing, if a State be ſo fooliſh, like an Indian, to part with his gold for a bead, becauſe he is pleaſed with it, and another, if the Merchant ſhould aver, his bead was of an intrinſick value through the whole world with the others gold. Sure I am, injuſtice and breach of faith agrees not with humanity; leſs than will it ſquare with Chriſtianity; the root of man's miſery is in not daring to truſt himſelf unto the law of his own nature, and the providence of his Maker.

The difficulty of making and keeping leagues.

Equivocal words in Treaties have been very pleaſant to the palate of thoſe, that firſt

Equivocal words.

firſt gave them, but have been very bitter in the ſtomack afterwards. Charles the fifth for preſſing upon the Landgrave of Heſſe an expoſition, which ſuited not with the Duke of Saxe's promiſe to his Father-in-law, the Landgrave, (though Saxe was made Elector by the ſame Emperor) yet made ſuch a confederation againſt him, as drove the Emperor out of Germany.

If a Prince ignorantly or paſſionately wave the true intereſt of his Nation, or too ſtrongly ſtem the tide of his Peoples inclination, ſuch Treaties never laſt long; and yet a wiſe Prince may rather give way unto the torrent of ſome proſperous Prince, and bow to his fortune, than put matters to the hazard of a doubtful war. Thus ſuch as are drawn from their proper intereſt by an unavoidable neceſſity, are pardoned for making ſuch abrupt changes, or giving ſuch aſſiſtances, as Boccalini ſays, the ſmaller Princes of Italy were by Apollo; ſince men of their ſmall intereſt in the world, though it be an indecent thing, (ſays he) muſt chew their meat on both ſides their chops. Thus Italy did betwixt Charles the eighth and Ferdinand, and Charles the fifth and Francis the firſt. But it is the diſhonour of Chriſtianity that Treaties are ſo ſolemnly made, nay, and

ſworn

ſworn unto, and yet ſo eaſily broken, and ſo vilely by that high Prieſt, who pretends to be the Vicar of the man (nay, of the God) of truth, diſpenſed with. And therefore after all theſe ceremonies, ſometimes Princes are forced to give hoſtages, and in giving hoſtages, ſometimes we find a Prince rather abate of his natural affection, than prejudice his affairs of State. So as Francis the firſt choſe rather to give his Sons for hoſtages, than twelve of his principal Miniſters of State.

The difficulties that attend upon Treaties.

Hence it is, there is no profeſſion hath more need of artifices, than that of an Ambaſſador or Secretary of State. The very preliminaries to a Treaty have oftentimes as much picking work and thorny circumſtances, as the Treaty it ſelf; for when two Princes in difference are both weary of their diſtances or contention, and ſo both affected towards a reconciliation, ſome punctilio ariſes, how they may have a right intelligence, and yet neither ſeem forwarder to a peace than the other. For then a third Prince muſt make that to be an act of his good affection, which is a ſtrong deſire of them both; and he muſt make way for ſome Miniſter to be admitted by either Party *al' incognito*, and a Cardinal de Richelieu will have a Pere Joſeph, that ſhall turn the ſcale where-ever he comes.

comes. And in theſe diſguiſes the Popiſh Princes have more advantage than any Proteſtant, though they ſometimes find out a Soldier or a Merchant, that uſually frequented that Court, and ſo can perſonate a man of one profeſſion, and act, as of another. By ſuch clandeſtine means as theſe, a Treaty is often ended, before it's known to be begun; and then the real Ambaſſador is a man rather of pomp than of buſineſs. Nay, when Princes find the inconveniencies of former Treaties, as if it were by way of ſuper-fetation, they are kindling of a new Treaty before they are delivered of an old. Thus our Henry the eighth found the French and Spaniard proclaiming a league againſt him, when at the ſame time his Ambaſſador entred . . . . . to demand the performance of a former Treaty then in being. And Philip Comines lay at Venice to make a league for Lewis the eleventh with that State, when, whilſt he lay there, and perceived it not, the Venetians and Spaniards made a league againſt his Maſter. And ſo were the Venetians themſelves ſerved at Cambray, where moſt of the States of Chriſtendom united againſt them, and they diſcovered it not, but it was like to have proved very fatal and ruinous to them; and yet it is obſerved, that this grave and wiſe Nation uſually recover-

recover by Treaties of peace that which they often loſe by miſadventures of war; whilſt the ſame Comines gives the reverſe of this medal to us Engliſh men, when he ſays, *We were never happy in our quill, when it was made into a pen; but when the feather was fixt to an arrow.* The very manner of treating carries with it a great difficulty, and a Maſter of Ceremonies, who uſually is, and ought to be a man of good literature, as well as languages, hath a large province, even in adjuſting the ceremonies, that belong unto the Ambaſſadors, in relation to their Maſters, and in relation to other Princes Ambaſſadors, reſient upon the place. He that inſpects our Sir John Finett's obſervations or memorials, and Sir Charles Cotterell's explanations or additions thereunto, not publiſhed yet, and he that knew both the men, may juſtly ſay, they filled their places; and a late Hollander, Monſieur Wickefort, hath written a ſerious tract, and a neceſſary upon this ſubject, and of the priviledges of Ambaſſadors, as there are many more, who have written large and wiſe Tracts upon their offices.

When Princes begin Treaties themſelves by interviews, they are ſeldom (and yet ſometimes) proſperous; for one appears a comlier perſon than the other, or is

prompt in diſcourſe, more magnificent, leſs affable, or hath ſomewhat, which the other wants, which raiſes emulation or envy, or elſe their train diſagree, and breed ill will betwixt the Maſters: and yet Lewis the twelfth and Ferdinand of Arragon, and Charles the fifth and Pope Clement the ſeventh interviewed and parted fairly.

Great caution is to be uſed, how Princes entertain motions of Treaties, even by themſelves or by their Allies, whilſt they are in the heat of action; for thus Pope Julio the ſecond, under pretence of a Treaty with the Duke of Ferrara, chilled Lewis the twelfth, or diverted him from thoſe aſſiſtances, which he meant to give that Duke, upon ſuppoſal they would not have been needful. Therefore in ſuch conjunctures, it is more needful for Princes to ſtrengthen, than leſſen their forces.

Arbitration is ſometimes a uſeful, often a frivolous cement of peace; for after much time hath been ſpent therein, ſome pretty fetch will make the whole labour inſignificant; as when the Venetians delivered up their ſentence betwixt the Pope and Maximilian with a proviſo, that if both parties would not ratifie it, neither ſhould be obliged by it.

A Prince Arbitrator ought to be unbyaſt, and equal in judgment towards both; but to become a party, whilſt he is an Arbitrator, darkens his honour and his juſtice very much. And a Northern Prince lately paid dear for it, being driven out of all thoſe Countries, which his Predeceſſors had not long before by victories gained, and by Treaties had confirmed unto them, though the proſperity of the Prince, whoſe party they joyned themſelves unto, to his great honour (for there is nothing more honourable fot a Prince, than expencefully and hazardouſly to be concerned for an Ally) procured them a reſtitution of all, and yet removed not a dependance upon himſelf. How it will fare with that State, that in the apprehenſion they had of their own concerns, made and joyned themſelves to a declining Monarchy, (at leaſt declining in their vicinity) and in that attempt loſt almoſt all they had, and then upon the like politick conſideration, drew in other great Princes to ſuccor them, which entirely drew from them the whole power they lay ſubjugated unto; ſo as their overflown inland, like their ſea-coaſts, had that tide of fortune drawn from their low grounds, which ſoon overflowed their higher countries; how theſe will fare in neceſſitating the others, to make a very

diſadvantageous peace, time will manifeſt, not my ſpirit of propheſie foretel.

Trade. Trade or commerce is the off-ſpring of confederation, and flows from council, and is to be managed by juſtice, which is guided by religion. Thus religion is the foundation of all other pillars, and reaches to confederation and trade; for both confederation and trade require great care and judgment in making the articles concerning them, and religion in obſerving them: for Princes or States confederate for ſecurity, and trade for gain; ſo as trade is a moſt natural root for raiſing treaſure, as treaſure is a moſt natural food for arms. And this is the reaſon, why in erecting theſe pillars of Government, this order of placing them is obſerved. And indeed the pillars are but ſo many Profeſſins in a Comm on-weal, which have been touched on before, viz. The Divine, the Lawyer, Stateſman, the Merchant, the Monnoier, and the Soldier.

Trade is either { Home / or / Foreign.

Home

Home trade is of things men buy, becauſe they have need of them, or of things they ſell, becauſe they have plenty of them, and ſubſiſt by them. So as in Oeconomicks it's uſually ſaid, a Maſter of a family ſhould endeavor to make himſelf a ſeller, not a buyer, for uſually men buy to loſs, ſell to gain. *Home trade*

Forreign trade is but the ſame thing in a market more remote, and under the laws of another Soveraign. *Forreign trade.*

Every County at home and Country abroad abounds in ſome one commodity or other, which others want, for venting whereof they have proper markets and ſeaſons, which muſt be obſerved, or the gain of the trade is uſually loſt. The product and fruits of the earth are better in ſome places than in others; even by reaſon of the clime, or by reaſon of the huſbandry; and may be afforded cheaper from one part than another, by reaſon of the multitude of labourers or artiſts, and the little wages is given in one part of a Country in proportion to another, or by reaſon of the conveniency of carriage. The King lives by the field, as was ſaid before, therefore husbandry is to be as much cheriſhed, as any trade, for it breeds healthy and ſtrong men, and fit for arms, and ſo in an iſland Mariners ought to be a *The want in one place is the ground of trading with another.*

principal care of the State. Every Government hath an intereſt in the labours, and in the manner of labouring of their people, and therefore they are to be drawn off from ill cuſtoms; or from deceitful working, as the Iriſh were from fixing their plough to the horſe tail, or the Clothiers from ſo working their cloths, as they ſhrink too much, or over-tenter them, *&c.* Voiture or making carriage eaſie by cutting rivers, providing high-ways to be well kept and paſſable, nay, providing they be ſecure againſt the thieves, ought to be a care of the State, in relation even unto trade; for the induſtrious man muſt be ſecured by the State in his habitation, and in his paſſages from place to place with his commodity, leaſt the waſps and drones prey on the hive, and drive the bee from her induſtry; therefore eaſie pardons to thieves and highway-men is a deſtruction to trade. Monopolers are another ſort of thieves, for they impoſe what rates they pleaſe upon a neceſſary commodity, and rob the buyer as well as the labourer, whom they force to work at their own rates, when they have engroſſed a commodity into their own hands. A State muſt therefore ſecure the Subjects property, and endeavor to raiſe his induſtry, and to countenance his ingenuity in

The things which ſecure trade.

in any thing, that promotes trade, as framing engines, or any thing that furthers it. It muſt provide againſt the rich oppreſſing the poor Tradeſman, that too often muſt borrow, by not taking too great or biting uſury, or ſuch broakage as makes the poor laborious honeſt man or trader only work for the wealthy idle hard hearted perſon. It muſt give immunities, priviledges, and encouragements to all kind of induſtry. It muſt in ſome ſort force men to promote publick good; as to prohibit men not to turn their tillage too much into paſturage, for that will depopulate. It may require them to plant woods, and hemp, and flax, or what elſe may become materials for a manufactury; for where-ever there are moſt manufacturies, there will be moſt people; and a multitude of people is not only the honour of a Prince, and the ſecurity of his land, but his wealth. To look after confederacies of men of a trade, as the Grazier by combination not to impoſe prizes on the Butcher, nor the Butcher by arts and wiles, in taking moſt of the paſturage about a great market town, to cut the graſs under the Grazier's foot, or becoming of two trades, (or both Grazier and Butchers) or by confederacy of theſe two, both to ſet the dice on the buyer. The ſame

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we may ſay of Colliers and Wood-men, and ſuch other trades the Common-weal cannot be without; for a confederation among Tradeſmen muſt not enhance the prices on the Gentry and Nobility, as little as the Tradeſman muſt confederate againſt the Handycraftſman or Manufacturer.

Forreign trade.

All the former conſiderations, and many more than I can think of, belong to home trade. But forreign trade is more nighly to be conſidered, becauſe if that be not well ballanced, the profit runs to another Nation. Deceits of home trade impoveriſh particular men, but the treaſure remains in the Kingdom. Theſe have their inconveniencies great enough; for when parts are unequally ſtrong, the whole body is the weaker; for break the order of any thing, and you break its ſtrength; for here is not the overflowing of an humor, but the cutting of a joynt or limb. Unto the Soveraign therefore belongs the conſideration and regulation more immediately of this trade. He therefore makes leagues of commerce with forreign Princes; and Treaties of Maritime affairs, or how his ſubjects ſhall be uſed in trade, and on the ſea, and reciprocally, how he ſhall uſe others: therefore the ports of the ſea are his, that he may let in, and

Moſt immediatly belonging unto the Soveraign's care.

let

let out ſuch commodities only, as he finds benefits his People. The cuſtoms, impoſitions, and rates of commodities are ſet by him, and are alterable, that trade in general and particular commodities may be ballanced with thoſe carried out; for if the ſubjects of one Prince have his gain in trading eaten out by the impoſitions of the other, or if one Nation furniſhes commodities of neceſſity for the other, and the other for luxury for them, it's ſoon determined, who will gain by the trade, or who will eat out the other; and the ſubject is not to be truſted, though it be his own concern in this, but reſtrained, becauſe few men will avoid thoſe expences, which gratifie their luſts. Our French trade for wines, our Canary trade, which formerly was driven by commodities, and now by money, and ſo our trade to Zant for currans demonſtrates this. It is not ſo with our India trade: though we carry out even gold and ſilver for it, becauſe our revending thoſe commodities in other parts brings us as much back in ſpecie, or bills of exchange. Trade therefore is not to be cheriſhed, as it enriches the Merchant, or as it increaſes the Soveraign's revenue, but as it brings wealth (and a wealth that will remain and ſtay amongſt us) unto the Nation, or as it paſſes into the

What is a thriving trade to a nation.

the habit of the body, not ſtrengthens particularly the head or ſome member. The trade, that brings in more wealth to ſtay in the Kingdom, than it carries out, that which having repaid its charges, and leaves a ſurpluſage, that is, a thriving trade to a Nation, or that which brings into it treaſure, and no other; for neither Princes nor Merchants gain can compenſate the loſs of the Nations ſtock; that is properly called the overballance, which thus inriches the Nation.

Neither the nation nor civil men ſhould ingroſs trade, or work deceitfully.

There are few trades in any Nation, but ſome Forreigner is his rival in them; and therefore if one work his commodity deceitfully, and the other ſubſtantially (which the wearing will ſhew) the market will aſſuredly run to them. Nothing better ſecures trade, than the true manufacturing of its commodities. It is part therefore of the care of a State, that no perſon or company employ ill or raw workmen: for a pound of wooll, which may coſt ſix or eight pence, if it be well wrought, may be worth two ſhillings or half a crown; but if ill wrought, not ſcarce one. Beſides, when this is once diſcerned, the credit of the Nation, as well as of the manufactury decreaſes. He therefore rightly determined, that ſaid, *Better feed your poor, and let them be idle, than*

than permit them ſlightly to work any manufactury. Neither muſt the Merchant be permitted to adulterate or ſophiſticate his commodity. Nor ſhould any office be ſet up under pretence of viſiting the commodity, and diſcovering the abuſe, (as with us is the Aulnage) and exerciſes it ſelf in tolerating it; for it is pernicious, unleſs the true end of it be preſerved, and then it's of good uſe: for the publick not only in the diſhonour, but in the vent of the commodity pays dearly the price of ſuch a Patent. There are too too many more inſtances to be found; but I fell upon this, becauſe it wounds us in our chief ſtaple commodity. Our State ſhould be more careful of this than other States; for to our ſhame we muſt confeſs it, our Nation in its genius (at leaſt in individual perſons) is too much given to lazineſs, and to affect a ſudden gain and return, and not to affect publick works, or ſuch as require time to ripen; or ſuch as relate to poſterity, or ſuch as conduce to the honour of the Nation, and not preſent and perſonal profit. This humor the Phyſicians of our State, by laws and rules of Government, which ſhould be obeyed, ſhould purge out, and endeavour to raiſe a publick mindedneſs in particular men. If Holland had had this humor, it had never been

been rich, but their publick ſpirit, with their frugality and induſtry, hath made them valuable in the opinion of a Philoſopher, as well as conſiderable in the eye of the whole world.

Had they had our
- ſituation:
- many and ſafe harbors.
- ſhipping, of ſuch timber, and ſo well built.
- ſuch ſtaple commodities, as
  - Cloths, Stuffs, Bays, *&c.*
  - Tin, Lead, and Leather.
  - Corn, Fiſhing, Saffron: or,
- ſuch means to have made free ports or magazines for all Nations upon ſmall cuſtoms to have waited for their markets:

too too probably they would have eat us out of our Trade; as we, for theſe laſt two Kings (the Fathers and the Sons) great care and encouragement of Trade, and by many worthy, knowing, and wealthy Merchants, who have corrected much of our ill National genius, have born up with, and overborn them therein: for the trade of England is great and highly valuable; for few rightly conſider, how many live on the land by thoſe few, who ſwim on the ſea. How many Factories are employed about building but one ſhip? The Timber Merchant, the Ironmonger, the Carpenter, the Smith, the Ropemaker, *&c.* Navigation begets many manufacturies, and

The advantages of trade, manufacturies, and ſhipping.

and is not only a wealth but a ſecurity unto a Nation: for the plough or keel at ſea breeds as many luſty Lads, and more daring, than thoſe at land. It's a part of the care and wiſdom of a State, that their ſubjects be bred laborioufly; eſpecially the poor Lads, that are put out to apprentiſhips, by the charity of Pariſhes, that they be kept to the plough, or to the keel, and not made Footboys, or idle Tapſters, *&c.* or multiply ſmall trades, *&c.* I believe the preſent great King of the world, who had never been conſiderable at ſea, but as he fomented jealouſies betwixt us and Holland, who like the acorn, covered his firſt growth under this ſhrub, till he thruſt out his head above it, and then dropt ſo faſt, that he by his own power and ours (craftily managed) endangered both of us: I ſay, I believe he had never affected to have been an Eaſt and Weſt Indian Merchant, but as he foreſaw with old Rome, in vain it was to affect the univerſal European land (or Monarchy) without he became conſiderable at Sea. So as though he ſails unto both Indies, yet thereby he hopes to fall upon Holland and England. Nor had he become conſiderable, but as the jealouſies of Holland towards us ſhrowded him, till he thruſt forth a top, that will ſhade us both, unleſs we hold a ſtricter

Navigation too likely to ſet up the greatneſs of France.

ſtricter correſpondence and confidence in each other, than hitherto we have done: and we have ſufficiently ſmarted for the deceitful aſſiſtance he gave us, and they, by the invaſion he made upon them, may think, what he then regorged, he may hereafter retain. But he that ſets bounds to the ſea, can to his proſperity; otherwiſe, humanly ſpeaking, and conſidering his policies to divide confederates, and the untempered mortar they have to hold themſelves together, we may propheſie hard things without the ſpirit of propheſie. But upon this ſubject of Navigation, he came ſo ſtrongly into my phancy, that I could not decline the folly of ſaying thus much, becauſe of the future danger.

But to revert to our proper ſubject matter, trade. No nation can be great or rich, that abounds not in ſome part of his dominions in ſhipping, or who neglects trade, and who hath not in his own dominions, or imports not materials for manufacturies. Yet it is no policy to think to engroſs it, or be monarchs of it, as Holland hath for a time affected and purſued that *ſea-monarchy*, as eagerly as Charles the fifth, or Francis the firſt did the *land-monarchy*: but it is wiſdom to divide the profit with neighbour Nations amicably. We throve not, when we could not content

our

our ſelves with the manufactory of our cloths, but muſt prohibit the tranſporting white and undy'd. Merchandizing, like the ſea ſhore, is made ſmooth and even both among our ſelves and Forreigners, not by governing all parts of it by Companies, or wholly excluding Neighbours. Companies for home and nigh trades are not very advantagious. They are always of moſt uſe, when they exclude no private traders; and yet they cannot ſubſiſt, if all Interlopers be under no reſtraint; therefore it may be well thought, that no man ſhould be permitted freely to trade, where Companies are erected, but under the regulation of that Company, nor that Company make ſuch chargeable by-laws, as ſhould diſcourage young and free traders; therefore Companies may by a Council of State or Parliaments be well countenanced, if regulated; ſo as they ſhould admit private Traders upon ſuch rules, as the Council of State, not themſelves, ſhould ſet down as equal betwixt both. Two Companies we have, viz. that of the Eaſt-Indies, and the Turky, which trades would ſoon fall to irreparable diſorder, if they were not ſupported by ſuch pillars. The great covetous rapacious Stateſmen in either of theſe Countries and places, would ſoon daſh private Merchants

Companies, or trade managed by them under a regulation.

againſt one another, and one Nations bribes would eat their Neighbours out, if the wiſdom of ſuch ſocieties prevented it not.

The Eaſt-India Company in Holland is a little monarchy, Amſterdam hath a half, Middlebrough and Zealand a fourth, Horn and Enchuyſen a ſixth, and the ſmall remain we may ſay ſerves to gratifie ſuch interloping perſons or places, as they will admit of. The ſoveraignty of this trade is in the States General, who renew the Charter upon a conſiderable fine to this Company, uſually once in ——years.

Had we not a trade in India, and a Company to govern that trade, the Pepper and Callicoes we bring home for nine pence would coſt us two ſhillings or half a crown, if brought us by the Hollanders. And this is proved too clearly unto us, by the Spice trade they have engroſſed, and caſt us out of, at the price of ſo much infidelity and blood. And our Eaſt-India and Turky Ships, beſides the Mariners, wherewith they muſt be manned, are a great ſecurity to the Nation.

The ſtandard of Coin.

A Prince never loſes either in his revenue or trade, in keeping up the ſtandard of his money; for flutter as much as they will, all trade is reduced to the intrinſick value of the coyn. To cry it up in thoſe con-

conjunctures of time, when a Prince is to pay, and to decry it, when he is to receive, is a kind of robbing his own Bankers or Subjects; but it is a ſhort liv'd policy, and Strangers will retort it upon himſelf. But nothing can be more fatal to a State, than to break aſſignments made on publick faith. It muſt be the child of ſome ſuch folly I would not deſcribe. It looks like the deſpair of ſome young Gamſter, that ſets all he is worth upon one hazard.

To get advantages by exchanges of money, and bills of credit is a politick prudence; for if France overballance us in their particular trade, they will get by us likewiſe in their exchange of money. Which concerns Ambaſſadors and Gentlemen travevelling as well as Merchants to obſerve. *Exchange of money or bills.*

Government is upheld by treaſure, and therefore treaſure hath many ſwoln titles given to it, as that it is the ſinew both of war and peace, the ornament of the one, and the ſtrength of the other; or the organ of motion and action unto both. Neither greatneſs, nor honour, nor ſecurity will be maintained without it. It is like food unto the body, when it fails, ſtrength ſoon doth ſo, and weakneſs appears: for, ſays Tacitus, *Diminutionem* *Treaſure.*

imperii doces, ſi fructus, quibus Reſpublica ſuſtinetur, diminuantur. If neither family nor city can be maintained without it, much leſs ſoveraignty over a whole people. The father of every family, the chief Magiſtrate of every town muſt in his perſon, attendance, habitation, and dyet, appear diſtinguiſhable from others by thoſe ſenſible enſigns of honour, which beget awe and reverence. Princes therefore were Lords paramount of the land they governed, which made the Kings of Iſrael ſo great Herdſmen, and to have occaſion of ſo many men to reap their harveſt. Not only William the Conqueror, but ſays Sir Edward Cooke, by the laws of King Alfred, the ancient Kings, who were Saxons, had all the Lands of England in demeaſnes. Princes therefore never more wounded their government, nor leſſened their reverence, than when they parted with their Patrimonial eſtates, and depended on ſubſidiary aids (even for their own ſubſiſtance) of their ſubjects; for that leſſened their honour, and raiſed the pride, and conſequently begot contumacy in their people; for it is natural for men to think, whom they freely give unto, they oblige; not conſidering, that the ſame duty belongs unto the Politick Body, as unto the Natural, where every member muſt ſend ſome-

Patrimonial.

Subſidiary.

ſomewhat unto that, which we call the habit of the body, (or the ſoveraignty) or elſe the members themſelves will dwindle away.

Prerogatives of Princes were a kind of treaſure to them: for Tenures and Services, Wardſhips, Purveyances, and Carriages, *&c.* were in nature of a revenue, and ſet forth their honour, eaſed their charge, and preſerved the dependancies of ſubjects on them. If we would look back into our own Hiſtory, and conſider how either the neglect, or ſome forced neceſſity, or ſome falſe policy have wrung theſe from our Princes, we may diſcern in a great meaſure our own preſent diſtempers. The Conqueror brought in with him great and independent Lords, rather as aſſiſtants than ſubjects; or as men to divide the prey with him; and therefore unto many of theſe, he gave large territories, with that, which the French call *Baſſe Juſtice*; ſo as their Tenants depended in a manner as much on them, as they did on the King, as Lord paramount. This bred the Barons wars; for though the Barons would tyrannize over their vaſſals, yet they agreed, the ſoveraign Prince muſt be made as weak and limited, as poſſibly they could. Then to weaken this crown, unfortunately riſes a diſpute of Regal title,

Prerogatives a kind of treaſure.

Lords aſſiſtant to the Conqueror.

Barons wars.

The diſpute of title betwixt the two Royal families.

even in the Royal family, and the red Roſe and the white become enſigns of a long and bloody civil war. And as men took part with either of theſe, upon ſucceſſes, they were to be rewarded, and by the various changes the crown, even by its proſperities, was rather weakned than ſtrengthened. Theſe Lay-quarrels begat a harveſt for the then ambitious and gripple Clergy: ſo as the Crown both by its Lords Spiritual and Temporal was in a great meaſure lorded over. This made

Henry 7.

that deep ſighted Prince, Henry the ſeventh, (brought to the crown by theſe Powers, who vindicated his Wife's title from an uſurping and bloody Uncle, Richard the third) to dread even that power, that had ſet him up, and ſo as ſubtilly as he could, by cheriſhing the Commons againſt them, to undermine it: and he foreſeeing the neceſſity of treaſure to ſtrengthen the crown, grew a legal Tyrant. For he then ſhewed the ſubject, what a ſevere rod the penalties of neceſſary and wholſome laws were in the hands of the Prince, if uſed without clemency. And could he have renewed his age, or that his long raign had been by time doubled, moſt probably he would have made

Henry 8.

the crown a ſubſtantive. His ſon Henry the eighth, though he was of as great underſtand-

derſtanding and greater literature, yet not being equal in King-craft, but tranſported with vanity and popular glory, whether by accident and paſſion (which abounded in him) or by deſign, it is unknown; he fell upon the State Spiritual, as his Father had done on the Temporal, and with more violence ſhook their greatneſs, and invaded their revenues in the Abbots or the Monaſteries and Convents, which had he converted to the maintenance of the crown, as he did by profuſely giving away their Lands, unto the maintenance of the acts he had done, or in caſting off Papal ſupremacy: the Father and the Son, we may probably ſay, would have made the crown for ever ſtood leſs in need of the ſubjects extraordinary ſupplies, which are ſeldom free bounties, but often hard bargains through the diminution of prerogative. The ſucceeding Princes, the one a Minor, the other two under diſputable titles, becauſe condemned even by the Father, and that in the heighth of his power, by the conſent of his two Houſes of Parliament; and the one of theſe Ladies being to reſtore the religion ejected, and the other to replant that, which was before ſo excellently reformed, and the next Succeſſor being a learned and pacifick Prince, and withal addicted much to eaſe and

Edward 6.
Q. Mary.
Q. Eliſabeth.
K. James.

pleaſure, and not a native but a forreigner. All theſe concuſſions caſt the crown, as we may ſay, chiefly into the hands of the Commons, the third State of this Realm; and the Lords, who were blinded with the hope of an Ariſtocracy, or at leaſt ſome addition of power, which they ſeemed now to want, ſo joyned with the Commons, as that the uſual failures of Go-
Charles 1. vernment in Charles the firſt's time became the overthrow both of King and Lords. Such is the deſtructive torrent of Populacy; and ſuch are the ſad conſequences of Princes negligently parting with their own patrimonial revenues, and as unadviſedly, for a temporary ſupply, diveſting themſelves of thoſe prerogatives, which ſerve both for their own and ſubjects ſecurity. And ſuch is the degeneracy of Nobility, that when ſervilely they have ſerved *to pull down the crown*, they have for their reward a vote of being an *uſeleſs State*.

Thus we ſee a State loſes its health and ſtrength by affecting ſome unwholſom diet; but it is an irrational thing in a Subject to expect ſafety and protection, and yet to have an unwillingneſs in a Deſpotical Government, as France is almoſt now, arbitrarily to be taxed, (for that unwillingneſs or ſullen murmuring doth but beget

get a ſharper tyranny) or in a limited and mixt Monarchy, as England is, to be ever ſelling their aids; for that is but crumbling the power of Soveraignty, and often making it more ſevere to the Subject in the hand of ſome inferiors. For as no Government can want an arbitrary power, ſo this is moſt ſeverely executed, where it is done by a numerous and inferior body. Witneſs the long Parliament of 1640. when taxes were ſo multiplied, and various charges laid on the Subject (which Tacitus obſerves and calls, *varia prædandi vocabula*) that we had *monthly taxes, contributions, loanes, fifth and twentieth parts, new ordinances for weekly taxes for the Britiſh army in Ireland, for reducing Oxford,* (the Sanctuary and place of the Kings reſidence) *diſtinct taxes for an Eaſtern and Weſtern Aſſociation, and for particular places, as Newark,* &c. and for *buying in* and (as we may call it) *ſelling, or ſending out the Scotch army.* I dare not look forward, but I pray unto Providence to divert real provocations, if imaginary or light could bring on us ſo much miſery, and that thoſe whom it concerns, may conſider how much treaſure they have ſpent of the Nations (beſides other ſad conſequences) by their impatience, and not freely giving a little, when a little would have ſerved, as all King Charles

the

the firſt's time it would have done. What it coſt afterwards, through the whole Parliamentary Reign or Protectorſhip, the before-mentioned taxes are proof enough.

I that vent rather ſtrong deſires and wiſhes than write Politicks, would be glad that the Crowns deſmeaſnes were both plentiful and unalienable, further than for a leaſe of 40 or 50 years, to reward deſerving Miniſters of State, and good Servants; for thô there muſt be an overflow for ſome Favorites, (for Princes are but men) yet thoſe fall not under my thoughts to provide for, but that the magnificence and ſplendor of a Court, and the hoſpitality of a Houſhold, and the ordinary and neceſſary expences of Guards, Garriſons, and ſtanding and uſual Navies, for the defence of the Channel, or conduct of the Merchant, ſhould not be precarious, probably would conduce more unto the ſafety and peace of the Nation, and proſperity of the Subject, than unto the Princes; but this is not fit for me to deſcant upon. I would never rob the people by the plenty of a Princes conſtant revenue, of having the means of ſhewing their good affection and loyalty by their bounty to their Prince; for it is an evidence they are under a free Government, that they are not neceſſitated to give, as it is an evidence that

that they are under an unſafe Government, that the Prince muſt be often forced, for the neceſſary expences of the Government, to depend on the good-will or humour of his People; for theſe have their viciſſitudes. *Res anguſta domi* will make a Prince often ſo jealous of his affairs at home, that he will not dare to ſeek occaſion to promote them abroad. I ſhall harp too often upon that ſtring; but I believe neither French nor Dutch had been able to have changed the ballance of Chriſtendom (as notoriouſly it is ſince) if ſuch a good intelligence as I wiſh, had been kept betwixt the Prince and his three Eſtates. What 100000*l.* *per annum* would have done in thoſe days in reſpect of military expences, 500000*l.* will not do now; and I believe our Neighbors feel it as well as our ſelves.

Home taxes or ſubſidies, freely and voluntarily given in Parliament, are the fitteſt ſupports for all extraordinary expences; but then theſe ſhould be endeavoured to be laid equally; for *Livie* calls a Dooms-day book (or equal tax) *res ſaluberrima, magno futura imperio,* and it is much better for a Prince, that his Nobles and Commons ſhould give, or lay the tax, by virtue of their liberty, than he receive or take it by virtue of his own Prerogative. For, ſays Chancellor Bacon, there is a great diffe-

rence

rence betwixt a tax raiſed or given by the Repreſentatives of the People, and one taken by the abſoluteneſs of the Prince; for thô it be all one in the purſe, yet it is divers in the payment; or it works diverſly on the courage and affections of the People. One needs Themiſtocles's two Goddeſſes to raiſe it, power and perſwaſion, the other diſputes it, or would caſt it off, by two as forcible Goddeſſes, neceſſity and poverty.

Arms. Arms is as conſiderable and neceſſary a pillar of Government, as any of the former, and I have caſt it in the laſt place, becauſe if men would be juſt, it would be unneceſſary; for the primary laws of juſtice are built or implanted in ſincere nature, and are ſufficient for the diſcharge of all publick and reciprocal duties, if they were obſerved. But arms or force are but ſecondary inſtruments of juſtice, and are grounded upon depraved nature; for they are never to be uſed, but when the Government cannot reduce the Governed unto the obedience of juſtice, but by them. We uſually therefore ſay, they are properly to determine the controverſies of beaſts, not men; ſo as among men there ought to be no recourſe unto one, until the other is diſobeyed; for force is rightly termed *ultima ratio Regum*, or the laſt thing

a Prince ſhould make uſe of. This is the iraſcible faculty in the ſoul of Government; or that which reſiſts the ataxia or diſorder in the politick Body, or in ſome member of it; or which gains that by fear, which ought to have been performed by love.

This is that, which fortifies juſtice at home, by ſeeing executed the penalties of the Laws, the proceſs of the ſeveral Courts, and their ſentences and judgments upon the caſes before them, whether thoſe ſentences be capital, pecuniary, or corporal. This is that, which is to reduce the refractory to the common juſtice and laws of the land, to quell inſurrections, and to ſuppreſs rebellions. And when diſobedience comes to any of theſe heights, every Court of juſtice hath its proper officers to ſee its ſentences and decrees executed; ſo in caſes of riot, or contumacy backt by numbers, an obligation lies upon a whole County, by the *Poſſe Comitatus* or power of that County, which the Sheriff hath the conduct of, to ſubdue ſuch perſons. And in caſes of rebellion or inſurrections at home, or invaſion of Forreigners from abroad, every ſubject is bound to repreſs the ſame at the hazard of his life.

At home.

Rebellion, tho' it bring on a civil war, is not properly a war.

Arms are the proper inſtruments of war, but inſurrection or rebellion of Subjects is not

not properly to be called a war, tho' it be a uſe of force; for war muſt be made amongſt equals, which no perſons, nor order of ſubjects can be to their Soveraign, as hath been proved already. So as all well conſtituted Governments reject co-ordination as the diſtracter of all obedience, and the juſtification of a civil war; therefore the reſiſtance of Subjects is rebellion, not war. Yet becauſe ſometimes the Rebels power is equal with the Princes, ſuch conteſts have got the name of a civil war.

Civil war. This, of all wars, is moſt deteſtable, and it muſt needs be hateful, where victory it ſelf is odious, and where cruelty is exerciſed upon conſanguinity and affinity, or nigheſt relations. So as Lucan expreſſes it well, when he ſays, *Bella ..... nullos habitura triumphos.*

Remedies on the ſubjects part againſt a Civil war. It is much better to give remedies how to prevent it, than rules how to manage it.

Remedies on the Subjects part are, to remember they are born under ſubjection, and are required of God to be ſubject, and to pay paſſive obedience, where they cannot active; therefore to be careful not to multiply grievances by inferences, or to think all will befall them that may, and to conſider, that it is very often impatience under

under ſmall grievances, that throws them into the ſufferance of greater. Let the multitude or vulgars conſider, without their many hands no great changes or turmoils could be made; and let other well-meaning men reflect, how often they are made properties of by cunning Deſigners and Diſturbers of a well ſettled Government, whoſe abilities ſerve only to create a miſunderſtanding between King and People, and to manage the diſcontent of the ſubject to their own advantage, and to ſet forth all the failures of a Prince only to cloud the ill conſequences of their own innovations, knowing, if they can diſturb the ſettled Government, a People cannot be long without one, and then they, that have been acceptable for the ſervice in pulling down a building, are like to be employed in that, which is to be ſet up. This might keep the ſilly fiſh from too greedily ſwallowing the bait, which will draw him out of his own proper element. The beſt Hiſtorian deſcribes theſe diſturbers very naturally, when he ſays, *Honores, quos quietâ Republica deſperant, perturbatâ conſequi arbitrantur.* And thus the name of *Liberty* hath very often through the affecting changes brought the ſubject in general into ſervitude. The ſobereſt and wiſeſt men therefore muſt not be beguiled herein by indiffe-

The hope of Innovators.

indifferency, as are the multitude through giddineſs, and the well-meaning through not diſcerning conſequences to hearken to changes. All theſe being often taken in the common ſnare of Innovators; for there being ſeldom ſuch a happy conjuncture of a State, but that ſomewhat is to be juſtly condoled, tho' at the ſame time the condition of the Subject is in the general very much to be thank't God for. Neuters defer their appearance in behalf of the Government ſo long, that when they would recover it they cannot, for the malignity of this humor ſoon infects the maſs of blood, and then theſe men either engage unſeaſonably, and ſo loſe themſelves and fortunes, or are lookt upon by the Innovator as ſuſpected perſons, and ſo undergo an equal load with thoſe, who worthily and ſtoutly from the beginning withſtand the innovation. Cicero's letters to Pomponius Atticus, and Atticus's life, and Chancellor de Vaire (who lived in Paris in the time of the French league in Henry the thirds time, and Sir Walter Rawleigh upon ſuch a conjuncture, when the Romans and Carthaginians both ſtrove for Sicily) are parts of Story fit to be conſulted, to know how a man ſhould demean himſelf in ſuch times; which will reſolve it ſelf into this, that men ſhould timely aſſiſt the ſettled

Govern-

Government, as obliged thereunto, and rather hope in a change of what is amiſs from the erring legal Governors, than expect remedies in the ſtate of the Publick by ſuch, who fly to arms to work reformation. The leaſt any man can do in ſuch a conjuncture, is with Pomponius Atticus, who took arms with neither ſide, yet owned Pompey, tho' not diſobliging Cæſar, or rather with Cato, tho' he ſuſpected Pompeys greatneſs, yet engaged with him, who engaged for the preſent ſtate of Government. But whoever takes offices or charge with the Innovators, and thereby promotes their affairs, as Sir Walter Rawleigh concludes, may be reckoned partakers of their crime. It borders too nigh guilt, to let even the conſideration of a mans own perſon (I mean an eminent mans) or family, to ſway him ſo much, as to lead him dully to be paſſive in ſuch a conjuncture; but it ſtains both, when the world knows his judgment is one thing, and his practice another; for there is a time, when a man may ſay, Providence calls to Civil martyrdom, which is often in defending the ſettled ſtate, never by Civil war in changing it.

Remedies on the Prince's part.

Remedies on the Princes part are, ever to be watchful, that his courſe of life and councels be not ſuch, as may make him

him unvaluable in the eyes of his ſubjects; that he be not found neceſſitous in his treaſure: for if in time of civil ſedition, he ſtand in need of money, in ſome ſort he ſtands at the courteſie of the ſubject, whoſe purſe and body both he ſhould not want at one time; for it was Nero's folly, that he ſtood moſt in need of the Subjects ſupplies, when he had moſt need to have eaſed them therein; for he that hath had no foreſight of contingencies, is the unreadilier aided. A Prince therefore ſhould never want a fit force, to keep himſelf from a ſurprizal, and a fit ſubſiſtance for ſome time for ſuch a body. And if he be but thus furniſhed, loyalty will keep them of his party, whom otherwiſe deſpair will drive from him; and falſe Brethren or Intelligencers will come over; eſpecially if the Prince's Miniſters be men of a good reputation, ſo as ſecurely intelligence may be held with them. And by ſuch means as theſe, diſcords may be raiſed among the rebellious, and they may be put upon ſuch raſh, or ſuch cautious councils, as may ruine them.

Arms in the Politicks, is like fortitude in the Morals; it is the guard and ſecurity of all the other virtues. Civil juſtice grounded on, and managed by religion, is the ſoul of Government; but the inſepa-

rable

rable prerogatives of it are treaſure and arms; for theſe are properly the ſinews, that make the members of Government move. As Government is the ordinance of God, theſe three are inſeparable from ſoveraignty: therefore none can make laws, but with the Prince, nor raiſe treaſure, but for the Prince; for common reaſon ſhews, men are bound unto the defence of Government with life and fortune; but experience ſhews, when a corrupt degenerate man, (or men) whom Providence hath given ſoveraignty unto, have both the ſoul and body (as we may call it) of Government in his (or their) hands, or arbitrarily at his (or their) diſpoſe, unwholſome laws may be made, i. e. ſuch as are partial, or ricketed, ſwelling the head too big, or a hectick or preternatural heat of the Soveraignty (be it Monarchy or State) may draw ſtrength too faſt from the habit of the body; therefore divers mixt Governments reſerve a general conſent to accompany ſoveraign authority, both in making laws and raiſing moneys: (though in neither of theſe nothing can be done by any but the ſoveraign perſons thus aſſiſted.) But arms or the Militia of the Nation (to ſhew the danger of co-ordination) is every where ſingly in the Prince or State; ſince if any but the Soveraign hath the power of raiſing

the arms, they will be ſoon ſuppoſed to have the power of uſing them; and therefore no man, how loyal ſoever, even for the ſafety of the Prince's perſon, can raiſe arms without his commiſſion.

Theſe remarks may appear trivial and pedantick, yet for want of ſuch a foreſight, or ſome grains of ſuch a powder, I have ſeen the affairs of a great King in convulſive fits.

Thus much for arms, as they concern the civil adminiſtration of juſtice, and the repreſſion of rebellion at home, or as theſe being oppoſed by ſubjects, ariſe unto a civil war. Now we will conſider arms, as by them one equal (or who hath no authority over the other) endeavours to reduce the other unto juſtice, i. e. to obſerve thoſe laws of Nations which are binding either by the law of Nature or Nations, or which are obligatory by reaſon of ſome league or treaty of commerce, made between two Nations. Thus by the law of nature, even when both perſons are ſubjects, and under one and the ſame law, if one by a ſudden aſſault invade the other, ſo as he is in danger of life by him, and cannot have recourſe unto that law, by which both of them are to be judged, nature authorizes the aſſailed to uſe a counter-force againſt the aſſailant, and

Forreign war.

and to be his own juſticiar: (but this is but accidental, and may be properly called a natural authority to repel force by force; or is a private war.) But that which Grotius calls a publick war, is betwixt two equals, who are both Soveraigns, neither having juriſdiction over the other. Now all Soveraigns are equals, though the one be never ſo much inferior unto the other in territories, wealth, or ſtrength; for where Soveraignty is unequal in power, it is equal in right: and becauſe theſe may injure one another, therefore they have a right to exact juſtice by arms from one another, and this is that which we call publick war. The root of war thus ſpringing from injuſtice, or the luſts of men, it is no marvel, that the fruit is ſo barbarous and inhuman; and yet even this monſter, which is too often an offence againſt juſtice, cannot be managed but by juſtice; for Princes ought never to war one upon another, but upon a belief, that the ground of their war is juſt. Nay, they ought not to begin a war, until ſincerely they have endeavoured to obtain a ſatisfaction by way of peace. Humanity then obliges to avoid it, and neceſſity only warrants the undertaking it. Says Moſes therefore, *When thou goeſt to war, enquire of the Lord,* or go unto his Oracles or

Or publick war.

The root of this war ſprings from injuſtice of one ſide.

Yet the ground of it muſt be juſt.

Word, or thine own conſcience, and reflect, whether the occaſion of the war be juſt and lawful. Conſult not the pravity of human nature, which would lay land to land, or upon an unreaſonable fear, that others will invade thee, (which hath been the common, but improſperous practice of mankind, (as Mr. Hobbs phraſes it.) Anticipate not, or invade not another's power, who hath not wronged thee, for fear by that power, he may wrong thee, which, as Thucidides ſets forth, was ſuch a juſtifying argument amongſt the Athenians, who warranted themſelves therein, becauſe it was the practice of moſt men, as if it had been the wiſdom and rectitude of the nature of mankind, though they found both the Lacedemonians, and all their ſmaller Allies confederating againſt them, becauſe they made this their boundleſs ambition to be a child of juſtice. Since that could not be the off-ſpring of juſtice, which by more men than thoſe that uſed it, was complained of, as an axiom of injuſtice. Neither uſe thoſe modern Policies, which propoſe a forreign war, as a Scavingry of the ſurplus of the people. Nor let thy plenty ariſe out of others miſery, by keeping two neighbors in the calamity of war, that thou may'ſt enjoy the plenty of peace. But

above

above all, let not thy vanity or thy glory prevail to exerciſe thy ſtrength upon thy Neighbors, ſince it is not power, but juſtice, that makes a Prince truly glorious. True it is, the luxury of one Prince and the covetouſneſs of another State, may be ſcourged by the rapacity and vain-glory of a third; but God permits what he allows not, and Princes are innocent in the acts they do, not from the ſuitableneſs of their deeds with his pleaſure, but from the conformity of them to his law. Neither was one Prince to ſurprize another, but firſt to ſend his Herauld, and denounce hoſtility, and to uſe thoſe other ceremonies, which the uprightneſs of elder times obſerved, or condemned, when not obſerved. For ſince the lives and eſtates of ſo many innocent perſons are involved in a war, humanity requires, that if poſſibly it can, it be declined. Since the villainous nature hereof could not avoid the allowing frauds, ambuſhes, falſe intelligences, and many more ſtratagems; nay, knew not, how to avoid cruelties and inhumanities, and conflagrations, which in all other caſes would be abhorred; for the Soldier, like the Huntſman, was allowed his gin as well as his bow, and might corrupt his enemies men, as well as employ his own. All which is to be underſtood, *flagrante bello*;

Several conſiderations relating unto a war.

bello; for in times of truce and ceſſation of arms, there ought to be a great reſtraint upon the former liberty. Methinks, that God made it a great reſtraint upon the beſt and wiſeſt Princes, and even upon the moſt injured, not raſhly to run into a war; ſince conqueſt gave, or was the mother of a right even unto dominion; ſo hazardous it was even to vindicate an injury by this inhuman courſe; for ſucceſs did not always attend upon the beſt cauſe. And it is a great evidence a Prince had juſt thoughts, when he began his war, if he appeared apt to end it upon moderate and reaſonable conditions, or *ne victis quidem præter injuriæ licentiam eripere.* Neither doth he grant peace, that grants it not, till he hath ruined his enemy; for that is not, as the Hiſtorian ſays, *pacem dare*, but *ſolitudinem facere.* Among Chriſtians ſure I am, it ought to be begun upon great deliberation, and to be managed with tenderneſs and reluctance even upon the conſiderations of humanity. And ſince the event is ſo uncertain, Moſes's councel ſurely is very reaſonable, *When thou art to make a war, be ſure to keep thy ſelf from every wicked thing; for the Lord walketh in the midſt of the camp*; and keep it clean free from dung, that there may be ſalubrity of body and purity of mind.

Princes

Princes are to reaſon with themſelves, whether with 10000 they can meet with their enemy that hath 20000; or whether they be ſupplied by Confederates or Mercenaries; for both theſe are inſecure to depend on. For Confederates have moſt commonly ſeparate and ſingle intereſts of their own, and Mercenaries are without any affection or good will to the cauſe, having their eye only upon the pay, and that is very often dazled, when the enemy can give them a better. Beſides, as they have mercenary bodies, they too often have mercenary minds; for this ſort of men in any extremity (which is uſual to befal men in a ſtate of war) have not that virtue and generoſity to undergo the toil and hazard of their preſent condition; Beſides, this may give Princes caution, how they engage in a war, ſince their very proſperity creates them new enemies, and ſome neuter Prince riſes up in behalf of the conquered, and reduces all to ſome nighneſs of equality or ſtate, which the war at firſt was begun upon. If choice or neceſſity lead them to undertake a war, they can have no wiſer councel, than that which the Delphic Oracle gave unto the Lacedemonians, *viz.* carry it on with all their power, or rather to overdo than undergo it; for then there is no retreat without

out great loſs or great diſhonor; ſo as fitting preparations of all neceſſaries are not to be ſought for, when they are to be uſed; for that war is ſure to continue longeſt, that is leaſt provided for, when it is firſt begun. Nor muſt the Prince forwardly run into it, upon a probability of his enemies overſight, but upon a confidence of his own foreſight. Nor ſhould the confidence or forwardneſs of his councellors, (eſpecially if they have perceived in himſelf a ſtrong inclination to the engagement) lead him to think, he ſhall meet with a conſtancy of fervor; for difficulties and dangers (which are the conſtant companions of a war) in action change thoſe tempers of mind, which firſt appeared in councel. Safeſt therefore it is, and moſt commonly thoſe Princes thrive beſt in war, who foreſee, and are ableſt to digeſt improſperities. The Germans never thought the Romans invincible, till they found no ill ſucceſs or misfortune could daunt them. This ſpirit in the Athenians, after their great loſſes in Sicily, made the Lacedemonians and their Confederates, as much apprehend their ſtomachfulneſs, as they had before at any time apprehended their power.

Many

Many conſiderations therefore attend upon preparation for a war :

Viz.

Conſtituent parts of an army.

A well choſen experienc'd General.
Officers, who have taſted adverſe as well as good fortune.
Commiſſaries, Providores, Quartermaſters, and Engineers, Chyrurgeons ; all expert in their Offices.
Arms, Armour, Horſes, Carriages, Tents, and Artillery, not inferior to the enemies.
Treaſure, as much as any thing, for all theſe are neceſſary to inſpirit the

Common Soldier : ſince his fighting part is the leaſt part of his duty ; it is the fatigue, or the undergoing the neceſſary toil and labour, as much as the danger of his profeſſion, that makes him valuable. To march all day and be weary, and then to quarter in open field, be the weather never ſo ſtormy, and no ſooner in his quarters, but often finding an enemy to diſquiet him, or leaſt he ſhould do ſo, to be obliged unto a freſh labor, by raiſing up ſome works to ſecure the ſame ; theſe are the difficulties of his condition, and the unavoidable contingences of it ; and

and therefore, as he is to be choſen of an able body, ſo he is to be governed by a ſtrict diſcipline, that he may know it his duty to undergo theſe labours and dangers often with ſcarceneſs of food, and with a patience and obedience, that would become a Philoſopher. All which he uſually with cheerfulneſs undergoes, when he hath a confidence in his General, as being an experienc'd Commander, well vers'd in ſtratagems; when he finds his care prevents his own Officers from preying upon him, and defrauding him of his pay; for then he is willing to uſe his hands, and not to uſe his tongue; or to be ſilent in action, that he may the better receive his orders or words of command, when he finds his belly and his back carefully provided for. When he is to fight, if he obſerves his arms are as good as his enemies, and his ground as well choſen to fight on, at leaſt as well as the place will afford, and if his difficulties be great, if he perceive good reſerves to ſecond him, this begets that ſpirit of diſcipline, which is the true ſpirit of an army, and makes them willing to keep their juſt order and rank, and that with ſilence, that they may hearken to what orders are given them, which is the true ſtrength of an army; and if their pay be not wanting, their duty is ſeldom.

Men

Men may vulgarly diſcourſe, that a good army in an enemies country will maintain it ſelf, and ſo peradventure it may, if the General receive the ſpoils in order to diſtribute among the common Soldiers, or for raiſing their pay; or if by ſtrong parties he brings in ſufficient proviſion of food, or ammunition-bread into their camp; but it never fares worſe with an army, than when by ſmall parties (or ſtraglers) the common Soldier forrages and provides for himſelf; for then the ſpirit of diſcipline, and conſequently the ſtrength of the army ceaſes, and all advantagious opportunities for the enemy ſeem to begin.

Times there are, when fate and deſtiny ſeem plainly to be ſetting up one Nation, and pulling down another, as when ſucceſſes, and that in ſeveral places at one and the ſame time, and that under no promiſing circumſtances, attend on one Prince, and fail another, inſomuch as more is to be attributed unto Providence or good fortune, than unto conduct. Such conjunctures as a Prince cannot foreſee, yet when he diſcerns, may fitly lead him to be leſs obſtinate, for uſually ſuch proſperities are but like a torrent, which carry all before them, but e're long have their ebb; for fortune uſually lets no long leaſes,

ſes, and the greateſt potentates are but her Tenants at will.

Martial-law. Where-ever an Army marches, there is a neceſſity of Martial law; for this is a body of bruſh-wood, which one ſpark ſets on fire, and therefore needs ſuch an arbitrary power, we may ſay, rather to ſtifle by a ſudden ſuppreſſing it, than to extinguiſh it by water, or any formal means.

A veterane army; the uſe and the danger of it. Few kingdoms or places can be reckoned ſafe without ſome ſtanding veterane army; but this will ever influence the Civil Government; for though armies ſhould wait on laws, and execute upon diſobedience the civil decrees, yet the robuſt ſervant often endangers the weak eſtate of the Maſter. Rome was in an ill caſe, when this ſecret was diſcloſed, that a Prince could be made elſewhere than within her walls, or that too common Soldiers even within her walls could transfer her empire, and give her an Otho for a Galba. Thus the ſoveraign Perſon and Government hath been changed and endangered by her own Guards.

The concluſion. Having thus laid the foundation, that all civil power, and the Soveraign Perſons that execute it, are of divine ordinance, and that the prerogatives belonging to both, are in intuition of the peace and ſafety of the whole ſociety, and in honour and ſecurity

of

of the head of that Politick Body; and therefore that they are not to be reſiſted, but both power and perſon to be held ſacred, or ſo ſet apart, that the power in its preſcript or laws be indiſputable, and the perſon in the execution thereof unqueſtionable; we may ſay, here is firm ground to raiſe our pillars or vital principles of Government upon; and on theſe we may rear the roof of wiſdom's houſe, and aſſert, that honeſty is the beſt policy; ſince by the light of nature or common reaſon, it is agreed as *Epictetus* ſays, that *the Gods juſtly and wiſely adminiſter all things, and that they have ty'd children and ſubjects unto Parents and Princes, not as they are good, but as they are Parents and Princes*; and therefore for ſuch bleſſings men are more to depend on their providence, than their own choice or wiſdom. For remove Government and Governours from this divine ordinance, and the principles of Policy ſhall, like the atoms of Lucretius, make mankind of ſuch an unquiet nature, that he ſhall be governed by his ſenſitive appetites and preſent advantages, rather than by thoſe innate principles, which by the moral virtues of his mind, have fitted him to exerciſe his own goodneſs, and to bear with other mens (eſpecially Governors) failures, or vices, and rather to pray for a good Prince, than

reſiſt a bad. And the ſame virtues will teach Princes, that there are no ſuch policies, as thoſe that are ethical; others being but like the pleaſures of titillation, earneſtly ſought for or delightfully uſed, but ſoon repented of. Marcus Aurelius's fame will be deſireable by a thinking man, when Alexanders and Julius Cæſars will be eſteem'd worthleſs, and when Neroes and Caligula's will be found ignominious. And when the ambitions of Charles V. and Philip II. and Francis I. and the great Henry's and Lewis's are conſidered, it may be feared, that Aſia and Gentiliſme owe more thereunto, than doth Chriſtendom or Chriſtianity. Macchiavilian principles of policy there can be none ſteady, and yet there may be many proſperous, becauſe they look after the end and deſpiſe the means, and moſt unnaturally they do often make proſperous a vice, by the exerciſe of ſome ſeeming virtue, and thus by ſome immoral means, drive at ſome politick end; for *quocunq; modo rem* is their axiom. Such ſort of men as theſe think it no diſhonour, if they can ſweep the ſtake, tho' they be found playing with falſe dice. Nor have they any remorſe, that by treachery they have deceived their friend or benefactor. Nothing of all this is ſaid to make the Phyſicians of State ſo cautious,

cautious, as not to know how in composition of a cordial to make use of the serpents flesh; for a nice piety or a scrupulous policy (I think at least) is not expected, even by God himself, from men of this condition, without there were an assurance of a clear openness and integrity on the other part. Therefore Macchiavel and Tacitus, and men of that form, are excellent Authors to give caution, when they are dangerous Guides to follow. The honest man therefore is not the fool, for he can let live in his house the serpent, but not in his breast; and he can shake off animal policy, to entertain Ethical. He hath these mixt in his own compositum; for as in himself he is both animal and rational, so in his politick constitution he is made up of the serpent, or sensitive part, and the rational and dove-like. These are not to be kept apart in him, but he is to be compounded of; but the dove must be the soul of his policy.

If we would seek another topick to prove all this, we would have recourse to the whole Histories of the world; and through all of them we shall find, that those carnal policies, which are to corrupt mens councels, are very useful to be known, since it is as necessary for a Traveller to be well hatted, booted, and coated against

foul weather and ways, as to be well horsed, to carry him his direct road. But observe all Histories, and they do as Comedies do, (or at least should do) discover many treacheries and vices, but in their conclusion they make them improsperous, and give the reward to virtue. And this further light we may borrow from them, that both Greek and Roman, (and if the subtil wit of the one, and the courage of the other could not, or did not prevent it, no succeeding nations or times ever did or will attain it) who most opposed Monarchical Power, never attained their Idol liberty, by manacling of Monarchy. Disasterous it was to Athens, and it cost more blood, and interrupted more the prosperity of Rome than any thing else; for both Livie and Tacitus set forth, how when Kings abused their soveraignty, that people sought to find their liberty in two Consuls, to whom soveraign authority was necessary to be intrusted; and these (as no men living ever did, or could make their affairs ever prosperous) became soon not only to be complain'd of in improsperous times, but to be envied, when they had the most success; for inferiors (especially when they think they create their Superiors) never want their passion. So as the Consuls fell soon into their displeasure and

and jealouſie, and a ſhort liv'd *Decemviri* muſt rectifie (as they did diſorder) this ſtate of government, and the people, in whom the ſoveraign power was ſaid to be lodged, muſt be protected by Tribunes, choſen from the Commons, and then by Tribunes Military, that might give check unto the Conſulary authority. But all this was but a rolling of a ſick man in his bed, and the beſt medicin they ever took was a Dictator, who ſilenced all other powers, and ſingly exerciſed all power; ſo as here was Monarchy in its heighth or achme; for the Dictator was a Prince bound by no law, nor clogged with any partnerſhip, only it was temporary and ſhort-liv'd; which is proof enough, (thô extremity and neceſſity teach the doctrine) that all truſt is ſafelieſt lodged in one, and that failures in government will attend the beſt conſtitution of government, and that variety of changes are but ſo many infirmities of a ſtate, and at laſt ſo diſhearten all wiſe and good men, from depending on a populacy, that a Cinna or a Sylla, a Pompey, a Craſſus, or a Cæſar, will in a diſguiſe, (or by a barefac'd challenging it) at laſt ſo weary and weaken by civil diſcords the people, that they will rather chooſe the change of their condition with ſecurity, than endeavor to recover

their old pretended liberty with danger. It is the want of good eyes, or the weakneſs of the Optick nerve, that makes men not perceive the uſefulneſs of ſoveraign prerogatives, even in relation to the benefit and well governing of ſubjects. For the terror of power often keeps the State quiet and ſecure, when the belief of liberty breeds that irreverence unto the wiſdom of Governors, that they kindle thoſe ſparks of contumacy, which ſet all into a flame. Few men have learnt this leſſon, but thoſe, who have lived in times of civil diſtraction; and therefore the concluſion ſhall be, Government is an ordinance of God, whoſe wiſdom having deſigned men to live in ſociety, made politick, like natural, bodies, conſiſt of a head and divers members, lodging life in the body, and ſenſe and motion in the head; ſo as human laws, (grounded on ſound reaſon and adapted to the genius of the people, and unto the various publick and private concerns, and derived (as nigh as might be) from the moral virtues, or the equity of them by nature implanted in mankind) were like the ſalt in the natural body, which tied all parts together, by prudence promoting publick before private good or intereſt, and by juſtice preſerving the harmony of tenderneſs and beneficence communicated

nicated from the head, and of cheerful and ready obedience yielded from the body; and by patience, a moſt neceſſary and eminent virtue in this corrupted and laps'd ſtate of man, (like mortification, on which even religion her ſelf is now founded) each bearing the others infirmities; for without ſuch a temper the publick peace or health of ſtate is loſt. Unto which temper, O Lord, reſtore this poor giddy Nation.

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